Identity in Fiction

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【Abstract】 In this paper, I present a very interesting observation about identity in fiction. I call it the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability. It is the phenomenon that two names that have the same referent cannot be used interchangeably in some context. I argue that the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds in the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense. I then show one application of the phenomenon in defending Kendall Walton’s account of fiction against Fred Kroon’s objections to him.
In this paper, I present a very interesting observation about identity in fiction. I call it the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability. After arguing that the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds in the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense, I show one application of the phenomenon in defending Kendall Walton against Fred Kroon’s objections to him.

Consider the following. My friend M had weird dreams two nights in a row. They were slightly different from each other. M told me about them. Here is what she said:

First dream: (1) I was standing, and I saw there was me in front of me, looking at me (it was me!). She approached me and touched my left cheek with her right hand.

Second dream: (2) I was standing, and I saw there was me in front of me, looking at me (it was me!). I approached her and touched her left cheek with my right hand.

Since ‘I’ and ‘She’ in both statements refer to the same person, M, if we replace them by ‘M’ in these statements, both of them will look as follows:
(3) M was standing, and M saw there was M in front of M, looking at M. M approached M and touched M’s left cheek with M’s right hand.

Now statement (3) is misleading in the sense that it describes two dreams as the same while they are in fact different. To make this difference clear, we need to index the names as follows:

(1)* M_1 was standing, and M_1 saw there was M_2 looking at M_1. M_2 approached M_1 and touched M_1’s left cheek with M_2’s right hand.

(2)* M_1 was standing, and M_1 saw there was M_2 looking at M_1. M_1 approached M_2 and touched M_2’s left cheek with M_1’s right hand.

In this way, we can differentiate the first dream and the second dream. We can recognize something very interesting here. ‘M_1’ and ‘M_2’ in these statements refer to the same person, M. In M’s both dreams, M_1 = M_2. However, we cannot use these names interchangeably in the above context. In the first dream, it was M_2 who touched M_1, not the other way around, and in the second dream, it was M_1 who touched M_2 and touched M_1, not the other way around. Let’s call this phenomenon ‘identity without interchangeability.’

Sometimes we have this kind of dream about ourselves. For example, in a dream, I am flying in the sky, looking down and watching myself riding a bike below. Or in a dream, I am outside the classroom, looking into the window and watching myself sitting in the classroom. We can observe that the phenomenon of ‘identity without interchangeability’ holds in all of these dreams.

One might object as follows. In the above dreams, only one of them is M and the other person is someone else who only looks exactly like M.
No one can be located at two places at the same time. Also, M must have dreamed from the first person point of view. In her first dream, she must have felt that her left cheek was touched by someone’s hand, and in her second dream, she must have felt that her right hand touches someone’s cheek. Judging from this first person point of view, we should conclude that in the first dream, M is the person who was touched by someone who looks exactly like her, and in the second dream, M is the person who touches someone who looks exactly like her.

In an actual case, if I see someone who looks exactly like me, it would be reasonable for me to judge that the person in front of me is not myself, but someone else, because in a normal case, it is indeed impossible for one person to be located at two different places at the same time. However, we are talking about a dream. In a dream, things that cannot take place in an actual, normal situation can happen. Thus, in my dream, if I felt and judged in my dream that I saw there was me in front of me, it seems true that in my dream I saw there was me in front of me. It was my dream after all and I felt and judged so in my dream.

If someone insists that we dream from the first person point of view, and judging from this first person point of view, there can be only one of M in the dream, we can easily find other examples that can avoid this objection. Consider two of my dreams about M:

First dream: (4) M was standing and in front of her, there was M (there were two Ms!). The first M approached the second M and she touched the second M’s left cheek with her right hand.

Second dream: (5) M was standing and in front of her, there was M (there were two Ms!). The second M approached the first M and she touched the first M’s left cheek with her right hand.
Since ‘the first M,’ ‘the second M,’ and ‘she’ in both statements refer to the same person, M, if we replace them by ‘M’ in these statements, both of them will look as follows:

(6) M was standing and in front of M, there was M. M approached M and M touched M’s left cheek with M’s right hand.

Now statement (6) is misleading in the sense that it describes two dreams as the same while they are in fact different. To make this difference clear, we need to index the names as follows:

(4)* M₁ was standing and in front of M₁, there was M₂. M₁ approached M₂ and M₁ touched M₂’s left cheek with M₁’s right hand.

(5)* M₁ was standing and in front of M₁, there was M₂. M₂ approached M₁ and M₂ touched M₁’s left cheek with M₂’s right hand.

In this way, we can differentiate the first dream and the second dream. ‘M₁’ and ‘M₂’ in these statements refer to the same person, M. One cannot object that judging from the first person point of view, only one of them is M. It was not M’s dream but my dream and in my dream, I was only watching two Ms. In both of my dreams, M₁ = M₂. However, we cannot use these names interchangeably in the above context. In the first dream, it was M₁ who touched M₂, and in the second dream, it was M₂ who touched M₁. I claim that in these dreams, we can observe the phenomenon ‘identity without interchangeability.’
Now I would like to extend my claim about the phenomenon ‘identity without interchangeability’ to other contexts: this phenomenon is common not only in dreams, but also in fictions. Consider a novel where the main character Ned, sees (another) him following and watching over him several times. \(^1\) Suppose that in one instance Ned sees him following him and then Ned laughs at him, and in another instance Ned sees him following him but this time, another Ned, who is following him, laughs at Ned. If we describe these situations, we will have the following:

(7) Ned sees him following him and Ned laughs at him.

(8) Ned sees him following him and he laughs at Ned.

Since ‘he’ in both statements refers to the same person, Ned, if we replace them by ‘Ned’ in these statements, both of them will look as follows:

(9) Ned sees Ned following Ned and Ned laughs at Ned.

Now statement (9) is misleading in the sense that it describes two instances as the same while they are in fact different. To avoid this, we need to index the names as follows:

(9) Ned sees Ned following Ned and Ned laughs at Ned.

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1) One example is Daniel Keyes’ *Flowers for Algernon*. See Daniel Keyes (1995), *Flowers for Algernon*, Orlando: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Some might object that it is only in Charlie’s imagination that he sees another him watching over himself. However, we can easily write up a new fiction where it is not in the character’s imagination that this kind of situation happens, but it actually happens.
(7)* Ned₁ sees Ned₂ following Ned₁ and Ned₁ laughs at Ned₂.

(8)* Ned₁ sees Ned₂ following Ned₁ and Ned₂ laughs at Ned₁.

‘Ned₁’ and ‘Ned₂’ in these statements refer to the same character, Ned. In this novel, Ned₁ = Ned₂. However, we cannot use these names interchangeably in the above context. The phenomenon ‘identity without interchangeability’ holds in the fictional context.

This phenomenon also holds in the fictional context in an extended sense.² Suppose Bill Clinton is looking at his statue made by a famous artist, and suppose Clinton touches the statue. Suppose also that Bill Clinton is looking at his statue made by another famous artist, and suppose that the statue’s hand touches Clinton when Clinton is moving around the statue.

According to Walton’s account of fiction, when we appreciate a work of fiction or a work of representation, we are engaging in a game of make-believe and we make-believe or imagine that a certain proposition is true.³ For example, when we read a novel, say, the Sherlock Homes story, we make-believe that we are reading the true description of an actual detective called ‘Sherlock Holmes.’ If the story says Sherlock Holmes is brilliant, we make-believe that the actual detective Sherlock Holmes is in fact brilliant. Similarly, when we see the painting that depicts people dancing around the fire, we make-believe that we are actually seeing people dancing around the fire. When a certain proposition is true in a game of make-believe, that proposition is fictional. In the first example, it is fictional that we are reading the true

² I will explain what the fictional context in an extended sense is below.
description of an actual detective called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and it is also fictional that the actual detective Sherlock Holmes is in fact brilliant. In the second example, it is fictional that we are seeing people who are dancing around the fire.

We can see that not only does the fiction itself create the fictional context, but the fiction and the appreciator together also create the fictional context. Compared to the fictional context created by the fiction and the appreciator together, the fictional context created by the fiction alone is narrower in the sense that the former context involves more ‘characters’ and more ‘(fictional) truths’ than the latter context. The Sherlock Holmes story and I, as a reader of this story, together create a game of make-believe in which there are more characters, because it includes me as well as those characters in the Sherlock Holmes story. And because of this, there are more propositions that are true in this game of make-believe than in the Sherlock Holmes story. For example, it is true in this game of make-believe that I am reading the true description of an actual detective called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ but it is not true in the Sherlock Holmes story. For this reason, let’s say that the fictional context created by the fiction alone is the fictional context in a narrow sense and the fictional context created by the fiction and the appreciator together is the fictional context in an extended sense. According to Walton’s account, appreciating a fiction creates the fictional context in an extended sense.

Let’s apply this account to the above situations. Clinton is engaging in a game of make-believe with the statue. Since the statue represents Clinton, Clinton makes-believe that he touches Clinton in the first situation. In the first situation, it is fictional that (10) Clinton touches Clinton. In the second situation, Clinton makes-believe that Clinton touches him. In the second situation, it is fictional that (11) Clinton touches Clinton.
Statement (10) and statement (11) say exactly the same thing while two situations are different. In order to distinguish between them, we need to index the names.

(10)* Clinton₁ touches Clinton₂.

(11)* Clinton₂ touches Clinton₁.

‘Clinton₁’ and ‘Clinton₂’ refer to the same person, Clinton. That is, Clinton₁ = Clinton₂. But we cannot use these names interchangeably in this context. ‘Identity without interchangeability’ holds in the fictional context in an extended sense.

To sum up the discussion in this section, the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds in the fictional context in a narrow sense, and we have seen this with statement (7)* and (8)*. This phenomenon also holds in the fictional context in an extended sense, and we have just seen this with statement (10)* and (11)*.

There is one thing to note here. In the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense, the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds, whether names are empty or not. In our example of the dream context, the name refers to the real person. But we can easily think of a dream in which two Alyosha Karamazovs talk to each other about their other brothers. In this dream, Alyosha Karamazov₁ = Alyosha Karamazov₂, but these names cannot be used interchangeably in this context. In our example of the fictional context in a narrow sense, names are empty. However, we can easily write up a novel in which two Clintons talk to each other about Hillary. In this fiction, Clinton₁ = Clinton₂, but these names cannot be used interchangeably in this context. Lastly, in our example of the
fictional context in an extended sense, names refer to the real person. But again, we can easily think of a situation in which we are watching a play where two Hamlets talk to each other. In this game of make-believe, Hamlet\(_1\) = Hamlet\(_2\), but, these names cannot be used interchangeably in this context.

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In the above section, I have presented a very interesting phenomenon that holds in the dream context and the fictional contexts: identity without interchangeability. To my knowledge, this is a noble phenomenon, which no one else has observed in the literature so far. I believe that if explored more in detail and more in depth, this phenomenon will tell us more about the nature of fiction and dream. More importantly, I expect that if we appeal to this phenomenon, some puzzles and problems involving fiction and dream can be solved. Below, I will give one example.

There have been important objections to Walton’s account of fiction raised by Fred Kroon.\(^4\) Kroon suggests two kinds of puzzles for Walton. The first puzzle is this: In reality, P is Q, but P is described in a fiction that not-Q. So we get contradiction that P is Q, and P is not-Q. For example, Clinton is in reality quite handsome. But suppose that the statue of him in the example mentioned in section 3 represents him as not so handsome. Then, according to Kroon, if we apply Walton’s account of

fiction, we get the contradiction that Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome.

The second puzzle is this: S is engaging in the game of make-believe with a fiction in which S is described to have a certain attitude R towards himself. S, learning this, has the attitude toward S that is opposite to R. So we get the contradiction that S has the opposite-to-R-attitude towards S because S has the attitude R towards himself. For example, Tom is watching a movie about himself. In the movie, he is described as ruining his life with a certain unhealthy obsession, and everyone except Tom pities him. So in the movie, Tom does not pity himself. In reality, Tom is a person who particularly pities people who do not pity themselves. So watching the movie, Tom pities this movie character Tom. Then, according to Kroon, if we apply Walton’s account of fiction, we get the contradiction that Tom pities Tom because Tom does not pity himself.5)

Both puzzles are supposed to show that Walton’s account implies a contradiction where a contradiction is neither expected nor desirable. I will defend Walton against Kroon’s objections by appealing to the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability. It is not my purpose in this paper to claim either that this is the only way of defending Walton or that this defense is far better than other ways. I only would like to show that there is an important application of the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability.

Let’s consider the first puzzle. Note that what we get from the example is not that it is true that Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome, but that it is fictional (it is true in a game of make-believe) that Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome. That is, the alleged contradiction is produced inside of the fictional context in an extended sense. If we recall what we have seen in my discussion about

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5) See also Stacie Friend (2000), p.196.
the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability in the fictional context in an extended sense, we can see that the following statement is not a contradiction but only ambiguous:

(12) Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome.

If we disambiguate it, we get the following:

(12)* Clinton₁ is handsome and Clinton₂ is not so handsome.

‘Clinton₁’ and ‘Clinton₂’ refer to the same person, Clinton. But once statement (12) is disambiguated and we get statement (12)* where we can distinguish between Clinton₁ and Clinton₂, there is nothing contradictory about it, because we are talking about the fictional context in which the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds.6),7)

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6) One reviewer raised the following worry. According to my account, in this fictional context, both “Clinton₁ = Clinton₂” and “Clinton₁ ≠ Clinton₂” seem true. Then, my account does not get rid of a contradiction. Instead, it reintroduces another contradiction. This is an excellent point and it is indeed a legitimate worry. I would like to claim that “Clinton₁ = Clinton₂” is true in this context, because, as I have explained above, both of them refer to the same person, Clinton. Philosophers such as Walton accept (or at least are committed to) this kind of identity, so it is not just me who claim so. However, I would like to deny that “Clinton₁ ≠ Clinton₂” is true in this context, for the same reason why “Clinton₁ = Clinton₂” is true in this context. To the objection that the same person cannot be placed at two different places at the same time, I would like to respond that it is a fictional context that we are talking about (see section 2 above), and to the objection that Clinton₁ and Clinton₂ have different properties, I would like to respond that although I had different properties at age 5 than I had at age 30, I as a person at age 30 am still the same person as me at age 5. That is, it does not follow from the fact that they have different properties that they are distinct. Therefore, my account does not introduce another contradiction.

7) One reviewer raised the following worry. Perhaps there is a no reference involved in the context of fiction, but only “an as-if reference” involved, and if this is the case, then “Clinton₁ = Clinton₂” is not true in the fictional context. Actually, Walton
Let’s consider the second puzzle. Here again, what we get is not that it is true that Tom pities Tom because Tom does not pity himself, but that it is fictional (it is true in a game of make-believe) that Tom pities Tom because Tom does not pity himself. Again, if we recall what we have seen in my discussion about the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability in the fictional context in an extended sense, we can see the following statement is not a contradiction but only ambiguous:

(13) Tom pities Tom because Tom does not pity Tom.

If we disambiguate it, we get the following:

(13)* Tom1 pities Tom2 because Tom2 does not pity Tom2.

‘Tom1’ and ‘Tom2’ refer to the same person, Tom. But once statement (13) is disambiguated and we get statement (13)* where we can distinguish between Tom1 and Tom2, there is nothing contradictory about it, because we are talking about a fictional context in which the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds.

Walton’s account of fiction does not imply a contradiction. If we have in mind that it is the fictional context in an extended sense where the himself claims that there is no real reference involved when we are engaging in a game of make-believe, and we only pretend to refer to something. I think that this is a legitimate worry. However, according to Walton’s account, even if there is only “pretending to refer,” we still make-believe that we refer to something, and thus it is true in this game of make-believe that we refer to something. And as we have seen (section 3 above), according to Walton’s account, when a certain proposition is true in a game of make-believe, that proposition is fictional, that is, it is true in this fictional context. Thus, it is true in the fictional context that Clinton1 and Clinton2 refer to the same person, and therefore “Clinton1 = Clinton2 ” is true in the fictional context, even if there is no real reference but only an as-if reference involved.
phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds, there is nothing contradictory about (12)* and (13)*. We have only the ambiguity, and once we get rid of the ambiguity, we can make perfect sense of them. Kroon’s objections to Walton fail.

5

In this paper, I presented an interesting observation about identity in fiction, which I call the phenomenon of Identity without interchangeability. I showed that this phenomenon holds in the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense. I also showed we can appeal to this phenomenon in defending Kendall Walton against Fred Kroon’s objections to him.8)

8) I thank Stuart Brock, Eric Chwang, Brian Kierland, Sungsu Kim, and Bradley Monton for their helpful discussions and comments. I also thank anonymous referees for their kind and helpful comments.
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픽션에서의 동일성

김 세화

이 논문에서 나는 픽션에서의 동일성에 대한 매우 흥미로운 현상을 제시한다. 이 현상을 나는 “동일하지만 서로 대체될 수 없음”이라고 부른다. 이것은 동일한 지시체를 지닌 두 이름이 어떤 맥락에서는 서로 대체되어 사용될 수 없는 현상을 말한다. 나는 이 현상이 꿈의 맥락, 좁은 의미에서의 픽션의 맥락, 넓은 의미에서의 픽션의 맥락에서 일어남을 보인다. 그리고 마지막에 나는 이 현상이 적용되는 한 예시를 보인다.

주요어: 꿈, 픽션, 이름, 애매성, 색인, 동일성, 대체되어 사용됨