The Changing Relationship between Labor Unions and Civil Society Organizations in Postwar Japan

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This article examines the historical development of the relationships between labor unions and civil society organizations (CSOs) in postwar Japan from the 1950s to the 2000s. The paper focuses on union-CSO relationships in three periods: the “post-authoritarian” period (the 1950s), the period of controversies over industrial pollution (from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s), and the period of union decline and neoliberalism (the 1990s and the 2000s). In the first period, the labor movement led coalitions as a “vanguard.” In the second period, the relationship between labor unions and CSOs became distant or tense. In the third period, to regain their social presence, labor unions formed coalitions with non-profit organizations (NPOs), and relationships between unions and CSOs were relatively equal. The third period also saw the development of more militant union-CSO coalitions to oppose labor market deregulation.

Keywords: labor unions, civil society, social movements, industrial pollution, NPOs
Introduction

This article examines the historical development of the relationships between labor unions and civil society organizations (CSOs) in postwar Japan, covering the period spanning from the 1950s to the 2000s. Over the sixty-year period the policy orientations of the labor movement, the state of civil society, and characteristics of union-CSO relationships went through many changes. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the historical changes in union-CSO relationships comprehensively. Instead, I focus on union-CSO relationships in three periods: the “post-authoritarian” 1950s, the period of controversies over industrial pollution from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, and the period of union decline and neoliberalism of the 1990s and the 2000s. Union-CSO relationships in the first and second periods were shaped by contentious politics over the pressing issues Japanese society faced in each respective period: issues of political democracy, the nation’s position in the Cold War, and widespread industrial pollution perceived to be a negative consequence of rapid economic growth.

In the first period, the labor movement adopted politicized and anti-government stances, engaging in struggles against what it regarded as the reactionary policies of the conservative government. CSOs in this period tended to be under the influence of the labor movement and leftist political parties, and union and party activists played a “vanguard” role in union-CSO coalitions. In the second period, union-CSO relationships became more distant. Labor unions were institutionalized in the political and industrial relations systems, while CSOs, especially those concerned with industrial pollution issues, acted on their own to solve grievances and distanced themselves from broad political and social issues. Some unions and regional union federations formed coalitions with community groups involved in struggles against pollution-causing factories. Labor unions and resident groups, however, were unable to form enduring and effective coalitions due to their different movement styles.

The third period saw the development of two types of union-CSO coalitions. First, the labor movement sought coalitions with CSOs to reassert the weakened social presence of labor unions. The social presence of unions had become weak because of two related factors: a decline in union density and entrenched enterprise unionism. Unions came to be regarded as interest groups representing a shrinking core segment of the labor market (i.e., full-time workers in large firms) and as being little concerned with inequality in
Labor markets. Thus, the labor movement led by Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation, established in 1989) tried to reassert the social presence of unions by promoting the involvement of union members in civic activities. In this process, Rengo and its affiliated unions sought to form coalitions with CSOs, especially those CSOs that engaged in socially-relevant activities in such areas as social welfare and community building (often referred to as “NPOs” [non-profit organizations]). Second, neoliberal reforms of labor markets in this period triggered another form of union-CSO coalitions that engaged in more contentious politics: those unions representing the interests of disadvantaged workers in labor markets formed networks with social movements concerned with social and economic justice.

The second section of this article briefly discusses conceptual issues in union-CSO relationships: a definition of civil society and CSOs and issues related to the position of labor unions in civil society. The third, fourth, and fifth sections of the article respectively examine the development of union-CSO relationship in the “post-authoritarian” period, the period of controversies over industrial pollution, and the period of union decline and neoliberalism. The conclusion summarizes the changing characteristics of union-CSO coalitions over the sixty-year period and briefly discusses the state of civil society in the post-March 11 (the Great East Japan Earthquake) era.

**Conceptual Issues in Analyzing Union-CSO Relationships**

How do we define civil society and civil society organizations, and what position do labor unions occupy in civil society? Since it is beyond the scope of this article to review the myriad approaches to conceptualizing civil society, I focus on Sunhyuk Kim’s conceptualization of civil society, which he defines as “a set of self-organized groups and movements in society that are relatively autonomous from the state, basic units of production and reproduction, and political society, and are capable of political activities in the public sphere to express their interests according to the principles of pluralism and self-governance” (Kim 2000, p.15). In other words, civil society consists of CSOs whose activities are relatively unconstrained by the control of the state, business corporations, families, and political parties. Although Kim (2000) applies this definition of civil society to an analysis of Korea’s transition to democracy, I think his definition is universal enough to be applied to an analysis of CSOs and union-CSO relations in Japan.
We should note that the above definition is relative in the sense that it does not set absolute standards based on which organizations qualify as CSOs (see Kim 2000, p.15). Thus, the definition can accommodate cases that deviate from the standards of autonomy and plurality. For example, labor unions – the leftist unions that formed “vanguard” coalitions with CSOs in the 1950s are a case in point – may violate the principle of plurality by claiming that class interests take precedence over other CSO interests such as those based on gender, ethnicity, or environmental justice. Regarding standards of autonomy, political parties (actors in political society) take advantage of CSOs as bases of party support or control the activities of the latter for political purposes. The tendency of leftist parties to dominate CSOs often causes social movement activists to distrust political parties, as was the case of anti-industrial pollution movement activists in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s.

The position of labor unions in civil society may be another “deviation” from the standard of autonomy because labor unions have dual roles as associations of workers in civil society and as actors in industrial relations institutions. Unions, by bargaining collectively with management, often find it necessary to concede to the logics of corporate management and market competition at the expense of their associational functions. Enterprise unions, the dominant organizational form of labor unions in Japan and Korea, are more likely to be captured by the logic of corporate management than industrial unions in the West. Moreover, as I discussed in a case study of the Yahata Steel Union (the enterprise union of a major steel firm) from the 1950s to the 1970s, management dominated industrial relations to such an extent that the union had lost its “associational life,” i.e., its sphere of political and cultural activities autonomous from management, by the early 1970s. In this and other instances the role of unions as worker associations in civil society was considerably weakened (Suzuki 2003).

Then, what kinds of unions are capable of forming coalitions with CSOs? As I show below, in union-CSO coalitions the labor movement side in the first and second periods was represented by federations of unions at the national and regional levels, more specifically, Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, the leftist national confederation) and its prefectural and district councils (those established at the city and county levels). National and regional union federations were free from the constraints of enterprise-level industrial relations and were able to express the general interests of workers and their families at the national and regional levels as well as to be concerned with broad social and political issues. Prefectural and district
councils of Sohyo were in turn supported mainly by public-sector unions in their respective regions, such as the unions of local government workers, public school teachers and national railway workers.\footnote{These unions were Jichiro (the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union), Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers’ Union), and Kokuro (National Railway Workers’ Unions). Since these unions’ exposure to market logic was weak, they could more easily function as associations of workers. Private-sector unions, in contrast, because they faced the competitive forces of the market, were more likely to represent workers as employees.}

**Union-CSO Relationship in the “Post-Authoritarian” Period**

*A Brief History of the Labor Movement in the Early Postwar Years*

The 1945 Labor Union Law legalized unions as part of the reforms imposed by the General Headquarters (GHQ) during the US Occupation. The democratic reforms led to a rapid increase in enterprise-based or plant-based labor unions (hereafter enterprise unions). In addition to the enterprise unions and their industry-level federations, nationwide labor union organizations (national confederations) also formed. Both Sodomei (Japan Confederation of Trade Unions) and Sanbetsu-Kaigi (All Japan Congress of Industrial Unions) were formed in 1946 and represented rightist and leftist labor movements, respectively. Sodomei was formed mainly by pre-war rightist and middle-faction union leaders, while Sanbetsu-Kaigi was under the strong influence of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). The leftist Sanbetsu-Kaigi, rather than the rightist Sodomei, exercised leadership in the labor movement in Japan for some years after its post-1945 rebirth.

US Occupation forces changed their policy in Japan from democratization to economic recovery after the Cold War started, and they tried to suppress the increasingly combative labor movement. For example, in 1948, occupation forces restricted the rights of civil servants and public-sector workers to engage in collective bargaining and strikes. A 1949 revision of the Labor Union Law strengthened the power of management vis-a-vis labor unions. In addition, the economic austerity policies of the occupation forces had indirect repressive effects on the labor movement. Administrative restructuring due to the fiscal constraints forced administrative organizations and public corporations to cut personnel in large numbers. Cuts in government subsidies and loans to private companies also forced these companies to reduce their personnel. Such personnel cuts in the public and
private sectors dealt a serious blow to the labor movement as the cuts affected many leftist unionists. Moreover, as the Korean War started, the occupation forces launched the “Red Purge,” in 1950, which led to the dismissal of 13,000 workers in the public and private sectors by the end of the year.

As a result of these direct and indirect repressive policies, many enterprise unions were severely weakened or forced to disband. The influence of the leftist Sanbetsu-Kaigi diminished not only because of the repressive labor policies of the occupation forces but also because of internal conflict between pro-communist and anti-communist leaders. The internal conflict resulted in withdrawals of affiliated unions and a drastic reduction of its membership. Unlike the labor movement in South Korea, however, which experienced more forcible repression by the US Army Military Government (for example, the General Council of Korean Trade Unions [Chunpyung] was forcefully dissolved due to its close tie with the Community Party), the Japanese labor movement was largely spared from outright repression by the occupation forces, and the framework of the Labor Union Law introduced as part of the postwar democratization efforts remained intact.

**Movements for Peace and Democracy**

When the US Occupation of Japan ended in 1952, Japan had a formally democratic political system, but its substantive content was yet to be determined. I call the 1950s the “post-authoritarian” period because the legacies of the authoritarian regime that had ruled Japan until 1945 were still present in the 1950s even after the drastic political reforms of the US Occupation. The conservative parties that ruled the government tried to rearm Japan by revising the Peace Constitution of Japan and tried to enact “reverse course” policies to correct “excessiveness” in postwar democratization reforms. Labor unions, particularly those affiliated with Sohyo, formed coalitions with social movement organizations and actively participated in the movements for peace and democracy that opposed, not only the introduction of what they regarded as reactionary policies, but also the presence of US military forces under the US-Japan Security Treaty (Takabatake 1977).

Sohyo, established in July 1950, began as a centrist union confederation but soon adopted leftist policy lines under the impact of the Korean War and intensified East-West conflict. The second Sohyo convention, held in March 1951, adopted “Four Peace Principles” after heated discussions. The Principles opposed rearmament, called for maintaining neutrality (in the
Cold War), opposed sponsoring (US) military bases in Japan, and supported an overall peace treaty (rather than a peace treaty only with Western countries) (see Carlile 2005, p.178). The reason for this change in Sohyo’s political stance included a strengthened alliance among mid-level left-leaning union leaders of the major member unions of Sohyo and the spontaneous spread of support for pacifism among young union members who had had direct experience of World War II.

Sohyo formed its first coalition with civil society groups to promote the Four Peace Principles. The coalition called “the Peace Promotion People’s Conference,” established in July 1951, was initiated by Sohyo and the Council of Peace Movements of Religious Believers, an inter-faith religious organization (Morishita 2006). As Lonny Carlile put it, “[t]he conference was essentially a council that linked Sohyo with the JSP (the Japan Socialist Party), women’s organizations, religious organizations, and a variety of other mass organizations that could be mobilized in protest actions focused on the peace issue” (Carlile 2005, p.182). The conference actively organized rallies and public lectures, campaigning against the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the ratification of these treaties by the national Diet after they were signed in September 1951. After the ratification of the treaties, however, the union-CSO coalition became less active because the leadership of the movements for peace and democracy shifted from the conference to Sohyo and its affiliated unions. The conference ceased its activities in late 1952 (Morishita 2006).

Sohyo and its affiliated unions led the struggle against the passage of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, staging two waves of strikes in April 1952. Sohyo and leftist parties criticized this law for restricting the freedom of speech, assembly, and association guaranteed by the Constitution, and they expressed concern that the law would suppress labor unions. In the struggle against the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, Sohyo formed a loose coalition with a wide range of citizen groups, especially groups of intellectuals, writers, and journalists. These groups regarded the law as a revival of the notorious Peace Preservation Law of 1925 and played an important role in mobilizing public opinion in support of Sohyo’s political strikes. Despite the mounting opposition to the law, the government refused to retract the proposed law, and the national Diet passed the law in July 1952 (Okochi and Matsuo 1973; Yamada 2006, pp.75-76).

In the mid-1950s, labor and other social movement organizations protested against US military bases and supported residents who resisted the requisition of their farmlands and fishing grounds for military facilities. In
the struggle, in 1953-54, against a military firing range in Uchinada village in Ishikawa prefecture, the Sohyo prefectural council played a leading role supporting local residents by organizing anti-military base protests, and the union of Hokuriku Railways (a private railway line connecting the prefectural capital and Uchinada village) refused to operate freight trains carrying ammunition and other military materiel (Okochi and Matsuo 1973, pp.140-144). In 1955-56, the prefectural council and district councils in Tokyo supported local farmers in their struggle against the expansion of the US air force’s Sunagawa base in the city’s western suburbs. In this anti-base struggle, the Sohyo’s Tokyo prefectural council formed a coalition with the student movement organization (Zengakuren [National Federation of Students’ Self-Government Associations]). The labor and student movements mobilized a large number of union members and university students to join farmers in resisting attempts by the government (acting on behalf of the US military) to requisition farmland, clashing with the riot police and suffering injuries. The anti-base struggle by the coalition of unions, students, and farmers eventually led to the withdrawal of plans to expand the Sunagawa airbase (Tokyo Chihyo 1980; Michiba 2010, p.101).

In the second half of the 1950s, union-CSO-based coalitions for peace and democracy became more active and widespread. Their upsurge reflected popular reaction against reactionary or controversial policies of the conservative government: the introduction of a system of teacher performance evaluation in public schools in 1957 and 1958, the revision of the Police Official Duty Execution Law in 1958, and the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1959 and 1960 (see Shimizu 1966, pp.119-120).

With the LDP (the Liberal Democratic Party, the unified conservative party established in 1955) regarding the leftist-oriented Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers’ Union) as posing a threat to its conservative-dominated constituencies, the government instructed education boards in each prefecture to introduce a system of teachers’ performance evaluations (kinmu hyotei) in 1957. It was widely believed that the government intended to weaken Nikkyoso through discriminatory evaluations that favored docile over militant teachers. Nikkyoso’s argument that the introduction of the evaluation system would not only lead to repression of the teachers’ union, but also allow the conservative government to interfere arbitrarily with public education, resonated with popular sentiment. Nikkyoso’s campaigns against the performance evaluations — fought at the prefectural level because it was prefectural education boards that were to implement the evaluation system — afforded opportunities for the formation of prefecture-level “joint struggle
conferences” (kyoto kaigi) of unions. Some joint struggle conferences included CSOs. For example, the Wakayama prefecture Nikkyoso formed a joint struggle conference with the Wakayama prefectural council of Sohyo, the Buraku Liberation League, and other unions and CSOs. The Buraku Liberation League, an association of residents of “former outcaste communities,” had fought against social discrimination against people from these communities and gave strong support to the teachers’ union that fought against the system which would introduce discrimination among public school teachers (Nikkyoso 1970, p.352, p.377).

Although the campaigns of Nikkyoso and its allies did not succeed in preventing the implementation of the performance evaluations in most prefectures, these campaigns built an infrastructure for prefecture-level joint organizations (see Shimizu 1966, pp. 219-220). When the LDP government suddenly introduced a bill to revise the Police Official Duty Execution Law in the national Diet in the late 1958, prefecture-level joint struggle conferences against the revision were promptly established in all but one prefecture. At the national level, the JSP denounced the proposed revision as “an attempt to revive the police state,” and with 65 organizations formed the National Conference against the Revision of the Police Official Duty Execution Law. Although a wide range of civil society groups (e.g., women’s and youth organizations and associations of writers and artists) participated in the national conference, its leadership was dominated by the JSP, Sohyo, and Zenro Kaigi (National Trade Union Congress) (Shimizu 1966, p.220; Takabatake 1977, p.333; OISR 1999, p.300). The national conference and joint struggle conferences at the prefectural and district levels organized mass rallies and demonstrations. Labor unions staged large-scale political strikes on November 5, in which about 600,000 union members participated. Moreover, many citizens and intellectuals without any organizational affiliations joined the extra-parliamentary movements. Because of public opinion increasingly critical of the government and because of factional

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2 The revision aimed to strengthen the authority of police officers so that they could freely enter buildings such as union offices, detain suspects without arrest warrants, and disperse mass rallies. The government, through the revision, intended to suppress the campaigns against the performance evaluations that had spread all over Japan and to preempt a further development of mass movements, particularly movements against the planned revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty (OISR 1999, p.300).

3 Zenro Kaigi, which adopted more conservative policies, was established in 1954 by unions that opposed the increasingly leftist orientation of Sohyo.

4 About 140 district-level joint struggle conferences against the revision of the police duty law were established (Okochi and Matsuo 1973, p.339).
conflict within the LDP, the government was eventually forced to retract the bill (Okochi and Matsuo 1973, p.39; Takabatake 1977, p.333).

The movements for peace and democracy had reached their peak in the struggle against the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1959 and 1960. The security treaty revision was aimed at strengthening the military alliance between the two countries. Opponents feared that the revision would increase the chance that Japan would be forced into US wars against other countries. Moreover, a strengthened US-Japan military alliance would mean an erosion of Japanese neutrality in the Cold War, with neutrality a commitment shared by Sohyo and the JSP. Ultimately, Sohyo and the JSP held out for the abolition of the security treaty itself. As in the case of the movement against the revision of the police duty law, the movement against (the revision of) the security treaty consisted of the national-level conference and joint struggle conferences at the prefectural and district levels. The National Conference against the Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty was established in March 1959 by 134 organizations. Although the national conference covered a wider range of CSOs than the national conference against the revision of the police duty law, Sohyo, the JSP, and the JCP\textsuperscript{5} were the most influential actors in the organization. The national conference organized 22 rounds of “unified actions” – mainly mass rallies, demonstrations, and workplace assemblies by union members – from April 1959 to July 1960 (Michiba 2010, pp.93-94, p.108).

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the development of the anti-security treaty movement in detail. Instead, I will focus on two developments related to union-CSO coalitions. First, the relationship between the leadership of the national conference (Sohyo, the JSP, and the JCP) and the student movement (Zengakuren, which was a member organization of the national conference) became tense, as the latter undertook radical, direct action (e.g., storming the premises of the national Diet) in defiance of the leadership, which opted for more moderate actions (see Michiba 2010, pp.108-109). The student movement led by Zengakuren had become politicized in the second half of the 1950s, and split into new left political groups after the anti-security treaty struggles. Second, the scale of mobilization in the movement drastically increased after the LDP forced the ratification of the revised security treaty in May 1960. The undemocratic passage of the ratification bill changed public perception of the security treaty

\textsuperscript{5} The JCP participated in the National Conference as an “observer” but influenced its policies. Because of the presence of the JCP, Zenro Kaigi refused to participate in the national conference.
because the focal point shifted from the issue of military alliance to democracy. The scale of mobilization increased not only because labor unions mobilized a larger number of their members but because a large number of citizens, whether organized by CSOs or not, participated in mass rallies and demonstrations. These “spontaneously mobilized” citizens formed informal coalitions with union members. For example, citizens supported the political strikes staged on June 4, despite disruptions to public transportation due to strikes by national railway unions (see OISR 1999, pp.314-315; Michiba 2010, p.117).

Union-CSO Coalition Problems in the Post-authoritarian Period

Although the movements for peace and democracy in the 1950s, led by Sohyo and the JSP and with participation by CSOs, were unable to prevent the government from implementing controversial domestic and foreign policies (they did stop the revision of the Police Official Duty Execution Law, though), these movements influenced subsequent policies. From the 1960s, the government avoided openly adopting “reverse course” policies, instead emphasizing the national goal of improving peoples’ livelihoods through economic growth.

Despite their political impact, the movements had internal problems, particularly in the relationships between unions and CSOs. As already indicated, union-CSO coalitions formed during the campaigns against reactionary government policies were “vanguard coalitions” in the sense that labor unions (especially Sohyo and its prefectural councils) and leftist parties (especially the JSP) played the leadership role. In the early 1950s the relationship between unions and CSOs seemed to be relatively equal when Sohyo formed coalitions with the Council of Peace Movements of Religious Believers and with communities of intellectuals, writers, and journalists in the campaigns against only signing peace and security treaties with Western nations and the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, respectively. In the struggle against the expansion of the US air force’s Sunagawa base in 1955-56, the labor unions (the prefectural council and district councils in Tokyo) respected the leadership of local famers and focused on mobilizing union members in support of farmers (Tokyo Chihyo 1980, p.481). In the national conferences against the revision of the Police Official Duty Execution Law in 1958 and the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1959-60, however, the influence of labor unions and the leftist parties, particularly that of Sohyo, became stronger. Sohyo asserted its leadership position in the national
conferences because it had the power to mobilize a number of people disproportionately larger than other organizations of the national conferences (Michiba 2010, p.95).

There were other organizational problems as well, particularly with regard to the two national conferences formed in the late 1950s. First, the decision-making structures of the coalitions were centralized in the hand of a few leadership organizations at the national level. Prefecture-level coalitions (joint struggle conferences) had no formal say in running the coalitions and were relegated to receiving directives from the national leadership. Many CSOs, which participated in the coalitions at the national or prefectural levels, were also excluded from the decision-making process (see Ishida 1961, pp.220-221). Second, major participating CSOs in the national conferences were often “penetrated” by activists of Sohyo, the JSP, and the JCP and were under the influence of these powerful outside organizations (Takabatake 1977, p.328). In other words, these CSOs were not autonomous actors in civil society in the sense that they were drawn into the sphere of political society (see the conceptual discussion of civil society above). For example, among major CSOs of the National Conference against the Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the Japan Peace Committee was under the influence of the JCP. Other CSOs, such as the National League to Protect the Constitution of Japan and Association of Women for the Protection of Human Rights, were under the influence of the JSP. Still other CSOs, such as the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and Japan–China Friendship Association, were under the influence of Sohyo and the two leftist parties (Michiba 2010, p.93).

The vanguard union-CSO coalitions challenging controversial policies of the conservative government continued into the 1960s, as seen in the case of the 1965 struggle against the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The scale of the movements, however, shrank. This was not only because the government avoided openly taking “reverse course” policies, but because many CSOs asserted autonomy in their activities and distanced themselves from Sohyo and the leftist parties. Only those CSOs controlled by the leftist forces participated in the coalitions with unions (see Takabatake 1977, p.346).
Union-CSO Relationships in the Period of Controversies over Industrial Pollution

The LDP government shifted its policy focus from politicized issues to economic growth in the early 1960s to defuse the movements for peace and democracy. While it largely succeeded in defusing these movements, the government policies that gave top priority to economic growth gave rise to another serious source of social conflict.

From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, there was an upsurge of social movements against industrial pollution. Discharges from petro-chemical plants, paper mills, oil refineries, and power plants contaminated sea water, farm land, and the air, and local residents suffered from poisoning and asthma caused by these sources of pollution. Victims of “pollution diseases” and local residents organized anti-pollution movements and opposed the construction of pollution-prone plants in their neighborhoods. At least three thousand anti-pollution “citizen movements” were formed by 1973 (McKean 1981, p.20). In the late 1960s, early in the campaigns, the anti-pollution social movement was dominated by movements of pollution victims and their supporters who filed lawsuits seeking compensation from the offending companies. Plaintiffs in the so-called “Big Four” industrial pollution lawsuits (Niigata Minamata disease [mercury poisoning], Yokkaichi air pollution [asthma], Toyama Itai-Itai disease [cadmium poisoning], and Kumamoto Minamata disease) filed suits from 1967 to 1969 and were victorious in district and higher courts from 1971 to 1973. The success of the plaintiffs and the increased media coverage of industrial pollution cases brought about cycles of anti-pollution protest all over Japan, to an extent that even the government felt pressure to legislate what were, in 1970, “the world’s strictest set of anti-pollution laws” (McKean 1981; Broadbent 1998).

These anti-industrial pollution social movements, often referred to as “resident movements” (jumin undo), were concerned with specific issues that local communities faced, such as seeking compensation for pollution victims and opposing the construction of pollution–prone plants. Participants in these movements regarded labor unions and the leftist parties with distrust because they suspected the leftist forces would take advantage of issues of industrial pollution for their own political purposes. Instead, they emphasized strategies based on “self-reliance and self-help,” avoiding “formal political affiliation and highly ideological language, preferring instead to build a non-partisan (muto muha) alliance of protesters” (Avenell 2010,
This distrust was fed by fundamental differences between the two types of movements: resident movements devoted their energy to removing threats to their livelihoods and did not hesitate to engage in long-term uncompromising struggles, while the movements led by Sohyo and the JSP were framed by national-level themes of opposition to the LDP government and were more willing to compromise on specific issues (Takabatake 1977, p.356).

The distrust in labor unions did not mean the absence of union-CSO coalitions in the anti-industrial pollution movements. Some, if not all, resident movements formed “common-cause coalitions” with labor unions, particularly with the district councils of Sohyo and public-sector unions, such as Jichiro (the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union), that were the main supporting organizations of district councils. With notable exceptions (see below for the case of the enterprise union of Chisso), enterprise unions of pollution-causing plants did not participate in coalitions with resident movements. Enterprise unions were concerned with economic interests such as jobs and the wages of union members. They were averse to supporting residents whose actions, such as filing lawsuits against polluters, came in direct conflict with the interests of unions and their firms (see Shirai 1971, p.9).

A survey conducted by Sohyo in 1976 indicated that there were district councils with the potential for becoming coalition partners. According to the survey of 411 district councils, 44 responded that they took up “anti-pollution struggles” as one of their three most important long-term commitments. Out of the 44 district councils, 23 councils took up “anti-pollution struggles” as their most important issue. Although the number of district councils most concerned with pollution issues was much smaller than the number of district councils most concerned with organizing activities/support for union members involved in labor disputes (167) or with negotiations with local governments (78), the number of such district councils was larger than the number of district councils most concerned with “anti-war and peace movements” (12) or with election campaigns (3) (Sohyo

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6 “Common-cause coalitions” are one of three types of coalitions between unions and non-labor organizations identified by Frege, Heery and Turner (2004) - the other types being “vanguard coalitions” and “integrated coalitions.” This type of coalition is “characterized by an attempt to identify separate but associated interests behind which a coalitions can form,” and unions and their partners engage in “cooperative, joint action” based on their associated and complementary interests. These coalitions, however, are unstable, “as the distinct interests of unions and their coalition partners move out of alignment” (Frege et al. 2004, pp.142-143).
The aggregate data of the survey on district councils did not show how district councils addressed pollution issues or whether they formed coalitions with resident movements. In the following, I briefly discuss the relationships district councils and their member unions formed with resident movements in two cases of industrial pollution, one in Yokkaichi city (Mie Prefecture) and the other in Fuji City (Shizuoka Prefecture). I also discuss an exceptional case of a “blue-green coalition” in which the enterprise union of a pollution-causing company (Chisso) formed a coalition with social movements of pollution victims and their supporters.

*The Case of Air Pollution, Yokkaichi Petroleum Complex*

Local residents living downwind from the Yokkaichi petroleum complex suffered from respiratory diseases (Yokkaichi asthma) due to sulfur dioxide (SO₂) air pollution emitted by oil refineries and chemical and power plants in the complex. The number of Yokkaichi asthma patients certified by the city government between 1965 and 1970 was 732 (31 of whom died or committed suicide). In September 1967 nine asthma patients filed a lawsuit against six companies operating plants in the petroleum complex, demanding that these companies pay them compensation for having caused their severe health damage (one of the “Big Four” industrial pollution lawsuits).

When the lawsuit was filed, no anti-pollution movements existed among residents at the grass-roots level. Public-sector unions in Yokkaichi, especially the union of city government workers (the union affiliated with Jichiro), played a leading role in preparations for the lawsuit. These public-sector unions were Yokkaichi area Sohyo district council members, but the council did not support the lawsuit because its membership also included enterprise unions that represented workers in the petroleum complex, particularly those at some of the defendant companies.

One year after filing the lawsuit, pollution victims organized their own association, the Association of Certified Patients of Yokkaichi Asthma. The Association of Certified Patients was established to support the nine plaintiffs of the lawsuit and demand public policies to secure their livelihoods. Toward the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, residents in the affected areas and

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7 The response rate of the survey was 32.2 percent (411 out of the total of 1,276 district councils). Survey results may not exactly represent the general trends of activities of district councils.

8 The following account is based on Ono (1971), Jichiro Mie-ken Honbu (1990), and Sawai (2012).
their supporters became active in grass-roots movements against industrial pollution. The Association of Mothers in Shiohama to Protect their Children was a grass-roots group formed by mothers of children suffering from Yokkaichi asthma in Shiohama, the area most affected by the pollution. The Association of Mothers and other residents in the area planned to file on their own a second lawsuit against polluters “to regain a blue and unpolluted sky,” rather than to gain monetary compensation (the filing of the second lawsuit was not realized) (Sawai 2012, pp.133-135).

These grass-roots groups were independent from leftist organizations such as labor unions and sometimes disagreed with these organizations over goals and methods. This did not mean, however, the total absence of coalitions between unions and grass-roots movements; individual union members and activists, particularly the secretary-treasurer of the district council, supported patients and residents. These activists conducted hearings for asthma patients to record their living conditions and suffering as pollution victims. They also organized and/or participated in popular education programs for residents on pollution issues. The programs afforded residents opportunities to start their own movements.

The Case of Resident Movements against the Construction of a Power Plant in Fuji City

Fuji City was a company town dominated by the paper industry since the early twentieth century. Residents had long suffered from air, water, olfactory, and other forms of pollution discharged from the paper mills. The announcement of a plan to build a new thermal power plant in 1968 spurred the development of anti-pollution movements in Fuji City and its neighboring towns. Residents feared that the power plant would add another source of pollution to the environment. The Citizens’ Council of Countermeasures against Pollution in Fuji City was established as a coalition between the Fuji district council of Sohyo, leftist parties, and resident groups. The Citizens’ Council tried to raise anti-pollution consciousness among residents by holding “educational meetings.” Moreover, residents and union members occupied the city assembly hall to block the passage of a construction permit for the power plant, clashing with riot police.

The anti-pollution coalition between the Sohyo district council and resident groups, however, started to unravel when, in 1970, the mayor of Fuji

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9 The following account is based on Ashikawa (2000), Koda (2005), and Arakawa (2012).
City, who had been supported by the Citizens’ Council, was elected. Some leaders of the Citizens’ Councils were also elected to city assembly members. Although their election to public offices was a result of the intensification of the anti-pollution movement, the supposedly “progressive” city government turned out to be more pro-business than expected and compromised on pollution-related issues. Moreover, the Sohyo district council stood on the side of the city government, weakening the anti-pollution principle of the citizens’ council. Thus, the relationship between the city government, supported by the Sohyo district council, and resident groups committed to environmental protection became tense.

The Case of the Coalition between the Enterprise Union of Chisso and Social Movements of Pollution Victims and their Supporters

Chisso Corporation was one of the leading chemical companies in Japan, and its original plant was located in Minamata, Kumamoto Prefecture. The government formally announced in 1968 that organic mercury discharges from Chisso’s Minamata plant had caused Minamata disease. By the time of the official announcement, 111 people had been diagnosed with the disease, 42 of whom died. Although the government argued that there had been no new Minamata disease patients since 1961, these victims turned out to be the tip of the iceberg.

The enterprise union of Chisso (Shin Nitchitsu Union, hereafter the SNU) made a “declaration of shame” (haji sengen) in its 1968 convention for having failed to fight against Minamata disease, which their own company had caused, and made supporting the victims an official policy of the union. While the Sohyo district council of Minamata city, whose largest member was the SNU, was also involved in the issue of Minamata disease, the SNU was the main actor on the union side in the “blue-green” coalition. The SNU’s main coalition partners were the Citizens’ Council for Minamata Disease Countermeasures (hereafter the Citizens’ Council) established by local residents in Minamata City and a social movement group called “the Association to Indict (those responsible for) Minamata Disease (Kokuhatsu suru Kai, hereafter the Association to Indict). The Association to Indict was originally formed in the city of Kumamoto in April 1969 to support activities of the 29 patient families who filed a lawsuit against Chisso (another case of the “Big Four” industrial pollution lawsuits). The Association aimed to do on

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10 The following account is based on Kikuchi (1983), George (2001), and Suzuki (2015b).
a wider geographic scale what the locally-based Citizens’ Council could not do, such as publicity and fundraising. The Association to Indict later developed into a network of autonomous local branches established by concerned citizens in other cities such as Tokyo and Osaka, becoming one of the most well-known cases of anti-pollution social movements.

The SNU, the Citizens’ Council, and the Association to Indict worked closely with two groups of Minamata disease patients, the “the Trial Group” (the plaintiffs in the lawsuit) and the “Direct Negotiation Group” (a group of newly-certified patients demanding direct negotiations with Chisso). At the trial against Chisso, the SNU supported the plaintiffs by providing inside information about the plant. After the Kumamoto district court handed down a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in March 1973, the SNU put one of its leaders in charge of supporting patients in the post-trial negotiations with Chisso.

Why did the SNU, through its coalition with the social movement and patients’ groups, fully support the struggles of patients and their families against Chisso? The relationship between the SNU and Chisso management had been very adversarial since the six-month lockout/strike over wage issues in 1962-63. After the dispute, management made every effort to reduce the membership of the SNU and to increase membership of the pro-management second union established during the labor dispute, for example, by reassigning 75 percent of SNU members to totally new workplaces, many of which were “the most unpleasant and menial tasks.” Managers also tried to “coerce them into joining the new (pro-management) union” or into accepting voluntary retirement (George 2001, pp. 168-169). The experiences of discrimination, harassment, and repression by management after the dispute changed the consciousness of members of the SNU about Minamata disease and Chisso culpability. According to Tatsuaki Okamoto, one of the SNU leaders who played an important role in forming the coalition with the groups concerned with Minamata disease, victims of the disease were “invisible” to union members for a long time. The experiences of management’s attempts to whittle away at the union through discrimination and harassment and the union’s struggle against them made union members “free spirited workers,” and this “free spirit” made the suffering of Minamata disease patients and their families visible to union members (Okamoto 1971, p.45). This transformation of union members formed the basis of solidarity between union members and Minamata disease victims. The union made a “declaration of shame” in 1968 based on the transformation and held Chisso culpable for the Minamata disease (Kikuchi 1983, p.308).
Union-CSO Relationships in the Period of Union Decline and Neoliberalism

The labor movement and social movements in civil society went through many changes since the mid-1970s. In the labor movement, the influence of enterprise unions in export-oriented industries that were cooperative with management became dominant. At the same time, the influence of public-sector unions, which were less exposed to the logic of markets and more socially-oriented, became weak. The shift in the power balance between private-sector unions, which tended to be cooperative with management and governed by the logic of markets, and socially-oriented public-sector unions promoted the movement led by the former to unify the labor movement under one dominant confederation. In the late 1980s, the two major national union confederations, which had represented the leftist and rightist currents of the labor movement, Sohyo and Domei (Japanese Confederation of Labor), were dissolved, and the labor movement was “unified” with the establishment of Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) in 1989. In the same year, two small national union confederations, Zenroren (National Confederation of Trade Unions) and Zenrokyo (National Trade Union Council) were established by the leftist unions critical of the moderate policy orientations of Rengo (for details, see Suzuki 2015a, pp.555-557).

Rengo, with its membership accounting for 62 percent of organized workers in Japan, as of 1990, was expected to strengthen the political and social presence of the labor movement, especially by influencing and participating in the policy-making process of the government on behalf of the working people. At the very moment that Rengo embarked on enhancing its organizational presence in the political field, however, the Japanese economy plunged into deep recession, and the government closely embraced neoliberal and deregulatory policies. Rengo, while opposing government deregulation of the labor market, could not exert any influence on the formation of such policies. Although the environment surrounding the labor movement changed radically in the 1990s, most enterprise unions affiliated with Rengo maintained their cooperative stance. Despite corporate restructuring and personnel cuts implemented by companies under severe economic pressure, these enterprise unions did not reassert their independence from management nor revive their associational functions. Instead, these restructuring policies helped increase formal and informal labor-management consultations at the enterprise level, further embedding
enterprise unions in the logic of corporate management, reducing their capacity to negotiate with management as representatives of their members.

One of the major reasons for (and one of the major consequences of) the declining influence of the labor movement at the national and corporate levels was a decline of union density and absolute numbers of union members. Union density declined after 1975 from 34.4 percent to 23.8 percent in 1995 and to 18.7 percent in 2005. The number of union members continued to increase until 1994 but began its decline in 1995. Union density in the private sector was below the overall rate, which included the public sector, falling to 19.8 percent in 1997. It further declined to 16.0 percent in 2006 (Suzuki 2015a, p.562).

Promotion of Union Civil Involvement through Coalitions with NPOs

Top leaders of Rengo felt the declining political and social presence of labor indicated a looming crisis and set up “the Rengo Assessment Committee” in 2002. The committee consisted of seven external members (a lawyer, three academics, a journalist, an NGO activist, and a writer) and submitted its final report in September 2003. The report made critical comments on the current state of Rengo and its affiliates and made proposals for the future direction of the labor movement. The report characterized enterprise unions as representing narrow interests of regular workers and criticized them for their inability to adapt themselves to rapid social and economic changes. The report also called upon the labor movement to break away from enterprise unionism and become more independent as a social movement. It proposed that labor unions should actively participate in civil society by forming alliances or networks with NPOs and by encouraging union members to participate in NPO activities (Rengo 2003). It should be noted that, although the report also called on labor unions to devise organizing strategies targeting those workers who had been underrepresented by unions, such as non-regular workers, young people, women, and workers in small and medium-sized enterprises, it did not propose union-CSO coalitions as a strategy to organize these workers. As is well known, labor unions in the United States often form coalitions with community groups and other CSOs for the purpose of organizing immigrant workers in low-paid service sector jobs. In contrast, members of the Rengo Assessment Committee saw an importance in coalitions between labor unions and NPOs, not because such coalitions would contribute to union organizing, but because they would help unions regain their legitimacy as important actors in civil society.
Labor Unions and Civil Society Organizations in Postwar Japan

Rengo and its affiliated unions sent about 50,000 union members as disaster relief volunteers in the aftermath of the 1995 Hanshin Awaji earthquake and has promoted the involvement of union members in civic activities (often referred to as “volunteer activities”) through collaborations with NPOs since then. The report of the assessment committee seemed to endorse these policies of Rengo and its affiliated unions. The purpose of union-CSO coalitions since the mid-1990s, though, was different from that of the union-CSO coalitions in the previous periods discussed above. The union-CSO coalitions in the previous periods were anti-establishment in orientation. They opposed the government’s domestic and foreign policies in the first period and protested against companies that caused industrial pollution in the second period. In contrast, Rengo and its affiliates promoted coalitions with NPOs, not to mobilize mass movements against the government or business, but to address at the level of local communities social problems closely related to people’s livelihoods. For example, about 20 percent of Rengo’s prefectural organizations\(^\text{11}\) either established or supported NPOs that engaged in provision for the elderly, childcare, and other social services (Rengo 2000).

To explain fully the development of union-CSO coalitions that engaged in “non-contentious” politics in the 1990s and 2000s, we need to see how social movements in civil society had developed since the mid-1970s. Many observers of civil society point to a transformation of social movements from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s: a shift from movements centered on “accusatory” and “resistance” styles of activism (typical examples of which were anti-pollution resident movements) to those centered on “proposal” and “participatory” styles of activism. The new types of civil society/social movement groups proposed “alternatives to established practices in government, politics, and activism,” rather than protesting and accusing businesses and government (Avenell 2009, p.249). These CSOs, often referred to as citizen activities (shimin katsudo), engaged in social welfare, community building, and environmental protection types of activities, often in collaborative relationships with government bureaucrats and business corporations (Inoue 1997; Ushiyama 2003; Avenell 2009; Ishikawa 2010). And these CSOs attained a legal status as NPOs when the Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities was passed in 1998. While some observers

\(^{11}\) Rengo’s prefectural organizations (chiho rengokai) are not successor organizations to Sohyo’s prefectural councils. After the dissolution of Sohyo, its prefectural and district councils were either dissolved or transformed into voluntary organizations with fewer resources. Rengo established its prefectural and district organizations from scratch.
interpreted the transformation of CSOs as evidence of a maturing of civil society, others were skeptical of the origins of proposal and participatory style movements and pointed out the role of the state and business in influencing their policy orientations. Whether formed spontaneously, or under the influence of the state or business, Rengo and its affiliated unions preferred these proposal- and participatory-style CSOs as coalition partners.

Militant Forms of Union-CSO Coalitions against Neoliberalism

While union-CSO coalitions formed by Rengo and its affiliated unions did not engage in contentious politics, neoliberal reforms of labor markets triggered another, more militant, form of union-CSO coalitions. Although cooperative enterprise unions dominated the labor movement, an alternative form of union organizations, individually-affiliated unions, has developed since the early 1980s. These unions had a regional representational structure, with members drawn from a number of firms. Often referred to as “community unions,” they covered those workers who fell outside the coverage of enterprise unions, such as part-time and other non-regular workers, workers in small firms, and foreign workers. In 1990, 60 community unions representing 10,000 workers established a loose nationwide network called the CUNN (Community Union Nationwide Network). Currently (in the mid-2010s), the CUNN has 76 affiliates and represents about 20,000 workers (the CUNN website, accessed on June 12, 2015).

Community union activists formed or joined networks to tackle policy issues such as the deregulation of the Labor Standard Law and social issues such as the increase of the working poor among young people. These networks were often based on loose personal networks among community union activists, those of labor-related NGOs and other social movements that maintained their militant style of activism (despite the rise of apolitical, non-contentious CSOs to their mainstream position), and experts such as lawyers and academics. Unlike coalitions between organizations often seen in union-CSO coalitions in the United States, these personal networks were fluid and

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12 As Simon Avennell argued, the state supported “the most cooperative and institutionally useful of these [new civic] groups,” while “(c)orporate actors have fostered social capital-type activism, with targeted support for prominent civic groups and the creation of civic networks” (Avenell 2009, p.283).

13 In addition to those unions affiliated with the CUNN, regional-level organizations of Rengo and Zenroren established individually-affiliated unions, which represented 15,000 and 10,000 workers, respectively.
lacked solid organizational structures, such as liaison committees of activists involved in networks. One such network organized a campaign called “Say No to the Revision of the Labor Standard Law” against the deregulation of the law in 1998, organizing numerous rallies and other forms of collective actions throughout Japan. Two rallies held in Tokyo in November 1997 and April 1998 gathered 3,000 and 4,000 participants, respectively. Another example was a network concerned with worker livelihood issues such as housing. The Tokyo-based network, the Anti-Poverty Campaign (Han Hinkon Net), consisted of activists from various anti-poverty movements, union activists, lawyers, and other concerned individuals. It sought to realize humane livelihood and labor conditions based on social and political solutions to poverty issues. Networks of union and social movement activists including the Anti-Poverty Campaign played an important role in the movement to set up an emergency camp at Hibiya Park in the center of Tokyo (called Hakenmura, literally “a village of [jobless] dispatched workers”) during the 2008-2009 end-of-year/New Year holiday period. The emergency camp provided food and shelter for about 500 unemployed non-regular workers who had lost their jobs and housing because of the economic and financial crisis. The movement drew wide media attention and put strong pressure on the government to reconsider its neoliberal labor market policies (see Suzuki 2012, pp.69-71, pp.82-83; Suzuki 2015a, pp.562-563).

Conclusion

This article examined the historical development of union-CSO coalitions, focusing on the post-authoritarian period (the 1950s), the period of controversies over industrial pollution (from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s), and the period of union decline and neoliberalism (the 1990s and the 2000s). The characteristics of union-CSO coalitions changed over time, mainly reflecting changes in the organizational strength and mobilization power of labor unions. In the first period, the largest national confederation, Sohyo, had strong organizational power, was capable of mobilizing a large number of union members, and played a “vanguard” role along with leftist parties when it formed coalitions with CSOs in political campaigns against reactionary government policies. CSOs accepted, if reluctantly, their subordinate positions in the coalitions because they lacked sufficient organizational resources. In the second period, despite the incorporation of labor unions, particularly private-sector unions, into industrial relations
institutions, labor unions still maintained strong organizational power. Although anti-pollution resident movements were poor in resources, they were wary of domination by unions and leftist parties and maintained arm’s length relationships with labor unions. Thus, union-CSO coalitions formed in this period were unstable because conflicts of interests between coalition partners led to their dissolution, as in the case of the anti-pollution coalition in Fuji City. The “blue-green” coalition in the case of Minamata, however, was an exception to the general tendency of union-CSO coalitions in this period.

In the third period, the organizational strength of the labor movement declined, as evidenced by a steady decline in union density. Labor unions sought coalitions with NPOs to regain their presence in civil society but from a position of weakness. They and NPOs stood on an equal footing in coalitions, despite the fact that labor unions still had greater organizational resources than NPOs. It should be noted that union-NPO coalitions promoted by Rengo and its affiliates were reactive in the sense that labor unions sought to regain what they had lost in the past, i.e., the strong social presence of unions. More proactive coalitions were built based on networks of community union activists, social movement activists, and experts. The latter coalitions maintained militant stances and engaged in mobilization-based actions to oppose deregulation of labor markets and to assist those who had suffered from the consequences of the neoliberal turn in the Japanese economy.

The state of civil society in Japan has drastically changed since the Great East Japan earthquake and the triple disaster of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011. The denuclearization movement started in late March and spread throughout Japan like wildfire. The “Good-bye to Nuclear Energy” rally held in Tokyo on September 19, 2011 was attended by 60,000 people and was the largest denuclearization rally since the start of the movement in March. On the same day, similar mass rallies took place in other large cities in Japan. An even bigger “Good-bye to Nuclear Energy” rally was held in Tokyo on July 16, 2012. With the participation of 170,000 people, it was the largest turnout in the post-March 11 denuclearization movement. The large turnout reflected the government’s forced restart of the number three reactor at the Oi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukui Prefecture on July 1 despite widespread opposition. Although the turnout of anti-nuclear energy rallies and demonstrations has declined since then, numerous grassroots social movement groups continue to mobilize against the restart of nuclear power plants and seek to bring government bureaucrats and TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) officials culpable of the nuclear disaster to
How did labor unions respond to the activation of social movements in post-March 11 civil society? Did they participate in contentious politics over the nuclear energy issue by forming coalitions with denuclearization movement groups? Union-CSO coalitions on this issue did not develop on a wide scale. Although two smaller leftist confederations, Zenroren and Zenrokyo, expressed their anti-nuclear energy stances and formed coalitions with denuclearization movement groups, the largest confederation, Rengo, remained neutral on the nuclear energy issue and distanced itself from the denuclearization movement. Rengo’s attitude reflected membership of pro- and anti-nuclear energy unions and the tendency of the confederation to give a priority to maintaining organizational unity over playing a role as a civil society actor.

Social movements in civil society have also reacted to other contentious issues, such as the government’s decision in 2014 to drastically change Japan’s security policy by permitting the Self Defense Forces to exercise collective self-defense. Although the activation of civil society affords new opportunities for union-CSO coalitions, many labor unions, particularly those affiliated with Rengo, seem to be unwilling to form coalitions with social movement groups and get involved in contentious politics. If social movements gain momentum because of these contentious issues, the inward-looking attitude of labor unions will, in contrast, make them more marginalized actors in civil society.

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