Another Cosmopolitanism: A Critical Reconstruction of the Neo-Confucian Conception of *Tianxiaweigong* (天下爲公) in the Age of Global Risks*

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In this paper we would like to present the profile of ‘another’ cosmopolitanism through critical reconstruction of one of the core elements in Chinese political imaginary, the conception of *Tianxiaweigong* (天下爲公), which means literally: “All under the Heaven belongs to the public.” The first meaning of ‘another cosmopolitanism’ lies in the fact that it starts not from the main western tradition of cosmopolitanism, but from the tradition of Confucian political thoughts. However, it has a second, but more important meaning that is concerned with two deficits which the cosmopolitan publicness in the age of global risks should cope with; the “democratic deficit” and what we would like to call ‘ecological deficits’. The critical cosmopolitan project in the age of global risks needs to be reflective in dual senses to cope with both two deficits. The second meaning of ‘another cosmopolitanism’ lies in this critical cosmopolitan project.

So our method of critical reconstruction is for putting together these two meanings to create a critical Confucian cosmopolitanism in a hermeneutic circle. On the one hand, we will reconstruct the Confucian cosmopolitanism from the viewpoint of the critical cosmopolitanism, and on the other hand we will explore the potentials of Confucian cosmopolitanism for providing the model of reflective publicness in its dual senses which is necessary for critical cosmopolitanism.

We would like to proceed in the following way. First, we will present basic features of the cosmopolitanism implied in *Tianxiaweigong* and explain the reason why the reflective publicness in its dual senses is necessary for critical cosmopolitanism. Second, the grammar of Confucian cosmopolitan publicness contained in Neo-Confucian conception of

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Tianxiaweigong will be reconstructed. Third, we will discuss the three paths of reconstructing the Heavenly Principle in the name of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment, and, based on this reconstruction, will present the profile of the eco-democratic publicness as the critically reconstructed Neo-Confucian cosmopolitan order. Lastly, we will explain its reflective structure in its dual sense and explore its implication for our age of global risks.

**Keywords:** Tianxiaweigong (天下為公), Critical Confucian Cosmopolitanism, Grammar of the Neo-Confucian Cosmopolitan Publicness, Dialectic of Confucian Enlightenment, Ecological Deficit, Reflective Publicness in Its Dual Senses.

I. Introduction

As a result of globalization we are now witnessing the rapid increase both of global interdependence and global risks. Global financial crisis, terrorism, paradox of the humanitarian-military intervention, and global ecological risks including climate change and nuclear accidents show us clearly that we are living in the age of global risks (Beck 2009). So the demand of a global publicness (公共性) which is expected to be able to coordinate these global interactions and cope with the global risks comes up on the agenda not only of academic, but also of global political discussions. Meanwhile, however, it also has become clear that neither the old international law regime nor the global American hegemonic regime could satisfy this demand. Thus explode various cosmopolitan discourses in various areas to give an alternative answer to this question of new global order (Archibugi 2008, Beck 2006, Delanty 2012, Habermas 2014, Held 2010).

This paper also belongs to such discourses. In the following, however, we would like to present the profile of ‘another’ cosmopolitanism through critical reconstruction of one of the core elements in Chinese political imaginary, the conception of Tianxiaweigong (天下為公), which means literally: “All under the Heaven belongs to the public.” As is well known, Tianxiaweigong has never ceased to be the core Chinese political imaginary through China’s long history. It was not only the regulative idea of traditional Confucian politics, but also was the leading political idea of Sun Wen (1866-1925), the leader of the Xinhai Revolution (1911), the first democratic revolution in China that destroyed the last Confucian empire. The first meaning of ‘another
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Another cosmopolitanism lies in the fact that it starts not from the main western tradition of cosmopolitanism, but from the tradition of Confucian political thoughts. In short, it means Confucian cosmopolitanism. However, ‘another cosmopolitanism’ has a second, but more important meaning that is concerned with two deficits that the cosmopolitan publicness in the age of global risks should cope with. The first one is the well-known “democratic deficit” which refers to the fact that global institutions or organizations fall short of democratic principle of legitimacy (Habermas 2014). The second one is what we would like to call ecological deficit. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the critical cosmopolitan project in the age of global risks needs to be reflective in dual senses to cope with both two deficits. This is the second meaning of ‘another cosmopolitanism.’ In short, it means a critical cosmopolitanism, which is reflective in its dual senses.

Our method of critical reconstruction is for putting together these two meanings to create a critical Confucian cosmopolitanism in a hermeneutic circle. On the one hand, we will reconstruct the Confucian cosmopolitanism from the viewpoint of the critical cosmopolitanism, and on the other hand, we will explore the potentials of Confucian Cosmopolitanism for providing the model of reflective publicness in its dual senses, which is necessary for critical cosmopolitanism. To say in advance, this paper is not to present new historical information on Confucian cosmopolitanism, but to explore its grammatical potential for critical cosmopolitanism, which remains undeveloped.

We would like to proceed in the following way. First, we will present basic features of the cosmopolitanism implied in Tianxiaweigong and explain the reason why the reflective publicness in its dual senses is necessary for critical cosmopolitanism (II). Second, the grammar of Confucian cosmopolitan publicness contained in Neo-Confucian conception of Tianxiaweigong will be reconstructed (III). Third, we will discuss the three paths of reconstructing the Heavenly Principle in the name of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment, and, based on this reconstruction, will present the profile of the eco-democratic publicness as the critically reconstructed Neo-Confucian cosmopolitan order (IV). Lastly, we will explain its reflective structure in its dual sense and explore its implication for our age of global risks (V).

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1 The most widely known case of it may be Zhao Tingyang’s discourse, see Zhao, 2005, 2006, 2009.
II. Tianxiaweigong (天下為公) and Reflective Cosmopolitan Publicness in its dual senses.

When the term Tianxia (=All under the heaven) first appeared in the political scene during the Zhou dynasty, not only did it refer to the political-geographical world as the region of the political rule, but it also contained a conception of political legitimacy based on Tianming (天命, Mandate of Heaven) (Chang 2011, 30-31). This meant that a legitimate ruler who received the Mandate of Heaven governed a fair and public world. In this sense, Tianxia involved a horizon of the normative expectation on itself. This normative expectation was summed up by the conception of Tianxiaweigong, which is composed of the Tianxia as the politically constituted world and the heavenly publicness as the source of legitimacy. In it was implied a conception of the cosmopolitan publicness. Here Tianming mediates between Tianxia and the heavenly publicness, and functions as the normative criterion for both justifying and criticizing the Tianxia as the actual political world order. In this respect, the cosmopolitan publicness implied in Tianxiaweigong is neither the purely utopian moral idea irrespective of the actual world nor the real political world order without any transcending moment. Rather, as an immanent-transcendent publicness, it played a critical function in the actual political world. In this sense we can say that the cosmopolitanism implied in it has the characteristic of actual utopianism.

It has another feature concerning the relationship between the civilization and the cosmological order. First, Tianxia (天下) embraced not only human beings but also all non-human existences. Second, the Heavenly publicness which had the role of organizing and justifying Tianxia was derived from the cosmological order. In this sense, the cosmopolitan order of Tianxiaweigong is strongly coupled to cosmological order, something like a fish in the sea. In contrast to this, the cosmopolitan order of the Christian tradition was decoupled from nature in that here even nature is regarded as created by God and is ruled by the divine providence. While the western Christian civilization regards itself and natural order as the expression of the will of God, Confucian Civilization regards Tianxiaweigong and its understanding of nature as a mode in which the will and the self-understanding of great Nature is manifested. While in western tradition, civilization and nature are synthesized by God on the side of civilization, in Confucian tradition, they are synthesized by the nature. In this sense, Tianxiaweigong give us deep ecological inspirations (Tucker & Berthrong
We think that these two structural features of Confucian cosmopolitanism implied in *Tianxiaweigong* have important implications for reconstructing the reflective global publicness in its dual senses. Before we explore them, however, we would like to discuss about the reflective publicness which is necessary to deal with both the democratic and the ecological deficit.

Ulrich Beck differentiates global risks into three categories; economic crisis, terrorism and ecological risks (Beck 2002, 2006). They may be reclassified into two categories: the ecological risk and the socio-political risk, which includes economic crisis and terrorism. As we mentioned above, in the current regime of global governance we can find two deficits which correspond to these two categories of risk: the democratic deficit and what we would like to call ecological deficit.

The democratic deficit refers to the gap between the technocratic efficiency and the democratic legitimacy of global governance. The democratic legitimacy relies on the principle of identification; those who are subject to the intended or unintended effects of collective decisions and rules should be able to participate in the decision process and to be authors of the rules. The addressee of the collective decisions and rules should be at the same time the author of them. In almost all global institutions and organizations, however, this principle is denied. According to Habermas.

“For even if all members of a specific international organization were unimpeachable democracies, the kind of legitimation that the individual member states bring with them from home, as it were, is increasingly insufficient to justify decisions of the organization as a whole - and all the less so the closer the cooperation and the greater the invasiveness and relevance of their jointly concluded policies. From the perspective of the citizens of each of the national member states, there is an asymmetry between the limited authorization of their own national delegates and the scope of the compromises carried by all delegates in concert; for these joint decisions impinge on the citizens of all of the member states indiscriminately. To this is added another deficit. In contrast to the decisions of national cabinets that cover all policy fields, the agenda of functionally specialized organizations is confined to particular areas of responsibility in such a way that this narrow focus does not allow the undesirable external effects of decisions to be taken into account. For both of these reasons, a certain paternalism is built into the legal form of this kind of organized cooperation.” (Habermas 2014, 8)
If there were no change in this state of democratic deficits,

“A multiplication of the familiar kind of international organizations capable of coping with the increased need for regulation would merely aggravate the aforementioned legitimacy deficit. Technocratic regimes will continue to proliferate under the innocent title of ‘governance’ as long as sources of democratic legitimation are not tapped for supranational authorities as well.” (Habermas 2014, 8)

Now let’s turn to what we would like to call ‘ecological deficit.’ It is not simply reduced to the lack of due attentions to the coming catastrophic consequences of the various forms of ecological crises. It also includes the misrecognition of the political energy of “emancipatory catastrophism” (Beck 2014a), which might be understood as the driving forces of cosmopolitanization from below. To this kind of ecological deficit corresponds the tendency to conceptualize cosmopolitanism only in the axis of the relationship between the normative principle and the institution within the cosmopolitan community and to pay no due attention to the relationship between the cosmopolitan community and its ecological horizon. Finally, to this tendency in turn corresponds the ecological deficit of western civilization itself, which regards nature as being created by God, therefore, thinks that both nature and ecological risks could be in principle manipulated and controlled by human beings. It does not regard itself as a ship on the wavy ecological sea, but as a stable great land, which contains a calm ecological lake in itself.

Our age of global risks compels us to cope with both deficits. However, there seems to be some tensions even between critical approaches to cope with them because the success of the one does not result in automatically that of the other. For example, Habermas’ approach puts focus on coping with the democratic deficit. We could not help recognizing the important implications of his project of ‘constitutionalization of international law’ (Habermas 2014) for coping with not only the democratic, but also the ecological deficit. However, his project pays primary attention to the democratic legitimacy of collective decisions within the ship of cosmopolitan community, and does not pay due attention to the relationship between the ship and the wavy ecological sea on which it is floating. It seems that he does not bring to full consideration the fact that the global democratic publicness is embedded not in a stable land of life-world, but in the wavy ecological sea.

Beck’s project of the critical cosmopolitanism from below (Beck 2006) and his conception of ‘emancipatory catastrophism’ (Beck 2014) seems to be
useful to cope with ecological deficits. However, his project seems to be confronted with the contrary problems in relation to the task of coping with the democratic deficit. It is unclear in what institutional mechanism and in what normative principle we are to organize the political energy of emancipatory catastrophism into the direction of extending the global democratic publicness.

Our discussion shows that the cosmopolitan publicness coping with both the democratic and the ecological deficits is required to be reflective in dual senses. On the one hand, it should be reflective in such a way that the global publicness coping with the global risks may not injure the autonomy of both individual (world) citizen and the collective forms of life organized by nation state. We will call this democratic reflectivity because it is based on the democratic principle of identification of the addressee and author of collective decisions and rules. This reflectivity is ‘internal’ in its character because it operates within the cosmopolitan community. On the other hand, the cosmopolitan publicness should be reflexive in such a way that it can feel the effects of its decisions on the ecological sea in which it is floating. We will call this ecological and external reflexivity. In sum, the cosmopolitan publicness coping with both two deficits is required to have both democratic reflectivity and ecological reflexivity.

Such a requirement shows us why Confucian cosmopolitanism alone is not enough. It falls short of this criterion of the critical cosmopolitanism. However, this is not to deny the possibility of the critical Confucian cosmopolitanism. On the contrary we think that Tianxiaweigong, if properly reconstructed, could supply insights on the reflective grammar of the critical cosmopolitanism in our age of global risks.

III. Grammar of Confucian Cosmopolitan Publicness:
A Reconstruction of the Neo-Confucian conception of Tianxiaweigong (天下為公)

Though Tianxiaweigong continued to be the core of the Chinese political imaginary, it was only in the Neo-Confucian conception of it that the various dimensions of its publicness were differentiated and at the same time

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2 Zhao’s version of Confucian cosmopolitanism also falls short of this criterion of the critical cosmopolitanism. Concerning critical comments on his Confucian cosmopolitanism, see Chang, 2011; Carlson, 2011; Callahan, 2008.
internally related in such a way that a complex structure which we would like to call the grammar of Confucian publicness was formed. We think, therefore, this grammar may be understood as that of Neo-Confucian cosmopolitan publicness.

This grammar was formed as the result of the project of Confucian enlightenment politics in the Sung Dynasty, which became possible with the paradigm shift from the Mandate of Heaven (天命) to the Heavenly Principle (天理) (Park 2014). As is widely known, the Mandate of Heaven was the principle for legitimizing and criticizing political authority from the Zhou Dynasty. But the receiver of the Mandate was confined to the King, and there was no real separation between political power and its justifying principle. As a result, the Mandate of Heaven functioned rather as a legitimizing ideology than as the criticizing principle. In contrast to this, Neo-Confucianism expanded the Mandate addressee to all human beings. The first sentence of The Doctrine of the Mean, on which Neo-Confucian teachers placed particular emphasis, summed up this change: “The Mandate of Heaven is called Human Nature” (天命之謂性).

The legitimizing principle then no longer lay in the lineage of kingship, but was located in every human mind as the moral potential. Political power and moral principle of its legitimacy were now separated into distinct spheres. With this separation was launched the (Neo-)Confucian enlightenment politics that sought to actualize the separated moral demands of the Heavenly Principle (天理) in the ‘All under the Heaven’ (天下). In this sense, this project of Confucian enlightenment politics may be understood as the Neo-Confucian project to constitute Tianxia as the cosmopolitan public order.

This cosmopolitan order was composed of four dimensions of publicness which are internally connected with each other by the project of the Confucian enlightenment politics. The first one is the publicness of Heavenly Principle. Here we would like to limit ourselves to present some characteristics of it. When Neo-Confucian teachers interpreted the Heavenly Principle, they were used to referring to the famous sentence from Book of Change: “The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes the Way (Tao).” They understood Tao as the dynamic principle of the cosmological synthesis of vital forces, put in modern terms, as the principle of autopoietic process of cosmological life. In this sense the publicness of the Heavenly Principle was in essence a meta-biological and cosmological one (Park 2001).

The main characteristics of this cosmological publicness can be summed up as its openness, fairness, cosmological communication and sympathy.
Cheng Hao (1032-1085), one of the founding fathers of Neo-Confucianism, grasps this explicitly.

“The constant principle of heaven and Earth is that their mind is in all things, and yet they have no mind of their own. The constant principle of the sage is that his feelings are in accord with all creation and yet he has no feelings of his own.” (Chan 1963, 525)

“A book on medicine describes paralysis of the four limbs as absence of jen (不仁, Inhumanity). This is an excellent description. The man of jen regards Heaven and Earth and all things as one body. To him there is nothing that is not himself. Insofar as he recognizes all things as himself, can there be any limit to his humanity? If things are not parts of the self, naturally they have nothing to do with it. As in the cases paralysis of the four limbs, the vital force no longer penetrate, and therefore they are no longer parts of the self. Therefore, to be charitable and to assist all things is the foundation of a sage.” (Chan 1963, 530)

The first task of the Confucian cosmopolitan politics is to limit the arbitrariness of the sovereign power with the Heavenly Principle. How is it possible to control the arbitrariness at the center and summit of the bureaucratic state publicness organized by law, the second dimension of Confucian publicness? The publicness of the Heavenly Principle was the Neo-Confucian answer to this question, which after the Qin Dynasty (BC 221-BC 206) had been the central problem in Confucian politics characterized by the merging of Confucianism and Legalism (儒法結合).

Neo-Confucian enlightenment politics had also the positive task of actualizing the moral potential extended equally to all human beings by the Heavenly Principle; in other words, to implement the “publicness of the Heavenly Principle” socio-politically. Integrated with Confucian Minbon-politics, which reads the heavenly mind in people’s minds, this positive task was to be carried out in the sphere of people’s lives (民生) and opinions (民意).

The publicness that emerged from the actualization of the Heavenly Principle within the dimension of popular livelihood was based on the political ideal of the Great Harmony (大同). This third dimension of the Confucian publicness, combined with Confucius’ notion of justice may be

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3 This is also a Confucian method for solving the paradox of sovereignty. On the relationship of the paradox of sovereignty and Confucian politics, see Park, 2014.
termed ‘Minbon-publicness’ (民本的公共性), which means the ‘social justice’ or ‘social welfare’ in current terms. Its main task is to guarantee the material conditions for actualizing the potentials of the moral life which the Heavenly Principle accords equally to all human beings.

Here arise, however, important questions concerning Confucian enlightenment politics in general. In what procedure is this enlightenment politics deployed? How is it possible to identify the Heavenly Principle which remains unsaid, nevertheless, is to be actualized? How is it possible to read the heavenly mind in people’s minds? As a solution to these questions, Confucian politics invented the Confucian deliberative politics (公論政治), which had the task of justifying and criticizing political authority and actual politics based on a rational core of people’s opinions that was discovered and articulated through public deliberations. We call the publicness formed in connection with this task ‘deliberative publicness’ (熟議的公共性).

In sum, the publicness of the Heavenly Principle regulates the arbitrariness internal to the state-bureaucratic publicness and at the same time realizes itself by means of dual mechanisms of the Minbon- and the
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deliberative publicness. This is the grammar of Confucian publicness (Figure
1). As the idea of Tianxiaweigong developed into Neo-Confucian enlightenment politics with the paradigm shift from the Mandate of Heaven (天命) to the Heavenly Principle (天理), the embryonic structure of the cosmopolitan publicness contained in that idea also developed into this grammar of the Neo-Confucian cosmopolitan publicness.

IV. Dialectic of Confucian Enlightenment and Grammar of the Global Eco–Democratic Publicness

1) We assume that in this grammar reside many insights for configurations of the cosmopolitan publicness in the 21st century. We can find in it the normative orientation and terms that may be applied to the critical cosmopolitan project of our age. It would be, however, unreasonable to infer directly from this grammar the structure of the cosmopolitan publicness in the 21st century, especially the reflective structure of it, because this grammar was strongly restricted by the pre-modern social and intellectual conditions. This grammar, above all the Heavenly Principle, must first be critically reconstructed for its implications and inspirations to gain feasibility in the 21st century, just as the establishment of the Confucian grammar of publicness was possible with the shift from the Mandate of Heaven to the Heavenly Principle. To deal fully with this reconstruction, however, this would require a separate article, and such is not the purpose of the present one. Here we limit ourselves to showing briefly the possible paths of reconstructing the Heavenly Principle.4

The first point to be considered in this context is that though this reconstruction is not one of actual historical paths, nonetheless it is not an arbitrary one but a rational-critical reconstruction of the potential developmental paths latent in Confucian enlightenment politics. To express this point, we will call this reconstruction dialectic of Confucian enlightenment. This dialectic refers to the entire process in which the Heavenly Principle encounters -in the course of its social realization - social practices, whereby the Principle is pressured to change, and the reconstructed principle once again sets in motion politics of enlightenment, which results in a new grammar of Tianxiaweigong. Additionally, it is because this dialectic is

4 About the nature of the Heavenly Principle, its problems, and the general direction of its critical reconstruction, see Park, 2001.
compelled to begin by nothing other than by Confucian enlightenment politics that we regard it as the rational-critical reconstruction of the potential developmental paths of neo-Confucian *Tianxiaweigon*.

Furthermore, this reconstruction can be supported by Confucius' own thoughts. The Master said: “It is human beings who are able to broaden the Way, not the Way that broadens the human beings.” This thesis has two implications. First, if human beings are to broaden the Way, it must be located in human practice, not outside of it. Therefore, it is not enough for the Heavenly Principle to be realized in the society. It should be transferred from Heaven to social practices and be reconstructed from within them. In this sense, a critical reconstruction of the Heavenly Principle is to be understood not as a deviation from, but as a critical return to Confucius' thoughts itself. Second, if the Way is broadened by human beings, this can be understood as the expression and results of their autonomy. It means that the dialectic Confucian enlightenment is oriented to the expansion of human autonomy. Now let’s explore the paths of this dialect and the meaning of their results.

2) The critical reconstruction of the Heavenly Principle and the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment could be carried out in three paths. The first one is the materialistic path (Park 2014, 156-160), in which the Heavenly Principle is reconstructed from within the productive and reproductive social activity in the dimension of the *Minbon*-publicness. Historically, one of the most clear signs of this path appeared in Tai Chen’s concept of *jen* (Humanity, 仁). Tai Chen (戴震: 1723-77) said:

“To desire to preserve and fulfill one’s own life and also to reserve and fulfill the lives of others is *jen* (humanity). To desire to preserve and fulfill one’s own life to the point destroying the lives of others without any regards is the absence of *jen* (inhumanity: 不仁)”

As we have said before, Neo-Confucians understood *jen* (Humanity) as the principle of cosmological communication. It was re-interpreted by Tai Chen as the principle that not only operates for social practice, but also resides in it.

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5 “子曰 人能弘道 費道弘人” [論語], 15, 28.
It is easy to see how this materialistic conception of *jen*, reconstructed in the context of *Minbon*-publicness, could develop into the socialist project in China. In spite of different orientations within this project, they are common in that they were primarily concerned with the material productive activity and welfare, that is, with *Minbon*-publicness in the language of the grammar of Confucian publicness. The Chinese socialist path to the ‘first modernity’ might be understood as a form of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment through this materialistic path.

The second path may be called a discursive path, in which the Heavenly Principle encounters public deliberations in the dimension of deliberative publicness. As we said earlier, the Heavenly Principle which should be realized through Confucian politics remains unspoken. However, the popular mind (民心), the only possible medium for its expression, is precarious. Neo-Confucian remedy for this dilemma was the public deliberation (*Gongnon*, 公論). It allowed them to identify the Heavenly principle through discerning the rational core of the precarious popular opinions. It was thus the locus where the Heavenly Principle encountered with popular opinions. This is also evident in Zhu Xi’s definition of *Gongnon*, namely, “that which follows the Heavenly Principle, accords with the people’s mind, and is held as true by all.” If so, the Heavenly Principle might be under the pressure of change from within the public deliberation in the dimension of the deliberative publicness, just as *jen* was so in the dimension of the *Minbon*-publicness.

In contrast to the material path, this discursive path did not appear with any clarity in the pre-modern Confucian society. However, the fact that Confucian deliberative politics flourished in Korea’s Joseon dynasty allows us not to negate this potential developmental path. It was not confined simply to state publicness, but cut across the boundaries of the state, and expanded and deepened into society to become a strong check on state bureaucratic publicness. So it might compel the Heavenly Principle to be reconstructed, for example, as a discursive rationality inherent to public deliberation. In this sense, we may speak of the grammatical possibility of a shift from the Confucian deliberative publicness to the democratic deliberative publicness (Park 2013, 71-5). In a sense, the Korean path to democracy may be construed as a delayed realization of this grammatical potential.

We have discussed so far two possible paths for the dialectic of

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7 On the more detailed discussions about this path, see Park, 2013.
8 "順天理 合人心 而天下之所同是者", [朱子大全], 卷 24. <與陳待郞書>.
Confucian enlightenment. Through these two paths the Heavenly Principle could be transformed from the cosmological principle to social principles. This means that its social synthesizing function is transferred from the Heaven to such social practice as social labor and public deliberation and now belongs to the rationality reconstructed from within them. What is then the fate of the meta-biological and cosmological principle which is devoid of its synthesizing function? In relation to this question we can think of the third, the ecological path of our dialectic. And we can find its actuality in the ecological crises that threaten humanity in general and the pressing demand on establishing a global ecological publicness.

This ecological path is based on the category of life-giving process, the autopoietic process of cosmological life. In contrast to social labor and public deliberation, in this very base of our social life, there remains always something like the ecological horizon that manifests itself mainly in the negative form of various ecological crises without being synthesized into the realm of the social.

This makes the ecological path distinct from the first two paths. While the two paths are located within social communities even in its cosmopolitan form, the ecological path deploys itself across the inside and outside of the...
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A cosmopolitan community. While the two paths promote actively the dialectic, this third path does so mainly in the negative form of ecological crisis. While the two paths start from within the established publicness, that is, the Minbon- and the deliberative publicness, the ecological path itself establishes the ecological publicness, which overlaps with the global democratic publicness in its extension. While the two paths appear first in the context of nation state of ‘the first modernity’ and then move into the global context of ‘the second modernity’, the ecological path proceeds from the start within the global context and compels us to take the cosmopolitan perspective.

3) Now let’s summarize the results of these three dialectical paths. They can be summed up in <Figure 2>, where the bureaucratic publicness is surrounded by the Minbon-, the deliberative and the ecological publicness in relation to the structural differentiation of state, market, civil society and the ecological horizon. We would like to call this the grammar of eco-democratic publicness. This grammar can operate both in the national and in the global context. In the national context, it shows that individual nation state has the task of establishing three types of publicness, which are connected respectively to global market, civil society and ecological environment. In this case, it functions as the grammar for “responsible cosmopolitan state” (Brown 2011). However, for this “responsible cosmopolitan state” not to be confined to a few global powers, it is necessary to establish the global eco-democratic publicness which is able to cope with such global risks as the global economic crisis, terrorism, and global ecological risk without falling into the trap of ‘democratic deficit’ and ecological deficit.

We can find an important implication for this cosmopolitan task in the results of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment. Confucian cosmopolitan publicness implied in the Tianxiaweigong was not embedded, but steeped in the cosmos. Such a state is not changed, but elaborated in Neo-Confucian Conception of Tianxiaweigong. However, the global eco-democratic publicness, which emerges as a result of the critical reconstruction of the Heavenly Principle, is no longer immersed, but embedded in the cosmos as the ecological horizon. In other words, it is not something like a fish in the ecological sea of cosmos, but something like a ship on that sea, which allows those people boarded on it to breathe the fresh air of freedom and autonomy without forgetting the fact they are still on the wavy sea. Now, let’s explore its implications for the cosmopolitan publicness in the age of global risks.
V. Reflective Cosmopolitan publicness in its dual senses: A Ship of the Eco-Democratic Publicness on Wavy Ecological Sea

This grammar of global eco-democratic publicness can be understood as that of the *Tianxiaweigong* in the 21st century. This may be the shape of the ‘another cosmopolitanism’ in its first meaning. Now it is time to explore its second meaning, that is, the critical cosmopolitanism which seeks to establish the reflective cosmopolitan publicness in its dual senses to solve both the democratic and the ecological deficits.

As we have said earlier, the global publicness in the age of global risks has two tasks, the democratic one and the ecological one, which correspond respectively to the democratic and the ecological deficits. From the viewpoint of ‘another cosmopolitanism,’ the democratic task may be summarized as the following demand: the pursuit of the welfare-oriented *Minbon*-publicness should be supplemented and regulated by the deliberative publicness. Here ‘democratic deficit’ refers not only to the lack of democratic legitimacy in the dimension of deliberative publicness, but also to the enormous socio-economic inequality caused by the neoliberal globalization in the sphere of *Minbon*-publicness. To cope with these democratic deficits, thus, the pursuit of the welfare-oriented *Minbon*-publicness should be supplemented by the deliberative publicness. In fact, it would be extremely difficult to regulate the unleashed movement of the global market without help from the global deliberative publicness. Furthermore, global publicness including *Minbon*-publicness should be carefully designed in such a way so that it would not injure both the individual autonomy of human beings as world citizens and the autonomy of the collective form of life. It is thus necessary for them to be monitored and regulated by global deliberative publicness. To put it simply, establishing the global deliberative *Minbon*-publicness is the primary democratic task of the *Tianxiaweigong* in the 21st century.

In contrast to the democratic task to establish the deliberative *Minbon*-publicness, ecological task has an ambivalent character. On the one hand, coping with ecological risks also belongs to democratic task because they should be solved in such a way as can satisfy demands of the deliberative *Minbon*-publicness. Satisfying the demand of the *Minbon*-publicness means that the ecological justice should be established in both the national and the global context. In order to satisfy the demand of the deliberative publicness, citizens should be able to participate in interpreting and solving ecological risks, because as Beck (2009, 24-46) emphasizes, risk does not exist as the
naked, but as the interpreted and constructed. This is the necessary condition for solving ecological risks democratically. On the other hand, the solution of ecological risks is not reduced to establishing the deliberative Minbon-publicness. As we mentioned earlier, there remains always the residual ecological dimension which functions as an ecological horizon and cannot be subsumed into the eco-democratic publicness. This means that the relationship between the eco-democratic publicness and the ecological horizon is constitutive of the reflective structure of the cosmopolitan publicness in the age of ecological risks. How are we, then, to understand this relationship?

The Confucian political tradition has a political metaphor, according to which the relationship between the state and people is regarded as something like a ship on water. Using this metaphor, we can view the ecological horizon as the stormy sea and the eco-democratic publicness as a ship on that sea. As we already suggested, this is a pertinent image of the reflective cosmopolitan publicness in the age of global risks.

In the age of the industrial modernization, risks were regarded as what could be well calculated and managed. However, as evident in the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, ecological risk remains no longer something like a typhoon in the teacup of the modern risk regime. The contemporary society is rather like a ship shaking on the wavy ecological sea where the typhoon of ecological disaster is coming closer. Those who continue to be attached to the anachronistic belief of the modern risk regime cannot avoid the fate of drowning in the sea of ecological disasters.

In response to this, the green romanticists advise to abandon the ship of the (eco-democratic) publicness and plunge into the ecological sea. However, this is a rough-and-tumble response which would lead to the same result. Why do these green romanticists conclude that the ship of modern society cast on the ecological sea cannot avoid the fate of sinking into that sea? It is because they think that the ship is made of iron. However, it may be made of wood. In this case, even though it may tremble on the stormy sea, it may not sink into the sea. However, even the Neo-Confucian cosmopolitan publicness may not avoid the fate of sinking into the sea of ecological disasters and may not break the surface of the cosmological ocean, if the Heavenly Principle was not reconstructed through the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment. It is this dialectic that allows Neo-Confucian grammar of publicness to transform itself from an iron ship into a wooden ship.

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10 On Green Romanticism, see Dryzek, 2005, 183-201.
When the Heavenly Principle is reconstructed in all its three paths, the Principle of the ‘Heavenly Principle’ is transferred from Heaven to the space of social practice and comes to be in the form of the organizational principle of the global deliberative Minbon-publicness. In what mode then does the Heaven deprived of its synthesizing function continue to be? It may exist in two modes. First, it may exist in the mode of the global dimension of the eco-democratic publicness. In other words, it may reside in the demand that the deliberative, the ecological, and the Minbon-publicness should be established not only in national dimension, but also in the global dimension. Second, the Heaven may exist now in the mode of the ecological sea on which the global eco-democratic publicness is floating. The ‘Heavenly principle’ is thus differentiated into the global dimension of the cosmopolitan publicness, practical rationality as its organizational principle, and its ecological horizon.

This differentiation compels Tianxiaweigong of the 21st century to keep the reflective publicness in its dual senses. On the one hand, this ship of Tianxiaweigong should establish its own democratic structure which requires a reflective relation to itself mainly on the dimension of the collective decision. We called this democratic reflectivity. It is now constitutive of the eco-democratic publicness of Tianxiaweigong of the 21st century. On the other hand, it should keep a reflexive relation to the ecological sea, in which it encounters unintended, uncontrolled negative consequences of its collective decision. We called this ecological reflectivity. For the ship to cope with both the democratic and the ecological deficit, two kinds of reflective relations should be adequately mediated without being reduced to each other. But, how is this possible?

Here, public deliberation on global ecological risks can play the role of mediator. First, it can mediate between the deliberative Minbon-publicness organized by the discursive rationality and the ecological risk which is discursively interpreted and constructed, and in this way keep the democratic reflectivity. Second, it allows the ship of the global deliberative Minbon-publicness to feel its negative effects on the ecological sea in its trembling. Keeping its ecological reflectivity in this way, the eco-democratic publicness, though trembling on the wavy ecological sea, nevertheless does not sink into that sea. Furthermore, in the same way, it can transform the enormous energy of the wavy ecological sea, which Beck calls “emancipatory catastrophism”, into the energy for expanding the global eco-democratic publicness. In sum, it is through these public deliberations that cosmopolitan publicness can keep its reflectivity in dual senses.
The significance of this reflective structure of the cosmopolitan publicness would be more clearly grasped, if we compare once again cosmopolitan projects of Habermas and Beck, which help us to reconstruct ‘another cosmopolitanism’ as a critical cosmopolitanism. As we have already said in chapter II, though they are clearly conscious of two deficits of current global publicness, it seems that they respectively put emphasis on solving one of the two deficits. Habermas focuses on solving the ‘democratic deficits’ through the eco-democratic publicness which will be formed by the project of constitutionalization of international law, without paying due attention to the relation of the ship of the eco-democratic publicness and the ecological sea. In his project, public deliberation mediates mainly the relationship between system and life-world, not the relationship between the society in general and the ecological horizon. It seems to serve not to the ecological reflexivity, but only to the democratic reflectivity within the cosmopolitan community.

In contrast, Beck pays much more attention to the ecological reflexivity than to the democratic reflectivity (Beck 2006). He emphasizes more the emancipatory political energy of the ecological catastrophe than the enlightenment project to institutionalize the normative principle (Beck 2014). It is, however, unclear in what way and in what form this energy would be institutionalized into the public order. He seems to hope that this energy be the main source of global solidarity necessary for global democracy project. Of course it could be so. However, it could also be oriented to the ecological totalitarian regime under the banner of the ecological state of emergency.

Of course, it would be wrong to conclude from this comparison that the reflective global publicness in its dual senses is bifurcated in contrary direction in their projects. However, this comparison shows us at least how important and difficult it is to keep this reflectivity in its dual senses. *Tianxiaweigong* (天下為公) of the 21st century shows us clearly why and how to construct and preserve this reflectivity. Here we may find the most important significance of this ‘another’ cosmopolitanism for the age of global risks.

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