Leibniz’s Criticism of
Occasionalism as Spinozism

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【Abstract】 Leibniz, in On Nature Itself, famously charges that occasionalism makes “God the very nature of things, while created things disappear into mere modifications of the one divine substance” (G IV 508-9/AG 165). Leibniz pivots this ‘Spinozism’ charge on the key claim that Malebranche and like-minded occasionalists fail to appreciate that substantiality itself is tightly connected to there being genuine causal forces internal to the entities in question. What is not clear is why Malebranche would be subject to such a criticism, if the central issue is how to understand what it is to be substance. While occasionalists do deny genuine causal activity on the part of creatures, they do not take this denial of causality to entail the absence of creaturely substances. This response raises questions about the overall persuasiveness of Leibniz’s argument, along with concerns about whether it is begging the question against Malebranche. In this paper, I hope to address these issues by taking a closer look at Leibniz’s Spinozism criticism. A key will be to understand how Leibniz argues for his conception of substance as activity. I will argue that Leibniz’s case for his conception of substance ultimately relies on his views about persistence. I will propose that Leibniz appears to think that if creatures are to be regarded as substances, they must persist, and,
moreover, that the persistence of creatures must be accounted a particular manner—persistence has to be grounded in forces intrinsic to the creature. Based on this analysis, I will go on to pursue the question of how convincing this claim is. In the end, I will cautiously suggest that Leibniz can go a considerable way in motivating this claim, if we take Leibniz to be emphasizing a particular type of dependence that modes have on substances. On my reading, Leibniz is suggesting that the lack of intrinsic forces within the Malebranchean scheme opens occasionalism up to the charge that created individuals are not much more than bundles of modifications. That is, creatures on the Malebranchean scheme lack substantial unity, a consequence that indeed seems dangerously close to Spinozism.

Leibniz, in *On Nature Itself* (1698), famously charges that “[the doctrine of occasional causes]… seems with Spinoza to make of God the very nature of things, while created things disappear into mere modifications of the one divine substance” (G IV 508-9/AG 165). In a way, this criticism of Malebranche’s occasionalism seems rather unremarkable, particularly to those who are aware of the starkly different approaches taken by Leibniz and Malebranche with regard to the issue of real causality within secondary substances. Leibniz, on the one hand, is adamant that force or causal activity is what makes a creature a substance at all. Malebranche, on the other hand, denies that creatures possess any genuine causal powers, a denial which constitutes a core claim of his occasionalism. Thus, if one adopts Leibniz’s perspective, and takes on the commonly held assumption that what are not substances in their own right are modes of some other substance, Leibniz’s charge in *De ipsa Natura* seems a straightforward, if provocative, statement of what we might expect.

But how damaging is this criticism for Malebranche? As noted above, Leibniz pivots this ‘Spinozism’ charge on a key claim:1) Malebranche
and his fellow occasionalists fail to appreciate that “the very substance of things consists in a force for acting and being acted upon” (AG 159). That Leibniz would make such a claim, linking substantiality to force is no surprise, for it has been long recognized as a cornerstone of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics. But one philosopher’s cornerstone often turns up being another’s rubble, and Malebranche flat out denies that creaturely substances have any genuine causal forces, let alone have them essentially. The denial of causal activity of creatures constitutes the core negative thesis of his occasionalism. Moreover, Malebranche did not take the denial of creaturely causality to entail the absence of creaturely substances. Thus, if the dispute comes down to the basic issue of how one ought to understand what it is to be a creaturely substance at all, it is far from being obvious that Leibniz’s charge of Spinozism should stick to Malebranche. Why should Malebranche accept Leibniz’s conception of substancehood when the consequences are so dire?

Many readers of Leibniz have recognized On Nature Itself as one of the defining works in which Leibniz attempts to set himself apart from the occasionalism of Malebranche. That much is clear. What is not as clear is how Leibniz’s criticism is actually supposed to work and,

1) A quick note about the term ‘Spinozism’: while some may take the term to refer to Spinoza’s necessitarianism, I will use the term to refer to Spinoza’s substance monism, namely, the view that there is one and only one substance, and all creatures are modifications of this one substance, God. I thank the anonymous referees of the Journal for pushing for this clarification.

2) Please refer to the Bibliography for complete list of Leibniz’s works. In the Theodicy, Leibniz writes “[t]hat which does not act does not merit the name of substance” (T 393). In his March 14, 1712 letter to Lelong, Leibniz also claims that “[t]here are only substances that act and there are no substances at all that do not act” (RML 423, my translation). Also see NE 65 and G III, 58.

subsequently, how successful it is. In this paper, I hope to seek some answers to these questions by taking a closer look at this Spinozism criticism. A key will be to understand how Leibniz argues for his conception of substance as activity. I will argue that Leibniz’s case for his conception of substance ultimately relies on his views about persistence. Thus, the first part of the paper will mainly be devoted to making this point. I will propose that Leibniz appears to think that if creatures are to be regarded as substances, they must persist, and, moreover, that the persistence of creatures must be accounted a particular manner—that is, the persistence has to be grounded in the nature or forces intrinsic to the creature. Based on this analysis, I will go on to pursue the question of how convincing this claim is. In the end, I will cautiously suggest that Leibniz can go a considerable way in motivating this claim, if we take Leibniz to be emphasizing a particular type of dependence that modes have on substances. On my reading, Leibniz is suggesting that the lack of intrinsic forces or laws within the Malebranchean scheme opens occasionalism up to the charge that created individuals are not much more than bundles of modifications. That is, creatures on the Malebranchean scheme lack substantial unity, a consequence that indeed seems dangerously close to Spinozism.

1. Malebranche’s Occasionalism

At the beginning of his chapter on “the most dangerous error of the philosophy of the ancients” in the Search After Truth, Malebranche suggests the following:

If we … consider … our idea of cause or of the power to act, we cannot
doubt that this idea represents something divine. … We therefore admit something divine in all the bodies around us when we posit forms, faculties, qualities, virtues, or real being capable of producing certain effects through the force of their nature.4)

Thus, he argues, it is necessary to prove that “there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes.” (Search 448)

Leibniz seems to have found such a blanket denial of creaturely natures or powers problematic early on in his mature thinking. In his January 1688 letter to Arnauld, Leibniz suggests that the denial of all force or power in things would be to “change them from substances, which they are, to modes; as Spinoza does, who holds that God alone is a substance and that all other things are only modifications.”5) This claim that occasionalism’s denial of creaturely forces reduces it to Spinozism is repeated throughout Leibniz’s philosophical career, but the most elaborate version is presented in his brief but important On Nature itself, or on the Inherent Force and Actions of Created Things.6)

De ipsa Natura was originally conceived as Leibniz’s response to the

5) LA 133 “les changer de substances qu’ils sont, en modes; comme fait Spinoza, qui veut que Dieu seul est une substance, et que toutes les autre choses n’en sont que des modifications.”
6) G IV, 508f./L 502. In quoting from De ipsa Natura, I will be using the translations of both Loemker and Ariew & Garber, depending on which I find more adequate. For other references to the charge of Spinozism see: RML 421; LA 133; G IV, 594; G IV, 568; G IV, 590; T 393.
controversy between John Christopher Sturm, who defended Robert Boyle’s claim that the term ‘nature’ should be replaced by ‘mechanism,’ and Günter Christopher Schelhammer, who defended the concept of nature. But this debate also provided Leibniz with the opportunity to challenge and criticize Malebranche and other occasionalists who were on common ground with Sturm in denying genuine causal efficacy or active forces in creatures.  

While Leibniz brings up a number of problematic implications of denying creaturely forces in this work, his most serious challenge focuses on the claim that the denial of natures in creatures has a fatal problem in that by removing natures, occasionalism cannot adequately account for the transtemporal identity or persistence of creatures. It is here that we get the explicit charge that occasionalism reduces to Spinozism:

But we cannot exempt him from criticism unless he can explain how it is that things themselves can endure through time, even while those attributes of things, which we call by the name ‘nature’ in them, cannot endure, since it is fitting that just as the words “let there be” [fiat] leave something behind, indeed, the very thing that persists, so should the no less wonderful word “blessing” have left something behind in things, a fecundity or a nisus for producing their actions and for being effectual, something which a result follows if nothing prevents it. To this I can add something I have already explained elsewhere, even if, perhaps, I have not yet made it sufficiently obvious to all, namely, that the very substance of things consists in a force for acting and being acted upon. From this it follows that persisting things cannot be produced if no force lasting through time can be imprinted on them by the divine power. Were that so, it would follow that no created substance, no soul would remain numerically the same, and thus, nothing would be conserved by God, and consequently everything would merely be certain vanishing or unstable modifications and phantasms, so to speak, of one permanent divine substance. Or, what comes to the same thing, God would be the very

7) Cf. Loemker’s brief introduction to the text on L 498.
nature or substance of all things, the sort of doctrine of ill repute which a recent writer, subtle indeed, though profane, either introduced to the world or revived. (AG 159-60)

This ‘Spinozism’ argument starts out by asking the occasionalist why things themselves persist if there cannot be persisting natures. I take it that Leibniz is here trying to show that something is inconsistent in the occasionalist position in holding that things persist through time while denying that the natures of things persist. However, the inconsistency to our eyes is not as obvious; it appears that such an inconsistency only arises if one further assumes that

(1) the persistence of creatures requires the persistence of the natures of the creatures.

How convincing (1) is and how Leibniz argues for it will be a major part of our focus, but assuming (1), Leibniz then appears to be arguing that, since

(2) occasionalism denies there are natures in creatures
it follows that
(3) occasionalistic creatures are not things that persist.

But, according to Leibniz, from (3) it is a perilously short step to Spinozism, since

(4) things that do not persist are Spinozistic modes of one divine substance.

Needless to say, the key premises of the argument are (1) and (4), and we can easily imagine Malebranche taking issue with both of them. Thus, the success of the ‘Spinozism’ argument depends on how Leibniz manages to argue for these two central premises.

Let us begin with (1). Why does the transtemporal identity of substances require the transtemporal identity of their natures? One might think that Leibniz would answer that (1) ought to be accepted because it
follows from

(5) the very substance of things consists in the force of acting and being acted upon. (AG 159)

Here a rough reconstruction of this line of thought. One thing that (5) suggests is that what makes something a substance is its active and passive forces. That is, the active and passive forces of a thing are essential, constitutive features of it qua substance. But if such forces are constitutive and essential to substantiality, then it seems natural to think that whether the creature as a substance maintains its identity over time depends on whether the creature maintains the constitutive or essential elements of its substantiality, which according to Leibniz are its forces. And we know that Leibniz takes the relevant notion of “nature” to be closely related to the forces within the substance. For instance, Leibniz earlier had identified the natures to be “a certain efficacy residing in things, a form or force…from which the series of phenomena follows” (L 501). If the identity of a substance over time depends on the identity of its constitutive, essential elements, and if its essential elements are the forces of the substances characterized as its nature, then it indeed seems plausible to suggest that the persistence of substances requires the persistence of their natures.

Confronted with such an argument, we can easily imagine Malebranche being perplexed. Why would one adopt such a conception of substance in the first place? It is not as if this Leibnizian conception of substantiality as activity is obvious in itself or the predominant way in which substantiality was understood in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and early 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries. To the contrary, as we are well aware, what might be called the “Cartesian” understanding, one that linked substantiality to ontological independence, was much closer to being the dominant conception of substance. Leibniz’s departure from this Cartesian notion of substance gives rise to
a further question, namely, whether the issue of transtemporal identity is really relevant to the discussion. If Leibniz needs to present a different understanding of substancehood altogether to proceed with the charge of Spinozism, then is not the real battle over the correct understanding of a substance? The issue of persistence actually seems to fall to the wayside, and if this indeed is how Leibniz proceeds with his charge of Spinozism, then he seems to be presenting an argument that comes close to question begging.

2. Force, Persistence, and Individuation

Fortunately, this reconstruction that argues from directly (5) to (1) does not appear to be the actual strategy Leibniz had in mind in the *De Ipsa Natura*. A closer look at the remaining portions of *De Ipsa Natura* reveals how Leibniz is devoted to showing how persistence is intricately related to the notion of force. His main strategy, interestingly enough, is to show that if one rejects forces or activity, one cannot properly individuate extended substances or bodies. In the background is an assumption that the individuation of created substances is a minimum requirement of any feasible metaphysics, an assumption that Leibniz appears to be taking for granted. That is, a metaphysical account that cannot do this job of proper individuation is fundamentally problematic, or so Leibniz seems to be thinking. Based on this assumption, he tries to convince the reader that the Malebranchean occasionalist faces this disastrous result, because in eliminating forces or activity he effectively does away with the only way in which bodies could be individuated, that is, their causal histories through change. What this suggests is that the actual strategy employed to establish (1) is to show that individuation
requires the persistence of things, and the persistence of things in turn requires forces. Let us take a closer look at this intriguing argument.

According to Leibniz, if there are no forces that constitute a body’s nature, through which the future state of a body follows from its present state, then one effectively lacks any basis for distinguishing bodies at all. For if there are no forces,

a body A in motion would differ not at all from a resting body B, and the view of that distinguished gentleman…would entail that there is no clear criterion in bodies for distinguishing them, since in a plenum, there is no criterion for distinguishing between masses uniform in themselves unless one is provided by motion. (AG 163)

The idea is to imagine two bodies A and B that share all other extensional properties, such as size and shape, and only differ in terms of motion and rest: A is in motion and B is at rest. A and B are exactly similar in all respects except for the fact that they differ in terms of motion: while A is “moving through” place $p_1$, as it were, at time $t_1$, B is at rest at $p_1$ at $t_1$.

But according to the analysis of motion presented by the occasionalist, Leibniz argues, A’s being in motion does not imply that A possesses a certain force, say a motive force, which moves it along through different locations. All created substances lack causal forces, and there is nothing more to being a Cartesian body than being extended – that is, to be in a particular, determinate relation of distance.8) So, for the occasionalist, that A is in motion simply means that A exists successively, via God’s continuous creation, at various positions over a duration of time, including $p_1$ at $t_1$. But if this is the case, Leibniz argues, then were we to observe A

8) Malebranche himself asks “is it not entirely obvious that all the properties of extension can consist only in relations of distance?” (Dialogues 106).
and $B$ at time $t_1$ respectively, the two would be indistinguishable, since they would share all their occurrent properties. They would be in the exact same physical state and thus be identical in terms of their relational properties of extension at $t_1$. Given that $A$ and $B$ have no other, non-extensional properties with respect to which they differ, $A$ and $B$ would be indistinguishable.\(^9\) Naturally, $A$’s being in motion and $B$’s being at rest cannot come to the occasionalist’s aid. For neither motion nor rest, according to the occasionalist, can be detected by the presence of some non-extensional property like a force or the lack thereof. There is nothing over and above the various relations of distance a body stands in at any given moment, and recall that motion is just the “successive existence of thing,” which changes its relation of distance over time. Thus, while $A$ would differ from $B$ if we considered their spatial relations respectively over time, at any given moment, the spatial relations the two each possess are identical in our supposed case. But the conclusion that the two bodies are indistinguishable and thus not distinct seems absurd, given the fact that we had assumed that $A$ are $B$ are distinct bodies, one being in motion and the other not. There clearly seems to be a difference between $A$ and $B$ even if their spatial relations are exactly identical at $p_1$.\(^{10}\)

One way the distinction might be attempted would be to invoke the future states of $A$ and $B$, namely, in the case of $A$, that of being in an adjacent place $p_2$ at time $t_2$ and, in the case of $B$, that of remaining in place $p_1$ at time $t_2$. But Leibniz’s response to this move is that the occasionalist’s understanding of bodies does not warrant a distinction

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9) Leibniz presents the same argument with the example of two perfectly similar concentric spheres, one spinning and the other not. See L 505.

based on future states. For the properties of \( A \) and \( B \) are exhausted by their present, occurrent spatial properties. Or, as Leibniz puts it, “the denomination by which one part of matter would be distinguished from another would be only extrinsic, indeed, it would derive from what will happen, namely from the fact that the part of matter in question will later be some other place or another” (AG 164). What if the occasionalist were to respond that the future spatial properties need not be excluded from the list of present properties of \( A \) and \( B \)? Leibniz would most likely take this maneuver to amount to a concession of accepting forces after all, since, as he clearly notes, all he had meant by a force or nature intrinsic to the creature is such that “the state following from the present one results per se from the force of its nature” (AG 163). If the future spatial properties were invoked, then \( A \) and \( B \) would be distinguishable in terms of their natures or forces, since their natures would causally prescribe different future states to follow from their present states.

We now see the interesting way in which the issue of persistence comes into play for Leibniz. Leibniz appears to be arguing that persistence, understood as the series of states a body is in over time, is necessary for the individuation of bodies, and the forces that are intrinsic to bodies, in turn, are needed to account for the persistence of bodies. And since any account of substance must account for the individuation of distinct substances, it turns out that force is constitutive of substantiality. That is, for Leibniz, it is the intrinsic forces or natures in creatures that ground the persistence of creatures, and this persistence is what grounds the individuation of creatures. This is why, for Leibniz, the force or activity is not some accidental feature of creatures that a given theory of substance can do without but a key and critical component of a basic ontology.\(^{11} \) Forces or natures, in anchoring the various states of a given

\(^{11} \) Robert Sleigh suggests that Leibniz thought that “remaining numerically identical
substance, not only provide the basis for the substance’s transtemporal identity but, precisely in providing such a basis for persistence, also ground the distinctiveness and individuation of substances. Thus, in a sense, it is through this discussion about persistence that Leibniz seems to be providing an important argument for the claim that forces are fundamental to substantiality, a claim, if we recall, very close to (5): the very substance of things itself consists in the force of acting and being acted upon.12) But this claim—that forces or natures are necessary for substantiality—while weaker, is sufficient for Leibniz’s purposes, since this weaker claim would still support (1), namely, the claim that the persistence of creatures requires the persistence of the natures of the creatures. For if forces are necessary features of creatures, then one could easily infer that the persistence of creatures requires the persistence of all of their necessary features, including their natures or forces.

Based on this central point, Leibniz goes on to make the final charge that occasionalism’s denial of forces lead us to the “despoiling of all distinctiveness,” “since that which does not act, which lacks active force, which is robbed of discriminability, robbed finally of all reason and basis for existing, can in no way be a substance. (AG 165-6)

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12) It seems weaker, since while (5) suggests that forces are exhaustive of what it is to be a substance, the claim here is that forces are a necessary component of substancehood.

over time is a basic condition that the metaphysically ultimate individuals of an acceptable substance ontology must satisfy.” See Sleigh’s Leibniz & Arnauld (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) p. 128. I agree but add that the reason why Leibniz thought persistence was a ‘basic’ condition was that possessing the power to persist over time and maintain transtemporal identity is a necessary condition for the individuation of substances.
3. A Malebranchean Response

This argument of Leibniz’s, linking forces to individuation via persistence, raises a host of questions. Notice that the argument relies on two critical claims:

(6) intrinsic forces are necessary for persistence
and
(7) persistence is necessary for individuation

As we might expect, Malebranche could easily question both. Let us begin with (7). Is it really the case that individuation requires persistence, as Leibniz is understanding it? Let us reconsider the Cartesian account of bodies or extended substances, according to which the occurrent spatial properties are exhaustive of all bodily properties. We recall that Malebranche himself had asked rhetorically “is it not entirely obvious that all the properties of extension can consist only in relations of distance?” (Dialogues 106). Note further that the orthodox Cartesian account of the individuation of bodies critically relies on motion.13) As Leibniz’s analysis shows, however, motion itself appears to presuppose that bodies are distinguished and individuated into those that are in motion and those at rest. So Leibniz seems to be presenting a rather strong case here.14) Given that the occurrent spatial relations exhaust the properties of any body, be it in motion or at rest, unless we can trace past histories (or foretell future trajectories), there seem to be no grounds for the Cartesian to distinguish and individuate bodies that share all other extensional properties.

14) For an illuminating and detailed analysis of this point, see Adams 1994a.
Does this mean that Malebranche has no way whatsoever to respond to such a criticism? While we have not exhausted the options for Malebranche to respond here to Leibniz, let us assume for the sake of argument that Malebranche grants (7), given the argument Leibniz has presented. That is, our Malebranche accepts that without persistence, creatures cannot be individuated. This Malebranche can still question whether intrinsic/creaturely forces are necessary for persistence or proposition (6). For instance, he might ask whether forces are necessary for persistence at all. Consider the traditional Aristotelian/Scholastic account of transtemporal identity, where typically the matter or material aspect of a hylomorphically constituted individual accounts for its persistence. Why could not matter have this tendency to persist built into it, as it were, as the aspect of the thing that endures and undergoes change?

Alluring perhaps, but, all things considered, I do not think Malebranche, being the Cartesian he is, would have found been able to embrace this avenue of response. As is well acknowledged, the Cartesian “innovation” to identify matter with extension was in part an attempt to move away from this traditional hylomorphic scheme, in particular, the difficulty ridden notion of “prime matter”. Moreover, since prime matter, traditionally understood, does not possess any quantitative features when considered in itself, such a conception of matter would hardly be consistent with the Cartesian conception as essentially quantitative.

But even if this Aristotelian approach is rejected, and Malebranche ends up accepting that it is indeed some sort of force that underwrites the

15) For instance, Malebranche might revise the Cartesian approach of relying on motion to individuate bodies. He could suggest instead that bodies are individuated primitively. For more on this possibility, see my “Passive Natures and No Representations: Malebranche’s Two ‘Local’ Arguments for Occasionalism,” *The Harvard Review of Philosophy*, vol. XV (Fall 2007), pp. 72-9.
persistence of a created substance, there still is a fair ways to go before the case for (6) is sealed. The all important question of whether the forces must be internal or intrinsic to the creature remains. Notice that countenancing robust causal forces operative in the world is not itself anathema to the Malebranchean scheme of things. In fact, the world is literally brimming with causal activity, though this activity is exclusively divine in character. So why could it not be that divine force is responsible for the persistence of things? That is, why cannot Malebranche hold that the persistence of creatures is grounded in divine volitions? If Leibniz posits forces intrinsic to the creature to account for their persistence, Malebranche could well, it seems, posit extrinsic, divine forces to account for their persistence. To get a clearer picture of what such a move on the part of Malebranche involves, let us consider in more detail how Leibniz thinks of his intrinsic forces.

For Leibniz, the force that ensures the persistence of a substance takes the form of the law of the series of successive states of an individual substance.\textsuperscript{16} As Leibniz writes to De Volder in January 21, 1704, “the primitive force is as it were the law of the series” of successive states of an enduring thing (G II,262/L533). Later on, in the same letter, he elaborates:

\begin{quote}
The succeeding substance will be considered the same as the preceding as long as the same law of the series or of simple continuous transition persists, which makes us believe in the same subject of change, or the monad. The fact that a certain law persists which involves all the future states of that which we conceive to be the same – this is the very fact, I say, which constitutes the enduring substance. (L 535)
\end{quote}

Moreover, for Leibniz, this “developmental” law—as I will call the law of the series of successive states of the substance—is unique to that substance. Robert Adams has pointed out, “Leibniz seems...to have favored a criterion of identity that assigns states to the same individual substance if and only if they are caused by the same individual causal nexus.... Due to Leibniz’s denial of real causal interaction between created substances, this criterion will not, in his system, assign the same state to different created individuals.” (Adams 1994b, 313) In other words, the developmental law that constitutes the causal nexus of substances does the job of individuating the substances because the law dictates that those and only those states that are prescribed in and caused by the developmental law that belongs to any given individual. And in prescribing and causing just those states that belong to this individual, the law itself is unique to the substance in question.

So along these lines, envision a Malebranchean surrogate, parallel to Leibnizian developmental laws. Admittedly, Malebranche himself does not discuss laws of this sort, nor, for that matter, does he seem particularly interested in the issue of persistence. So we do not have any direct textual support for the Malebranchean response we are envisioning here. But since one of our aims is to see what kind of resources Malebranche has to meet Leibniz’s criticism, I think it will be philosophically both interesting and fruitful to investigate this line of thought. The Malebranchean surrogate for the Leibnizian developmental law would take the form of an individualistic divine law/volition that governs the series of states of an individual substance and is specifically tailored for it. These laws would be very much like the natures or laws of the causal nexus in Leibnizian creatures except for the critical difference that they would not be things that are left in the creature, as it were, due to God’s volitions. That is, they would not be the “traces” of God’s
volitions, forever imprinted in the creatures as their intrinsic natures, but, rather, these laws would just be the particular divine volitions themselves. Now what would be problematic for Malebranche to point to these laws as grounding the persistence of creatures?

Would Leibniz be happy to concede that Malebranche’s way of accounting for transtemporal identity and individuation—that is, by invoking divine individualistic laws and without forces intrinsic to the creature—works out after all? I think this is highly unlikely. In the following section, I will present some reasons why I think Leibniz would have find this approach unacceptable.

4. Malebranchean Laws and Bundles of Modes

As we noted earlier, the Leibnizian law of the series of states that make up a created substance individuates the creature from others by assigning states to this creature if and only if they are caused by this law of the series. (cf. Adams 1994b, 313) What this implies is that the identity condition of a mode or state is tied to the law of the series in such a way that a state can neither be divorced from the law nor plucked, as it were, from its original series without losing its identity. Given that Leibniz denied the suggestion that Arnauld could have been married and would have still been himself (LA 30ff.), we can imagine what Leibniz would have thought about the possibility that one of Arnauld’s states belong to a different individual, say, Malebranche. For Leibniz, not only do these states lose their identities if they do not belong to the series governed by Arnauld’s developmental law, but Arnauld also would not have been Arnauld had he not had all the properties that he actually has. We can see, then, that Leibniz would strictly prohibit what I will call the
“mixing and matching” of modes—that is, a situation in which a mode that was to occur in one series occurs in a different series with no loss to its identity. The series to which a state belongs determines the identity conditions of the state itself. Hence, Leibniz will not grant the very assumption behind the idea of mixing and matching, since once the mode is unconnected from the series, as it were, it no longer is the same mode.

This renders vivid the kind of bond or unity the modes have within the Leibnizian scheme of things. The constituents of the series are not, as it were, merely ‘bundled’ together. Leibniz is firmly rejecting a ‘bundle’ model, by which I mean a model where the constituents of the bundle maintain their identity even if they were to be placed in a different series, and the substances themselves are nothing over and above the bundles that are compiled from these modes. On this bundle model, the modes are more basic than the substances they comprise, since, while the identity conditions of the modes are independent of the whole or bundle, the identity conditions of the bundles are tied to which modes are in the bundle. In effect, the substance turns out to be a mereological sum of its modes, and it is the modes are the more basic units or unities, capable of belonging to different wholes. So, on the bundle model, we might say that the law free floats from the bundle of modes and merely describes the series, while a Leibnizian law plays a critical role in determining the content of the series, and cannot be divorced from it.

We have just seen that Leibniz would unequivocally reject any such bundle model of substances. But what about Malebranche? How does Malebranche think of the relation between the states or modes of a substance and the laws that govern them? Earlier we had envisioned Malebranchean developmental laws that paralleled Leibnizian laws except for the fact that the former were actual divine volitions, instead of laws intrinsic to the creature itself. The question then is whether the
Malebranchean laws are like the Leibnizian laws that are undivorceable from just those modes that belong to a given individual. Or are they rather more like the bundle laws that permit mixing and matching and free-float as it were from the series of states? Once again, Malebranche does not appear to have had much interest in or been troubled by such issues. So the texts that we have in our possession do not seem to address these questions directly. But given what he says about laws and divine volitions in general, and how they supposedly work in governing the various events in the world, I think we can make a case for the interpretation that Malebranchean laws are much closer to bundle laws and, subsequently, his overall view of substances comes worryingly close to the bundle model as well, or so I shall argue. It is this worry, in my view, that ultimately motivates Leibniz’s charge of Spinozism.

To see why this is the case, let us turn to Malebranche’s distinction between general and particular volitions. Here we need to focus on the fact that for Malebranche the key difference between natural events and miraculous ones is whether the events in question are governed by general laws or particular ones. And for Malebranche a particular law/volition is understood as an exception to the general law. Here is a revealing quote from the *Dialogues*:

> When God performs a miracle and does not act in accordance with the general laws that are known to us, I maintain either that God acts as a consequence of other laws unknown to us, or that what He does then is determined by certain circumstances He had in view from all eternity in undertaking that simple, eternal, and invariable act which contains both the general laws of His ordinary providence and also the exceptions to these very laws. ... [I]n the exceptions to the general laws God acts sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, although always according to what is required of Him by whichever one of His attributes, as it were, most valuable to Him at that moment. (OM/12/177-8).
According to this passage, when God appears to be acting in a miraculous manner, either one of two things is going on: either God is acting in accordance with general laws but these laws are unknown to us, or his action is an exception to the general law. In what sense is his action an exception? Malebranche clearly states in the *Treatise on Nature and Grace* that rarity is not what makes the exception.\(^{17}\) Thus, in my view, the exceptionality of miracles is most naturally understood as typical of a situation where the very same event that is typically governed by a general law is, in this miraculous instance, governed by a law different from the general law, one that is a particular volition. The issue of differentiating general and particular laws is going to important, and presumably there is going to be a significant difference in terms of the content of two laws, with the particular volition being much more specific. But we need not worry here about how to express the difference precisely. Let us focus on the fact that for Malebranche the miraculousness of an event is determined by the fact that it is governed by a particular law, and this implies that the same event (or occasion) can be subsumed under different laws, either general or particular.\(^{18}\) It is this fact about Malebranchean events—the possibility of being governed by distinct laws—that, in my view, inevitably opens the door to the possibility of the mixing and matching of modes. Let us see why.

Consider the following scenario. Suppose that my finger has just been pricked by a pin. Typically I would feel pain on this occasion. In other words, my finger being in this damaged state would be followed by a mental mode of pain in me. But imagine that God had miraculously

\(^{17}\) See OM/8/696.

\(^{18}\) As the quote above reveals, Malebranche seems to want to reserve the term ‘occasion’ for those events that are governed by general laws. Hence the very same event then could either be an occasion or not, depending on the type of law governing the series of events.
willed to spare me from this instance of pain and that George, my colleague down the hall, feels the pain instead. I, in turn, experience the pleasant sensation of tasting a ripe peach, which my colleague was about to experience, had not God willed this particular volition to switch our relative sensations. I take it there is nothing within Malebranche’s views about laws or occasions that rules out such scenarios. In fact, it seems to be part and parcel of the very spirit of occasionalism that God has full discretion, as it were, to decide which mode follows. It is not as if I am (or any prior state of my mind is) causally active nor is it the case that my mind determinately fixes the mode to follow on a given occasion. So, on this scenario, I end up having a mode that George would have had and George ends up having a mode that I would have had, due to the miraculous divine volition just mentioned. There is textual support that such a scenario would not have been foreign to Malebranche, since Malebranche himself considers similar, abnormal events in discussing how we ought to understand miracles:

God acts by general volition, when he acts in consequence of general laws that he has established. For example, I say that God acts in me by general volitions when he makes me feel pain when I am pricked [by a pin], because, in consequence of the general and efficacious laws of the union of soul and body that he has established, he makes me suffer pain when my body is ill-disposed. I say, on the contrary, that God acts by particular volitions when the efficacy of his will is not determined by some general law to produce some effect—thus, supposing that a body begins to move without being pushed by another, or without changes in the will of some mind, or without some other creature who determines the efficacy of some general law; I say that God would move this body by a particular volition. (OM V, 147-48)

As we had seen earlier, Malebranche made clear that the rarity of the event does not make a miracle. Rather the issue is whether the law that
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governs the series of modes is general or not. So, to make our mode-swapping example a miraculous one, let us stipulate that the divine volition involved is a particular volition. That is, it is not applicable to any other instances of my finger being pricked and is an exception to the general volition connecting finger prickings with pain.

The key question about this scenario concerns the identity of the modes involved. Recall that the modes of pain and pleasure were swapped respectively between myself and George. Should we think that the modes of pain and pleasure are different modes due to the fact that they are possessed by different individuals? Or are the identity conditions of modes, for Malebranche, independent of such factors? As I have been suggesting, I think Malebranche is committed to the view that the states or modes are neutral with regard to both the law that governs them and the substance to which it belongs. That is, for Malebranche, states or modes do not lose their identities simply because they belong to a different substance or are governed by a different law of the series. As we saw, one state might be the occasion for God’s general volition and the very same state might prompt his miraculous activity via a particular volition. Moreover, in our swapping case, the very same mode of pain, which is usually conjoined to the mode of a finger pricking, was conjoined to the chewing of a ripe peach. So we have no good reason to think that the modes themselves would have to change because they were conjoined to different preceding modes. Nor does Malebranche seem to have any grounds to suggest why they would have to be different. Modes or states, then, seem completely open to how they are bundled together and, in this sense, Malebranche seems to lack the resources to prohibit the possibility that a mode of one individual substance might belong to another. Despite our efforts to envision a Malebranchean surrogate for Leibnizian developmental laws, Malebranche’s own views about
creaturely states and the laws do not allow him to prohibit the mixing and matching of modes.

5. Yet Another Malebranchean Response

But is it really the case that Malebranche lacks the resources to prohibit the possible mixing and matching of modes? And, more importantly, perhaps even if he lacks these resources, is such mixing and matching decisively problematic? We will devote the remainder of the paper to addressing these final questions.

Let us first consider the former question. Might we have been too quick in coming to the conclusion that Malebranche does not have the resources to rule out such mixing and matching? There is some textual evidence that could suggest hastiness on our part. For instance, in his Réponse, in arguing for why there are no motive forces in bodies, Malebranche states, “if moving force belonged to bodies, it would be a mode of their substance, and it is a contradiction that modes go from substance to substance.” This strongly suggests that Malebranche does not think that modes can move from one substance to another. We might think that this is evidence that Malebranche prohibits a kind of mixing and matching. The thing to note here, however, is that even if Malebranche did prohibit the transfer of modes, it is not clear on what grounds Malebranche could base this prohibition or whether he is entitled to it. Unfortunately, Malebranche does not provide any further explanation. But perhaps Malebranche was thinking that the transfer of motive forces presupposes the “free-floating” of modes—that the

transferring modes come apart from the substance and exist, however instantaneously, without inhering in a substance. And Malebranche might have thought it to be a prerequisite of the basic setup of the substance/mode ontology that modes cannot be detached from substances at any time. If this were Malebranche’s reason, then he would not have been alone, since Leibniz too finds the detachment of modes or accidents from substances problematic:

Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did. (Monadology 7, AG 214)

Malebranche then does seem to be on common ground with Leibniz, if he had wanted to argue that the migration of modes is impossible, because free-floating is impossible.

But note that our scenario need not involve the detachment and transfer of modes in this sense. In fact, in our scenario, it is not the case that the mode of pain that I had once possessed momentarily free-floats and is later transferred to George. Rather we had imagined a case where, on the occasion of the pricking of my finger, the sensation of pain, yet to occur, occurs in George. In other words, it is not the case that the sensation of pain had occurred in me and then transferred over to George. Rather, we are imagining that God, on the occasion of the finger pricking, instantiates a particular volition where a different soul is made to have the pain, instead of instantiating the general law that such prickings are followed by pain felt by the soul whose body is being pricked. So, on the scenario proposed, there need not be the problematic case of free-floating of modes just described. What this suggests is that the prohibition against free-floating modes does only so much in ruling out cases of mixing and matching. The migration of modes that have
already been possessed by an individual substance is ruled out. But this does not rule out the possibility that a mode that ordinarily would have occurred in one individual actually occur in a different individual. In other words, prior to a mode’s being actually assigned and possessed by an individual, the no free-floating dictum lacks a target. We will of course need to consider why such ‘pre-possession’ swapping of modes is problematic at all. But let us first consider what further resources might be at Malebranche’s disposal to resist even the possibility of such ‘pre-possession’ swapping.

Against the possibility of the pre-possession swapping of modes, I think Malebranche can also say that there are very good reasons to think that such mixing and matching will not occur in our actual world. To support this claim, Malebranche would most likely point to God’s preference for the simplicity of his ways. Particular volitions of the kind that would bring about the swapping of modes are so particular and complex that acting on such laws would be antithetical to the economy of God’s ways, according to which God’s modus operandi is to use the simplest means. What are the simplest means? As we know, Malebranche notes, in such places as the Treatise on Nature and Grace, that the simplest means are achieved when God acts by general laws:

An excellent workman should proportion his action to his work; he does not accomplish by quite complex means that which he can execute by simpler ones, he does not act without an end, and never makes useless efforts. From this one must conclude that God, discovering in the infinite treasures of his wisdom an infinity of possible worlds … determines himself to create the world which could have been produced and preserved by the simplest laws, and which ought to be the most perfect, with respect to the simplicity of the ways necessary to its production or to its conservation.20)

20) OM V, 28. The English translation is from Patrick Riley, Treatise on Nature and
Given God’s preference for the simplicity of his ways, Malebranche could argue, it is extremely unlikely that the swapping we had imagined earlier would occur in this world. For even if an intervention of this sort would bring about more perfect outcome, Malebranche’s God is loathe to violate the simplicity of his ways.

All this would be rather reassuring to my colleague George, but the “God’s preference of simplicity” response does not really address the issue at hand. My scenario of ‘pre-possession’ mixing and matching of modes was intended to show that there is nothing about the modes themselves nor the laws that govern them that prohibits such mixing and matching on the Malebranchean scheme of things. In contrast to how Leibnizian laws were embedded in the modes in such a way that the modes themselves, in virtue of the internally encoded developmental law, prohibit any change in the series of modes, there is no such prohibition in Malebranchean modes. The laws are fundamentally extrinsic to the creature and its modes. Regardless of whether such cases of pre-possession mixing and matching actually occur in the world, it is clear that there is nothing to the modes themselves, or the possible laws that govern the series of modes, that prohibits the possibility that my finger picking is connected to George’s feeling pain. If neither the modes themselves nor their relation to the developmental law rule out mixing and matching, there is a sense in which mode-swapping is still very much possible, unlike Leibnizian scheme. That is, if we bracket the external circumstances that might kick in—such as facts like God’s preference for the simplest laws—we get a sense that, on the Malebranchean scheme, mode-swapping is eminently possible because there is nothing within the modes themselves that anchor the prohibition. On Leibniz’s scheme, the impossibility of mixing and matching was grounded in facts about the

modes themselves and their laws, since the modes and laws were connected in such a way that the modes did not suffer such mixing and matching. Hence there is what we might call an “intra-modal” ground that prohibits mixing and matching in Leibniz’s case. In Malebranche, there are no such intra-modal grounds. For Malebranche, it is not the modes but rather God that does not suffer swapping. And these considerations, I contend, tell us something important about the nature of Malebranchean individual substances and their modes.21)

This bring us to the second question raised earlier. We might wonder why the lack of intra-modal grounds of prohibiting the mixing and matching of modes is problematic at all, given that such miracles do not, or are extremely unlikely to, occur on Malebranche’s scheme. To put the question differently, why does it have to be ‘intra-modal’ grounds that rule out the possibility of mixing and matching? In answering this question, I believe we get to the core concern that Leibniz had about Malebranche’s occasionalist system. The worry is that the lack of an intra-modal ground for prohibiting mixing and matching raises serious worries about the integrity and unity of created substances.

Let us return to our original scenario of mixing and matching. So I am going through a series of modes $M_1$, $M_2$, $M_3$ and am about to experience the sensation of pain, $M_4$. George is going through the series of modes $N_1$, $N_2$, $N_3$ and is about to have the sensation of tasting a ripe peach, $N_4$. I

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21) One note of caution about my suggestion that an occasion could be subsumed under multiple laws, allowing for mixing and matching scenarios: I wish to make clear that I am not suggesting that for Malebranche any mixing and matching of modes is possible—that is, that any two modes of any two creatures can be connected. Malebranche, in fact, thinks there are various eternal truths that are immutable and necessary which guide the exercise of divine volitions and as such they are not subject to voluntaristic intervention. In Prémotion and the Dialogues, Malebranche explicitly states that certain relations of magnitude and perfection are inviolable. But the scenario envisioned above, I take it, does not violate these restrictions.
have contended that, on Malebranche’s scheme, it is possible for N_4 to occur in my series, while M_4 occurs in George’s series. Nothing about the modes themselves or the possible laws prohibits this possibility. Moreover, had God not intervened in this miraculous manner, the very same modes of M_4 (the pain sensation) and N_4 (the peach taste) would have occurred within myself and George respectively. So obviously it is possible that M_4 and N_4 occur in myself and George respectively. This tells us that facts about which substance these modes are ultimately assigned and belong to have no effect on their identity conditions. In other words, the identity conditions of M_4 and N_4 are not affected by and are neutral with respect to the issue of which substances they will be modes of. If so, it appears as though these modes could have been modes of any human soul.

Moreover, notice that there is nothing particularly special about M_4 and N_4. The same observation holds for the rest of my modes as well as George’s—that is, M_1, M_2, M_3, N_1, N_2, and N_3, etc. In fact, it applies to all the modes that I have, or, for that matter, all of the modes that you have. For just as it was possible for M_4 to occur in George and N_4 in me, any mode of mine or yours could have miraculously occurred in George and vice versa.

So, on this Malebranchean picture, the series of modes that make me up do not seem to be particularly connected to me, nor to each other. In other words, not only does the relation between the series of modes and the substance that is me tenuous, there also seems to be no real connection between the modes themselves. In fact, the tenuousness of the connection between what are supposedly my modes and me as a

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22) We might wonder why we are restricting the possible substances to human minds. As noted earlier, Malebranche makes clear that there are certain relations of perfection that prohibit certain distribution of modes, and I take it that if the mode of tasting a ripe peach were given, as it were, to a rock, this would constitute a violation of the relations of perfections Malebranche had in mind.
substance seems to raise questions about whether my modes are fundamentally dependent on the substance that is me. Hence, on Malebranche’s scheme of things, the modes that are mine seem much closer to members of a bundled whole than modes that have a fundamental dependence on me as a substance. It is as if they are accidentally bundled into the aggregate that turns out to be me. For, the members of the bundle did not have to be part of this bundle. Moreover, they would have been the very same modes, even if they had been members of a different bundle. In fact, it seems as though I am nothing more than the bundle of modes that has the actual modes that I have gone through, a picture of substance that seems remarkably Humean in many respects.

But, on such a bundle model, the worry arises that the modes seem more fundamental than the bundle itself. And I believe it would not be at all surprising if Leibniz took this to be too much of a disruption of the basic substance/mode ontology, which in my view endorses two key principles: (1) the priority of substance over mode, in the sense that there is an asymmetric dependence relation between substance and mode; (2) relatedly, the modes of a given substance are united in the substance in such way that the substance is thought to posses a unity per se. Thus, if the modes are more fundamental than the bundles they comprise, and if the aggregate modes are nothing more than a bundle, then Leibniz could have taken this as evidence that the Malebranchean bundles of modes are not substances after all. For how could the states or modes of a substance be more basic than the substance in which they supposedly have their being and essentially depend? Moreover, how could a substance’s unity to be so weak as to be merely a bundle? So, whether intended or not, the basic ontological framework of a world consisting of substances and their modes along with the asymmetric dependence relation seems to be shaken to the core on this Malebranchean scenario. For the essential
ontological priority that substances have over their modifications is radically reversed and the unity per se that substances possess is lost. The picture in which substances are the results of the bundling together of modes is tantamount to rejecting the critical features of the basic substance-mode framework.

6. The Charge of Spinozism

From our post-Humean vantage point, the idea that things are merely bundles of modes might not seem that foreign or preposterous. Also, as Berkeley’s philosophical notebooks attest, even in Malebranche’s time period, the suspicion that we as minds are mere “congeries of perceptions” was in the air.23) Whether intentional or not, it seems as though Malebranche’s system was rather amenable to this conception of things at least with regard to the status of creaturely substances. This would not be the only overlapping of views, given the other affinities Malebranche and Hume share—for instance, their analysis of causation as necessary connection and their denial of such necessary connections between creatures.24) But it is difficult to deny that this would be a new radical understanding of what it is to be a thing or substance. And the relevant


24) Many commentators have notice the similarity between Malebranche and Hume with regard to their views on causation. As McCracken has shown, the similarity is not coincidental, since Hume was deeply influenced by Malebranche. See McCracken, Charles J., 1983, Malebranche and British Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
point for us is that this kind of total repackaging of what it is to be a substance might have been too much for Leibniz.

We are well aware of his emphasis on unity as the distinguishing feature of a true substance. As he noted to Arnauld, “that which is not truly one being is not truly one being either (AG 86). So suppose that Leibniz was not willing to give up this basic feature of the basic substance/mode framework. Leibniz would have then insisted on maintaining that modes in principle have their esse in the substance of which they are modes, and their identity conditions are inseparably tied to the substance. If so, then as long as Malebranchian modes are indeed modes of a substance, they must be modes of some substance that guarantees their esse and identity. Evidently, it cannot be the bundled individuals that are the substances in question, since the modes do not have the kind of essential dependence on these bundles. Rather, as we have seen, it seems to be the other way around: the bundles result from the aggregation of modes, and the modes seem to be ontologically more basic. If so, then this can only mean that the individual creatures to which we had thought these modes belonged are not substances after all, and the modes are modes of a substance distinct from the bundles. In other words, what we had thought to be creaturely substances are in fact merely bundles of modes, and there is a true separate substance to which all modes and their bundles owe their esse and identity. The prospect that this substance is none other than the one, unchanging, permanent, divine substance seems right around the corner, along with the full-blown charge of Spinozism.

We might ask, so why is Leibniz immune from Spinozism? Why do creatures enjoy genuine substancehood in his case? I take it that it is because for Leibniz the laws bind and unify the modes. The binding or unification makes it the case that the modes are essentially tied to the
series itself. And these laws in turn constitute the core causal nexus of created substances, their primitive forces. Earlier, we had seen Leibniz claim that for Malebranche laws bestowed only an "extrinsic denomination" on things, while his view entails that the laws are "inherent" in the things themselves (AG 158). We are now in the position to make more sense of this critical difference. Recall that I had suggested that laws that govern bundles of modes free-float from the laws in Malebranche’s case, while laws for Leibniz are intricately connected to the modes within the series by being built into, as it were, their identity conditions. Free-floating bundle laws are extrinsically related to the modes, since while the issue of which bundle a mode belongs to is specified by the law in question, this specification is irrelevant to the identity conditions of the modes themselves. Whether a mode is specified to belong to one bundle by a general law or to another, different bundle by a particular law, the mode itself maintains its identity. That a mode can be subsumed under different laws nicely brings out the fact that the laws are extrinsic to the modes. In contrast, on the Leibnizian picture, the developmental law is intrinsic to modes in the sense that it is this law that ties all the modes of the series into this unified, unique whole in such a way that the identity conditions of the mode itself is tied to the law of the series. One might even suggest that the laws governing modes have a prescriptive role in that the laws are constitutive of the identity conditions of the modes. For every mode there is only one law that can govern it. In my view, it is this unity that underwrites the substantiality of Leibnizian creatures.

This is, of course, not to suggest that the options for Malebranche have been exhausted at this point. In particular, with regard to the issue of the per se unity of substances, there might be further resources that Malebranche might have access to such that he can avoid the reduction
of substances to mere bundles of modes. For instance, there might be something like a primitive notion of substantial soul, which is something over and above the modes that a soul has, and what ensures its per se unity. I am not confident that Malebranche can reach back to such a resource, but, even if he did, I do not think it would be surprising if Leibniz had additional arguments for such a primitive notion of substantiability should be rejected. But this discussion will have to wait for a different occasion.

Some brief concluding remarks. I have argued that Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism as Spinozism basically comes down to the claim that the lack of causal forces tying together the states of an individual leads one to accept that the individual turns out to be a bundle of modes. But these ‘bundled’ individuals, Leibniz is arguing, are not real substances after all. For if such bundled individuals were substances, then this would imply that the modes are more basic than the substance, which violates the essential dependence modes have on their substance. The causal forces or laws that unify the modes of creatures, then, are not superfluous features that a creature might have or lack. Their very status as substances depend on there being such forces that anchor the modes. This is why Leibniz so emphatically claims in the De Ipsa Natura that “the very substance of things consists in a force for acting and being acted upon” (AG 159), or so I have argued.25

25) The earliest ancestor of this paper is a chapter of my dissertation. Much has changed since that initial attempt, but the main goal—that of making sense of Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism—has endured throughout the years. Other earlier versions of this paper were delivered at numerous conferences, and I thank the audience for their questions, comments, and criticisms. I give particular thanks to Lisa Downing, Sung-il Han, William Taschek, and the anonymous referees of this journal for their generous comments, criticisms, and suggestions.
Leibniz's Criticism of Occasionalism as Spinozism
Bibliography

Abbreviations of Leibniz’s works
LA The correspondence between Leibniz and Antoine Arnauld. Cited by pages of GII.

Other Historical Sources


Secondary Sources
라이프니츠의 기회원인론 비판

이 석 재

후기 철학의 주요 저술인 『자연 그 자체에 관하여』에서 라이프니츠는 기회원인론은 결국 스피노자주의-신만이 유일한 실체이며 피조물은 모두 신의 양태에 불과하다는 입장-로 전락하고 만다는 강한 비판을 제기한다. 이 비판의 핵심에는 인과적 힘을 결여한 것은 실체일 수 없다는 전제가 자리하고 있다. 문제는 기회원인론자들이 이러한 전제를 받아들일 이유가 없다는 데 대표적인 기회원인론자인 말브랑슈는 피조물의 인과력을 부정하지만 그렇다고 유한 실제의 존재를 부정하지는 않기 때문이다. 라이프니츠는 이 논변에서 스스로에게 유리한 실제 개념을 제시함으로써 선결문제의 오류를 벗기고 있다는 우려마저 자애한다. 본 논문은 실제성의 필수적인 요소로 인과력을 제시하는 라이프니츠의 논변을 기존의 해석과는 다른 각도에서 살펴봄으로써 그가 어떻게 스스로의 실제 개념을 정당화하는지 규명하고자 한다. 필자의 해석에 따르면, 인과적 힘이 없이 사물은 지속하지 않고, 사물이 지속하지 않으면 개별화되지 않는다는 논변으로 라이프니츠의 시도는 재구성될 수 있다. 이 때 라이프니츠는 사물의 지속을 가능하게 하는 근거는 피조물 내에 있는 내부적인 힘이어야 한다는 조건을 첨부하는데, 필자는 이 조건의 근거로 양태의 실제의존성에 대한 라이프니츠의 입장에 주목한다. 이러한 재구성을 통해, 필자는 라이프니츠의 논변이 나름대로 설득력을 지닐 수 있다는 주장은 떠는 동시에 서양근대사기에서 실제와 인과성에 대한 핵심적인 논쟁의 한 단면에 대한 이해를 도모하고자 한다. 본 논문의 궁극적 목적은 인과력에 기반한 라이프니츠의 실제론을 터득하려고 있는 중요한 논
변에 대한 새로운 해석을 제시하고자 한다.

주제어: 라이프니츠, 말브랑슈, 기회원인론, 인과, 스피노자주의, 실제, 지속성, 양태