What Made the Civic Type of National Identity More Important among Koreans? A Comparison between 2003 and 2010*

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This study aims to describe and explain the recent change in national identity in connection with the process of globalization that Korea has experienced in the last two decades. Analyzing data from the 2003 and 2010 Korean General Social Survey, our results show that Koreans’ worry about negative socio-cultural influence caused by an increase in the number of immigrants, namely the problem of social integration and harms to the Korean tradition and culture, resulted in increased civic and mixed types of national identity. In addition, stronger perceptions about immigrants taking jobs away and about immigrants’ contribution to the national economy strengthened ethnic identity, suggesting that Koreans tend to consider immigrants as having two separate kinds of economic influence: the first is their influence on the Korean economy as a whole, and the other is their influence on competition among individuals. All in all, the results indicate that Koreans started to realize that incoming immigrants are not just visitors but neighbors beside whom they must live. The worry that these immigrants lack the qualities necessary for them to become Korean citizens may result in an increased emphasis on the importance of the civic and mixed type of national identity. Since the mixed type of national identity is a combination of ethnic and civic national identity, its increase in importance would be partly affected by the fact that Koreans have come to think of the civilian virtue of immigrants as being critical.

Keywords: national identity, civic identity, ethnic identity, mixed identity, globalization, socio-cultural influence, immigrants

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Introduction

Korea is one of the most homogeneous societies in terms of ethnicity and culture. For most Koreans, ethnicity and nationality are the same: Korean nationals are ethnic Koreans. Only a few foreigners resided in Korea permanently until very recently. Now the situation is changing. Racial and ethnic diversity has increased rapidly since the 1990s, due to an increase in the number of foreign workers, foreign brides, children of multicultural families, and repatriated Koreans, in addition to foreign students and tourists. Indeed, in 2012, the number of foreigners residing in Korea for more than 90 days amounted to 1,445,103, or 2.8 per cent of the population. Thus, Korean society seems to be becoming a multicultural society.

Korea did not officially accept immigrants, with the limited exception of international marriage migrants, certain categories of professionals, and those who had invested a certain amount of money in Korea. But Korea began to accept foreign workers for a limited period of time in the late 1980s, mainly because of the scarcity of blue-collar workers. As the Korean economy entered the post-industrial stage, unskilled workers became rare and Korean workers tended to avoid the so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs. Furthermore, the average wage of Korean workers increased due to economic growth and strong union activities. So, companies that needed lower-skilled workers either moved factories to less-developed countries such as China and South-East Asia or imported workers from those countries. Since the latter option is costlier and harder, many small and medium-sized companies opted for the former option. Responding to this situation, the government allowed the industries to import foreign workers beginning in the early 1990s. These migrant workers were usually allowed to stay in Korea for at best two years during the 1990s, after which they have to return to their countries. But many of them remain in Korea after the expiration of their contract to take advantage of better economic opportunities, and become illegal foreign workers (Seok et al. 1998; Seok 1998). According to one estimate, the number of illegal foreign workers could be more than three times the number of legal foreign workers. Between 1992 and 1994, for example, there were 15,000 legal foreign workers in Korea, while illegal workers numbered more than 55,000. As of 2011, the number of foreign workers, both legal and illegal, is estimated to be 670,000, a little less than half of the total foreigner population in Korea (Seok et al. 2003; Chung 2012).

The number of international marriages among Koreans has also rapidly
increased recently. Koreans who married foreigners numbered 110,362 in 2007. But the figure had increased to 144,681 by 2011, 9 per cent of the total marriages in that year. 90 per cent of international marriages are those with spouses from East Asian countries. In fact, a majority of international marriages are between Korean bridegrooms from rural areas and brides from China or Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Thailand. Most young Korean women do not want to live in rural settings where they have to work hard and have few opportunities to enjoy cultural and leisure activities.

Korea has long been a secluded country. Koreans have historically boasted about their ethnic and cultural unity, and they have maintained a strong national identity. But there have been signs recently that this is changing. These days, not only are there many foreigners living among us, but children of multicultural families are a common sight in neighborhoods and schools. There are also tens of thousands of foreign students in major Korean universities. Many Koreans view this increasing ethnic and cultural diversity as a threat to the myth of ethnic uniformity, a challenge to the conventional wisdom that ethnicity and nationality are the same, and a challenge to the prevailing model of the unitary and homogeneous nation state (Yoon and Song 2011). As a result, multiculturalism is a matter of urgency for many Koreans. Globalization has certainly facilitated the onslaught of multiculturalism in Korea, by opening up not only labor markets but also the minds of Koreans.

Consequently, the shift toward a multicultural society or the issue of multiculturalism has come to the fore in both the journalistic and academic worlds (Jang 2010; Kim et al. 2011). At the same time, the fact that Korea was forcibly subjected to globalization after the IMF intervention following the 1997 economic crisis has brought forth a strong sense of patriotism and nationalism. Nationalism is “a strong national devotion that places one’s own country above all others” (Smith and Kim 2006, p. 127) and is related to patriotism. Thus, nationalism is often a strong force with which to defend one’s own national identity from intrusion by other nations and cultures, and is regarded as an antithesis to multiculturalism. Paradoxically, the recent process of globalization has bred both multiculturalism and nationalism (Kim et al. 2011). These countervailing forces are now at work in Korea, changing the existing form of unitary and exclusive national identity, which had seldom been seriously challenged. What is happening to national identity among Koreans in the era of coexistence between nationalism and multiculturalism? Do Koreans still possess a strong national identity? Have
there been any changes in the characteristics of national identity among Koreans?

The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the recent change in national identity in connection with the process of globalization that Korea has experienced in the last two decades. To account for the recent change, the 2003 and 2010 Korean General Social Survey data are analyzed. This study is also intended to examine what particular type of national identity the forces of globalization and multiculturalism have been helping to form. Specifically, worries about potential social problems and conflicts caused by the increase in the foreign population make the civic dimension of national identity more important among Koreans. Attitudes towards the influx of foreigners into Korea are expected to affect the formation of both ethnic and civic identity in 2003 and 2010. Thus, those more worried about the socio-cultural influences of foreigners are likely to think of civic factors as more important for being ‘real’ Koreans. This tendency is expected to be more remarkable in 2010 than in 2003.

Globalization in Modern Korea

Korea used to be a “hermit kingdom” until the last decade of the 19th century, when it opened its doors to the outside world after a long period of seclusion. By that time Korea had maintained its political independence and cultural uniformity for more than a thousand years, despite numerous wars with neighboring Japan and China and occasional defeats. Korea's first encounter with the Western world came in the 19th century, and 35 years of colonial rule by a modernized Japan followed soon thereafter. It was an act of forced globalization and cultural imperialism by the colonial power.

After liberation from Japan in 1945, an American military government ruled Korea for three years. The first democratically elected government took office in 1948, but by then Korea was split into a communist North and a liberal South, a division which remains to this day. In 1950 a civil war broke out between the North and the South, and ended in 1953. American forces fought with the South Koreans and have stayed in the South since then. Besides its military support, America had provided substantial economic aid to South Korea. As a consequence, the anti-communist and pro-American ideology has been officially sanctioned by the South Korean government and internalized by many South Koreans.

Except for some exposure to American culture, however, contact with
foreign cultures for Koreans was very much limited due to the South Korean government's ban on the import of foreign cultural products, censorship, and control of foreign travel. It was only after 1987, when democracy was finally restored after almost three decades of military dictatorship, that these policies were abandoned. Koreans were allowed to travel freely in 1989, censorship was formally abolished in 1999, and the ban on the import of foreign cultures began to be lifted in 1998.

The mid-1990s marked the new or second phase of globalization in South Korea. The Kim Young-sam government, the first truly civilian government elected in 1992, adopted neoliberalism as its basic ideology and vigorously pursued globalization by joining the WTO in 1995 and the OECD in 1996. Liberalization of the economy was at least partly responsible for the 1997 financial crisis, which forced the South Korean government to ask the IMF for a bailout. As a string attached to the bailout, the IMF imposed on the South Korean government a series of policies that emphasized liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. The Kim Dae-jung government, which succeeded the Kim Young-sam government in 1998, was a progressive government with a different set of economic and political ideals, but it had no choice but to follow the IMF mandate of neoliberal structural reform. Over the course of the reform period, Korea underwent profound changes not only in its economic institutions and practices, but also in its social organizations and cultural values. The Roh Moo-hyun government that followed the Kim government was also a progressive government, but could not avoid the globalization tide. After ten years of progressive governments, South Koreans elected rightist president Lee Myung-bak (2008-2012) in 2007, who supported liberal economic policies.

The second phase of globalization may also be characterized by the dramatic expansion of information and communications industries and by extensive penetration of such information technologies as personal computers, mobile phones, satellite televisins, and the Internet into the everyday lives of average Koreans. This information revolution has greatly facilitated cultural globalization by providing Koreans with an almost unlimited access to foreign culture.

But globalization in this phase may be called a forced transformation, because it was imposed by the IMF. Because it was forced on Koreans by a foreign institution, various types of resistance on the part of the Korean people emerged. The 1997 economic crisis had not only imposed economic hardship, but also seriously damaged Koreans’ national pride. Korea had until this point been regarded as one of the most successful cases of peripheral
development along with other members of the four Asian tigers, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. South Koreans were also very proud that they had hosted the Olympic Games in 1988. Thus, the economic crisis and the IMF intervention were almost unbearable for the proud Koreans, and led to the renewed rise of nationalism and patriotism.

An early example of the patriotic reactions to the crisis is the gold collection movement in 1997 and 1998. It was a voluntary movement by individuals and organizations, the purpose of which was to ease the foreign currency crisis by collecting gold from voluntary donors. Within a few months more than one million donors had joined the movement by donating their golden jewels, golden plates, and even golden teeth and an Olympic gold medal. The total amount of collected gold exceeded sixteen tons, worth 160 million US dollars.

Along with the rise of patriotism, national identity became an important concern, as evidenced by: the unprecedented popularity of television lecture series on Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism and Taoism; the popular catchphrase, “the body and the land are inseparable”, which means that indigenous products, especially agricultural products, are better for people than foreign ones; and a number of bestsellers and popular movies that dealt with traditional cultural heritage or famous historical events.

These reactions to globalization are only partially responsible for the rise of nationalism. The Kim Dae-jung government’s so-called “sunshine policy” toward communist North Korea had the effect of stimulating nationalism. The sunshine policy aimed at establishing better a relationship between the two antagonistic Koreas by facilitating increased contact and exchanges between them. As a result, a substantial proportion of the South Korean population began to change their attitude towards North Korea and to see the North-South Korean relationship from a nationalistic point of view rather than from the viewpoint of Cold War ideology. In fact, according to the 2005 Korean General Social Survey results, almost 60 per cent of the respondents regarded North Korea as a partner for cooperation or support in contrast to 36 per cent who considered it an enemy or a state to guard against. This is a big change because North Korea had long been officially recognized as a major enemy, a view that was also accepted by a majority of South Koreans. Age variations indirectly indicate the change in South Koreans’ attitude toward North Korea. Respondents in their 20s and 30s tended to show more favorable attitudes towards North Korea than those aged 40 years and over (Kim et al. 2006).

In fact, throughout the ten years of progressive governments (1998-
2007), the sunshine policy continued and the North-South Korean relationship improved. As a result support for nationalism had remained high among the South Korean public. However, the rightist Lee Myung-bak government assumed power in 2008 when an economic crisis that had originated in the U.S. struck South Korea. The new government returned to the pro-American, anti-communist ideology and abandoned the sunshine policy, souring the North-South Korean relationship. As a result, nationalism waned and globalization waxed. Cosmopolitanism has also become more widespread.

Alongside nationalism, cosmopolitanism has also emerged as a powerful ideology, especially among young Koreans. Opening the market up to foreign goods allows consumers to choose from products made in a variety of countries. South Koreans have grown accustomed to foreign products and show little reluctance to consume them. Young Koreans, who were born and raised in more affluent and globalized years, tend to be more cosmopolitan in their consumption behavior, while they actively participate in nationalistic rallies and events. This is an indication that their nationalism is not a naked or blind one. Nationalism has provided them with opportunities to reevaluate imported Western culture as well as indigenous Korean culture. At the same time, as children of modernization and globalization, they have cultivated their own tastes, acquired the ability to select among a range of products that differ in quality, and been given the access to a wide variety of foreign products. In a sense they are dualistic in their inclination: ideologically they are more inclined to nationalism, but in terms of behavioral, especially consumption, patterns they are more cosmopolitan.

Theories of Globalization and National Identity

Globalization is usually defined as the movement or flow of objects, signs, and people across regions and intercontinental space and the connectivity or interdependence among them (Held et al. 1999, p. 16; Tomlinson 1999, p. 22). The globalization process in recent years has often been approached in terms of the changing conditions of capitalism. According to James H. Mittelman (2000), one of the principal proponents of this view, the deep recession experienced by the Western countries in the 1970s was the driving force for globalization. The recession prompted the development of new strategies for restructuring production from the Fordist to the post-Fordist model, which emphasizes more flexible, capital-intensive, and technology-
intensive operations. This results in the adoption of the neo-liberal ideology of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization in order to enhance competitiveness. As a result of this process, the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism has been extended and consolidated (Mishra 1999, pp. 7-8), and the neo-liberal ideology has been adopted by such international organizations as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

This form of globalization is often associated with imperialism, a form of intended globalization that has a homogenizing effect. At the cultural level, imperialism refers simply to cultural domination, or the imposition of a particular set of beliefs, values, knowledge, behavioral norms, and lifestyle by core nations over peripheral ones. Peripheral countries may have to accept dominant culture at the expense of losing their own traditional cultural identities. But this theory of globalization, which equates modern globalization with imperialism, has been challenged on many fronts. One criticism is that material or symbolic transmission does not necessarily originate in the same place or flow in the same direction. In other words, there is no clearly defined center or periphery. And the effect of cultural flow is likely to be cultural hybridization rather than homogenization (Crane 2002, p. 4). Another criticism points out that cultural transmission or flow usually encounters active responses or resistance by local people. As Berger states, globalization poses “the great challenge of pluralism: the breakdown of taken for granted traditions and the opening-up of multiple options for beliefs, values, and lifestyles” (Berger 2002, p. 16). But rational audiences may accept selectively and interpret differently the materials brought to them through globalization. Thus, cultural globalization does not breed a homogenized world culture; instead multiculturalism becomes a dominant trend, with national or local identities remaining relatively intact (Crane 2002).

One of the more extreme forms of response is ethnocentrism, which involves regarding one’s own culture as the best and rejecting other cultures as inferior or evil. A more common response is nationalism, which promotes national pride and often leads to a revitalization of indigenous cultural tradition. Thus, even if globalization takes the form of imperialism, it does not necessarily result in cultural domination or homogenization. Rather, depending on the context in which globalization occurs and on the intensity and forms of locals’ response, it may bring about multiculturalism, nationalism, or “a middle point between global homogeneity and parochial isolation” (Berger 2002, p. 16).

In a similar vein, Catterall (2011) posits that globalization may
Globalization certainly affects national identity, because it brings new cultural elements into the national culture and provokes nationalism. National identity is “a part of an individual’s social identity and a collective phenomenon that unites people into national groups” (Korostelina, 2013, p. 293). National identity is a product of both ethnic history and community identity, religion and belief system, and dominant ideology and conscious manipulation, which involves commemoration and symbolism (Smith 1991, 2009). National identity is closely related to nationalism, since nationalism is defined as an ideological movement to acquire and maintain autonomy, unity, and an identity for people who are regarded to form a nation. While Smith emphasizes particularistic configurations of ethnic cores and political values, which exist prior to the era of nationalism or the nation-state, in defining national identity (Smith 1991), Anderson, Gellner, and Hobsbawm see the nation and nationalism as results of economic and political development. These theorists are also different in that while Hobsbawm predicts the decline of the role of nationalism in historical development, Smith views nationalism as on the rise in the era of globalization. Castells also posits that the age of globalization is the era in which nationalism is revitalized in order to challenge the existing nation-state and to reconstruct an identity based on nationality.

Thus, even though globalization undermines the nexus between nation and state, it does not necessarily disrupt national identity. Rather it can serve to bolster national identity through the revitalization of nationalism that it may provoke. However, globalization may adversely affect national identity indirectly through promoting cosmopolitanism, which seeks to transcend the nation (Catterall 2011). Cosmopolitanism, sometimes regarded as an analogue of globalization, is always posited in opposition to national identity (Bowden 2003).

Multiculturalism is another factor that may intervene in the relationship between globalization and national identity. Certain countries such as Australia and the United States take multiculturalism as a principle of nation-
building and as a core value of national identity (Moran 2011). But for nations whose political community is based on ethnic uniformity, multiculturalism may be identity-threatening. Studies show that higher levels of immigrant diversity and the perception of immigrants as cultural threats lead to an increased emphasis on certain aspects of national identity (Wright 2011).

Since the process of nation-building is not uniform among nations, and since nations are made of different building blocks, national identity should differ among nations. One of the classical models of national identity is Smith’s dichotomous model, which contrasts the ethnic-genealogical and civic-territorial models (Smith 1991). The civic model arose first in the West, and assumes a nation whose components include “historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology” (p. 11).

The ethnic model is essentially a non-Western model that assumes a community of common descent. In this model, one remains a member of the community of one’s birth forever, whether one stays in his community or emigrates to another (p. 11). While in the civic model national identity is a matter of civic choice and there is a Western emphasis on laws and institutions, the ethnic model emphasizes “genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions” (p. 12).

But these models are ideal types; national identities are never constructed solely out of either model. As Smith concedes, these models reflect a profound dualism in national identity and nationalism, and “Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized” (Smith 1991, p. 13). Many of the empirical researchers that mapped national identities along this dual model found that the ethnic/civic distinction does not neatly distinguish national identities among nations. So some researchers use slightly modified models in their empirical studies, examples of which include a continuum from purely ascriptive to purely achievable dimensions (Wright 2011), ascribed/objectivist and civic/voluntarist aspects of national identity (Jones and Smith 2001), and an open and inclusive national identity versus a closed and exclusive one (Moran 2011). Fran L. Johnson and Philip Smith tested their revised model of national identity in a series of studies. They found that the civic/voluntarist dimension of national identity is significantly related to post-industrialism and globalization at the macro level. Another interesting finding is that higher degrees of globalization and internal cultural
differentiation tend to lower citizens’ commitment to either form of national identity. At the individual level, migration experience, generative shifts, cognitive skills, and economic class position were found to play crucial roles in shaping civic identity.

Since the two dimensions of national identity proposed by Anthony Smith are not mutually exclusive in empirical settings, it seems to be more realistic to devise a model of national identity that considers both. In fact, Smith concedes that civic and ethnic forms of national identity coexist to various degrees in all countries. M. Hjerm, in his comparative study of national identity among four European countries, proposed two other forms of national identity in addition to the ethnic and the civic types. The ‘multiple’ national identity is a combination of ethnic and civic national identity, and the ‘pluralist’ identity involves people having no sense or a weak sense of national identity (Hjerm 1998, p. 340). The ‘multiple’ national identity is later called a ‘mixed’ type. This four sector model is usually depicted as in Table 1 in empirical studies, and was proven to be useful in both Western and non-Western cases (Hjerm 1998; Heath and Tilley 2005; Yoon and Song 2011). For example, Yoon and Song, in an analysis of a national sample survey conducted in 2008, found that 79 per cent of the sample supported the mixed type, 9.6 per cent the civic type, 7.3 per cent the ethnic type, and 3.9 per cent the plural type (Yoon and Song 2011). We will also use this model in our analysis of Korean national identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Factor</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Plural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civic Dimension of National Identity in Korea

The process by which recent globalization has affected national identity in Korea is summarized in Figure 1. The basic premise is that the recent process
of globalization in Korea may have changed people’s perception of national identity through its effect on the rise or decline of nationalism and multiculturalism. We predict that globalization, which was furthered by the 1997 economic crisis and subsequent IMF intervention, provoked nationalism, which in turn imbued Koreans with a strong sense of national identity. Nationalism was strengthened by the so-called ‘sunshine’ policy toward North Korea during the years of progressive government (1998-2007), but declined during the rightist Lee Myung-bak government’s rule (2008-2012), followed by a waning sense of national identity. The recent process of globalization has also facilitated the shift toward multiculturalism by easing cross-border movement of workers, brides, and tourists. Multiculturalism is associated with the civic dimension of national identity. Therefore, we expect that Korean society has become more multicultural recently and that the civic type of national identity has grown stronger.

The forced nature of globalization followed by the 1997 economic crisis greatly damaged national pride and provoked a strong sense of nationalism in South Korea. This was supported further by the sunshine policy of the leftist Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments, which lead to a stronger, more ethnically based sense of national identity. But the Lee Myung-bak government that succeeded the Roh Moo-hyun regime turned the tide in the opposite direction by taking a conservative and anti-communist stance and embracing neo-liberal ideology. As a consequence, nationalistic fervor has subsided and Koreans’ sense of national identity is weaker than before.

On the other hand, multiculturalism has been steadily rising due to the increase in the size of Korea’s foreign population. Multiculturalism is usually associated with the civic dimension of national identity, which has been the case in Korea. Globalization has also promoted cosmopolitanism in certain segments of the Korean population by allowing citizens access to symbolic as well as material products originating from a variety of countries. Cosmopolitans are less concerned with national identity. But in the Korean case, people who are cosmopolitan in behavioral terms may be nationalistic emotionally and ideologically, and thus dualistic in their sense of national identity (Kim et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2013). Since it is unrealistic to think that the ethnic type of national identity was quickly replaced with the civic one, we expect that the mixed type of national identity, rather than the civic one, has increased significantly in recent times.

In brief, based on the discussion of globalization and national identity above, this study expects to uncover several changes in the configuration of Korea’s national identity. First, the mixed type of identity, which is a
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combination of ethnic and civic identity, might become stronger among Koreans. This reinforced mixed type of identity seems to reflect the increased importance of the civic type of identity. Second, the civic type of identity might also become more salient. Third, the concern about the negative socio-cultural impact of the increasing number of immigrants is likely to make the civic type of national identity more important. This tendency is expected to be more remarkable in 2010 than in 2003. Recently, Koreans have been more frequently exposed to foreigners and foreign culture than in the past, which has lead them to realize that incoming immigrants are not just visitors but neighbors beside whom they must live. The worry that these immigrants lack the qualities necessary for them to become good Korean citizens is expected to result in an increased emphasis on the importance of the civic dimension of national identity. Fourth, the worry about immigrants’ lack of necessary civilian virtues would also facilitate the formation of a mixed type of identity. Since the mixed type of national identity is a combination of ethnic and civic national identity, its increase in importance would be partly affected by the

FIG. 1—Changes in ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity in Korea

![Figure 1](image-url)
### TABLE 2

**DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>2003 (N=1242)</th>
<th></th>
<th>2010 (N=1513)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Ethnic</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Civic</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic influence(1)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic influence(2)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural influence</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social influence</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National identity**

1) How important do you think it is…

1) to have been born in South Korea to be truly South Korean?

2) to have South Korean citizenship to be truly South Korean?

3) to have lived in South Korea for most of one's life to be truly South Korean?

4) to be able to speak the South Korean language to be truly South Korean?

5) to respect South Korea's political institutions and laws to be truly South Korean?

6) to feel South Korean to be truly South Korean?

7) to have South Korean ancestry to be truly South Korean?

**Immigrants’ influence**

- **Economic influence**

  a) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Immigrants are generally helpful for South Korea’s economy.’

  b) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in South Korea.’

- **Socio-cultural influence**

  c) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Immigrants contribute to South Korean society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.’

  d) How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Immigrants cause an increase in the crime rate’ (2003), or ‘An increase in the number of immigrants could intensify social conflicts (2010).’
fact that Koreans have come to think of the civilian virtue of immigrants as being critical for Korea’s future.

Data and Method

The 2003 and 2010 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) data, which include a national identity module, will be analyzed to investigate the effects of perceptions about immigrants’ economic and socio-cultural influence on ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity, respectively. The 2003 and 2010 KGSS commonly contain several questions which measure different aspects of national identity and perceptions regarding immigrants’ influence on Korean society. The dependent and independent variables used are listed in Table 2, which includes descriptive statistics of the sample.

As for analyses, multiple regression analyses were first used to examine the effects of perception regarding immigrants’ influence in 2003 and in 2010. Furthermore, latent class analysis was used to categorize different aspects of national identity in 2010. Finally, multinomial logistic regression analyses were used to compare the effects of independent variables on mixed and civic identity, in comparison with those on ethnic identity.

Results

Figure 2 reveals the changes in seven aspects of national identity between

![Fig. 2.—Changes in seven aspects of national identity](image-url)
2003 and 2010. Importance given to most aspects that represent ethnic identity, namely birthplace, lifelong residence, and ancestry, show a decreasing pattern, with the exception of nationality. By contrast, the importance of civic identity, such as respect for institutions and the law and sense of belonging, increased, with the exception of language.

These changing patterns in ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity are illustrated more vividly in Figure 3. Ethnic identity decreases, whereas civic identity increases between the years 2003 and 2010.

Table 3 shows the effects of perceptions regarding immigrants’ influence on ethnic identity. The interpretations focus on M3, the final model. First, age (b=0.01, p<.001) and lower education levels (b=-0.02, p<.01) are associated with stronger ethnic identity both in 2003 and in 2010. Married status is associated with stronger ethnic identity in 2003 (b=0.13, p<.001). Buddhists are associated with stronger ethnic identity in 2010 than those who are not religious (b=0.08, p<.05).

Regarding immigrants’ economic influence, the perception that immigrants take Koreans’ jobs increases ethnic identity. The tendency gets stronger from 2003 (b=0.04, p<.05) to 2010 (b=0.06, p<.001). The effect of perceptions about immigrants’ contributions to the national economy increasing ethnic identity exists only in 2010 (b=0.04, p<.05).

As for immigrants’ socio-cultural influence, perceptions about negative socio-cultural influence increase ethnic identity, and the tendency gets
stronger from 2003 (b=0.05, p<.01) to 2010 (b=0.07, p<.001). On the other hand, immigrants’ cultural contributions did not have any statistically significant influence on ethnic identity. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the effects of perception regarding immigrants’ economic and socio-cultural influence on ethnic identity, controlling for other variables.

Table 4 shows the effects of perceptions regarding immigrants’ influence on civic identity. First, age is consistently associated with stronger civic identity (b=0.01, p<.001 in 2003). In 2003, employed status is associated with weaker civic identity (b=-0.07, p<0.05), and in 2010, Buddhists are associated with stronger civic identity than those that are not religious (b=0.09, p<.05).

As for immigrants’ negative social impact, stronger perception about
Fig. 4.—Effects on the Ethnic Dimension of National Identity (2003)

Fig. 5.—Effects on the Ethnic Dimension of National Identity (2010)
increased social conflict results in stronger civic identity. The tendency was
greater in 2010 (b=0.05, p<.01) than in 2003 (b=0.03, p<.1). The perception of
immigrants’ cultural contributions did not yield statistically significant effects
on civic identity.

With regard to immigrants’ economic influence, stronger perceptions
about immigrants’ economic contributions resulted in stronger civic identity in
2010 only (b=0.06, p<.001). Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the effects of
perceptions of immigrants’ influence on civic identity, controlling for other
variables.

Table 5 shows the latent class analysis comparison by classes in 2010, as
pictured in Figure 8. Classes are categorized into three kinds of national

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regression Analysis about the Effects of Perceptions Regarding Immigrants’ Influence on Civic Identity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic contribution</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job competition</td>
<td>.03+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural contribution</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/social conflict</td>
<td>.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education year</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.07+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (ref: no religion)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (ref: lowest 25%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50%</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-75%</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-100%</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.96***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
FIG. 6.—Effects on the civic dimension of national identity (2003)

FIG. 7.—Effects on the civic dimension of national identity (2010)
### TABLE 5
**Latent Class Analysis Comparison by Classes For 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Lifelong residence</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Institution/ law</th>
<th>Sense of belonging</th>
<th>Ancestry</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>BIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 1</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.877</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>0.4906</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>0.920</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.4318</td>
<td>9100.115</td>
<td>9223.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.0776</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
identities: mixed identity, when both ethnic and civic dimensions are emphasized (class 1), ethnic identity (class 2), and civic identity (class 3). Generally, in classes 2 and 3, aspects representing ethnic identity tend to be higher, but in class 3, civic aspects expressing civic identity score relatively higher than ethnic identity. Thus, class 3 is categorized as civic identity.

Table 6 shows the results of multinomial logistic regression with the three classes categorized in the latent class analysis, and ethnic identity as the base outcome for comparisons with mixed and civic identity. First, for one-unit increase in the predictor, females are 57% more likely to have mixed identity rather than ethnic identity (p<.001), while education year is 6% less likely to have mixed identity than ethnic identity (p<.01). In addition, for one-unit increase in the predictor, age is 2% more likely to have mixed identity than ethnic identity (p<.001). Married status is 38% more likely to have mixed identity than ethnic identity (p<.05), and 70% more likely to have civic identity than ethnic identity (p<.05).

Regarding the economic influence of immigrants, for one-unit increase in the predictor, economic contribution is 17% more likely to have mixed identity than ethnic identity (p<0.05), while job competition is 28% more likely to have mixed identity (p<.001). In other words, as seen in Figure 9 below, as perceived economic contribution increases, the probability that a respondent has mixed rather than ethnic identity gets higher. As perceived
job competition increases, the probability that a respondent has mixed identity rather than ethnic identity increases, as in Figure 10.

As for immigrants’ socio-cultural influence, social conflict is 16% more likely to have mixed identity than ethnic identity, as seen in Table 5 above. In other words, as seen in Figure 11 below, as perceived social conflict increases, the probability that a respondent has mixed identity rather than ethnic identity increases. Two variables measuring socio-cultural influence are added in the multinomial logistic analysis in Table 7 below, whose result

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic contribution</th>
<th>Ethnic vs. mixed</th>
<th>1.17*</th>
<th>Ethnic vs. civic</th>
<th>1.04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job competition</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.28***</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.16*</td>
<td>.8+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.57***</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>.98+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education year</td>
<td></td>
<td>.94**</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.38*</td>
<td>1.70*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.24+</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion (ref: no religion)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (ref: lowest 25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50%</td>
<td></td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-75%</td>
<td></td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 1444
Log-likelihood -1,207.66
Wald chi-square 206.41***
McFadden’s R-squared .079

Note.—1) + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
2) Base outcome of dependent variable is ‘ethnic identity’
confirms the salience of socio-cultural impact on strengthening civic identity. The results uncover that with regard to cultural impact, the value put on shared tradition in Korean society is 23% more likely to have mixed identity than ethnic identity. Regarding social influence, social conflict regardless of
government efforts is 18% more likely to have mixed identity.

Discussion

This study mainly analyzed the effects of perception of immigrants’ economic
and socio-cultural influence on ethnic, civic, and mixed dimensions of national identity. The results show that with regard to civic identity, the perception of immigrants’ social influence had an increasing impact from 2003 to 2010: as time went by, stronger perceptions of increased social conflict led to stronger civic identity to a greater extent. This suggests that Koreans’ worry about immigrants’ negative social influence resulted in increased civic identity.

It is worth noting that the increased perception about immigrants increasing social conflict led to an increase in both civic and mixed identity in 2010. As we hypothesized, Koreans’ worry about the problem of social integration resulted in stronger civic and mixed identity, implying the added value of civic virtues in becoming a proper Korean citizen. As for the cultural influence, the value put on sharing the tradition and cultural practices of Korean society had a stronger influence on increasing mixed in 2010. This suggests that Koreans’ worry about immigrants’ negative cultural influence also strengthened civic and ethnic identity at the same time.

With regard to the economic influence of immigrants, stronger perceptions about immigrants taking jobs away had a stronger impact on increasing mixed rather than ethnic identity in 2010. Likewise, perceptions about immigrants’ contribution to the national economy had a stronger impact on increasing mixed rather than ethnic identity in the same year. These results suggest that Koreans’ perceptions of immigrants’ economic influence strengthened both civic and ethnic dimensions of national identity.
in recent years.

As for ethnic identity, stronger perceptions about immigrants taking jobs away strengthened it, and the tendency intensified as time went by. Ethnic identity was also strengthened in 2010 as respondents evaluated immigrants’ contribution to the national economy more highly. These results suggest that Koreans tend to consider immigrants as having two separate kinds of economic influence: the first is their influence on the Korean economy as a whole, and the other is their influence on competition among individuals. Accordingly, these factors had different effects on ethnic identity. When considering the national economy as a whole, Koreans’ perceived need for immigrants strengthened ethnic identity in 2010. On the other hand, the worry about immigrants posing a threat to their own employment security also strengthened Koreans’ ethnic identity, which serves as a psychological exclusion mechanism towards immigrants. These two perceptions of immigrants’ economic influence had a time dimension as well, as they had a stronger impact on ethnic identity in 2010 than in 2003 overall.

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References


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