International Humanitarian Response and Militarization of Refugee and IDP Camps in Kenya and Sudan*

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This comparative case study examines to what extent government’s attitudes toward forced migrants and the levels of international humanitarian field operations and protection services have affected the likelihood that the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya and the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Darfur, Sudan, are militarized. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, the level of militarization is affected by the response of the host government, as each government in Kenya and Sudan tries to securitize refugees and IDPs. Second, protracted refugee situations have not been factored into the militarization in the Dadaab area, although it made government and armed groups target the camps in Darfur to decrease the influence of armed groups or increase the negotiation leverage of armed groups. Third, humanitarian assistance and protection contribute to maintaining the humanitarian character of the Dadaab refugee camps while in Darfur, the international presence has been effective in the government-controlled area and it has been limited in the rebel-controlled area due to the restrictions imposed by the government and armed groups.

Keywords: Refugee, Internally displaced persons (IDPs), Camp militarization, Humanitarian assistance, Securitization

1. INTRODUCTION

The central question of this study is to what extent host governments and the international community have affected the likelihood that refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are militarized. Given the lack of a coherent definition, the militarization of refugee and IDP camps in this study means the combination of armed attacks on the camps, the presence of armed elements, armed trafficking, and forcible recruitment. By militarizing the camps, armed groups may manipulate humanitarian assistance and protection services for their movements; therefore, the militarization of refugee and IDP camps has been considered a threat to national security. Thus, host governments securitize the presence and/or movement of a large number of displaced people in need of protection while neglecting or containing displaced people along the periphery of their territory. The international community, including the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), also has securitized humanitarian operations since its personnel began to actively engage in countries in conflict.

Three theoretical approaches in international relations are employed for this study. First, the theory of lateral pressure (Choucri and North 1975) implies that armed groups are likely to attack refugee and IDP camps or militarize the camps for their political and economic

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causes if the armed groups do not have enough resources to support their groups and pay for their recruits. Second, the opportunity and willingness approach (Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990) suggests that in order to militarize the camps, the government or armed groups should have the capability to carry out their policy or tactics, which actors choose based on the expected costs and benefits of those tactics. Third, studies on collective action (Olson 1965) and rebel’s dilemma (Lichbach 1995) show that armed groups try to militarize the camps in order to prevent residents in the camps from defecting, while the government tries to minimize the influence of armed groups within the camps. Based on these approaches, this study expects that humanitarian resources will increase the benefits of the camps’ militarization by armed groups, while the effective presence of protection services will be of high cost to armed actions by government and armed groups.

Case studies focus on the refugee camps in Dadaab, Kenya, and IDP camps in Darfur, Sudan. The Dadaab refugee camp is one of the oldest and largest refugee camps in the world, but relatively few cases of military actions were reported, although the Kenyan government has framed Somali refugees as terrorists and has suspected that militarization of the refugee camps has occurred by the infiltration of armed groups. IDP camps in Darfur, Sudan, which are divided into two groups: one in the government-controlled area and the other in the rebel-controlled area, are also examined. The presence and levels of humanitarian assistance vary in these areas; consequently, the varying degrees of humanitarian organizations’ accessibility to people of their concern resulted from the insecurity imposed by government, government-associated militia, and armed factions contribute to the militarization of IDP camps.

This study relies on documents and reports from the United Nations and UNHCR. UNHCR’s Global Reports and Statistical Yearbooks as well as the Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) reports provided information on refugee and IDP movements and the humanitarian responses to forced migration crises. For more detailed information, “Dadaab refugee camp,” “Darfur IDP camp,” and “militarization” were used for keyword searches in the UNHCR’s Refworld website. The quarterly reports of the UN Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur were also main resources for information about military actions and the responses of the international community to those actions in Darfur, Sudan.

The second source of information is media coverage over the camp militarization between 1980 and 2010, which is accessed through the LexisNexis database. “Militarization,” “armed attack,” “armed faction,” and “armed trafficking,” along with “Kenya refugee” and “Sudan IDP,” were used for keyword searches from the major news media such as the BBC, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), New York Times, and Africa News. If there are multiple reports on the same incident or interview, this study checked those reports with UN documents to identify the original source.

2. SECURITIZATION AND MILITARIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN CAMPS

Neither governments nor international humanitarian organizations have appropriately addressed the human needs of refugees and IDPs. It is a well-established principle in international law that protecting the physical security of refugees is the primary responsibility of host governments (UNHCR 2000:2; Lischer 2005:144). However, the host governments in sub-Saharan Africa are often unwilling to and unable to provide enough
physical protection for refugees and IDPs (Achvarina and Reich 2006). Those displaced people cannot help but rely on the assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. Moreover, unless effective protection services are provided by host government and/or the international community, refugees and IDPs are very susceptible to threats imposed by military actions.

This happens because governments have securitized refugee issues since the inception of the 1951 Convention and throughout the independent movement of former colonies in the 1960s (Loescher 1993). The onset of the Cold War changed the image of refugees as victims of Communism, who vote for the legitimacy of Western democracies “with their feet” (Haddad 2008:143). In the late 1970s and 1980s, refugees were used as instruments of warfare with the direct and indirect involvement of the West in regional and internal conflicts in developing countries. The “refugee warriors,” “refugee fighters,” or “freedom fighters” became pawns of Western foreign policy decision-makers (Zolberg et al. 1989).

After the Cold War, refugees and IDPs have been staged as high threats to national and international security through the following three processes. First, xenophobic attitudes toward migrants rose in Europe (Helton 2002), and European countries started to hinder the flood of refugees attempting to enter their territories. Second, the international community began to prefer protecting displaced people inside of their countries of origin by “situating refugee camps and settlements in secure locations . . . in collaboration with UNHCR” (UN General Assembly 1993:13), as opposed to recognizing and hosting them as refugees in asylum countries. Third, the international community, including UNHCR, has been actively operating in conflict zones since the 1990s on the humanitarian ground; thereby, it can hardly remain totally neutral and apolitical by putting its personnel in danger. Consequently, UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations have securitized issues of refugees and IDPs while extending its mandates from conventional refugee protection to IDP protection.

One of the reasons that refugees and IDPs are securitized is that humanitarian camps are frequently militarized and manipulated by government and/or armed groups. Although there is no clear definition of refugee camp militarization, Muggah and Mogire’s definition of refugee camp militarization is widely cited and consists of the following:

\[\ldots\]the combination of military and armed attacks on refugees within camps; the storage and diffusion of weapons, military training and recruitment; the presence of armed elements, political activism and criminal violence within camps; and the exploitative use of relief/development resources by non-refugee residents and their dependents (Muggah and Mogire 2006:7).

They make a distinction between “refugee camp militarization” and “refugee militarization.” Yet, this distinction is empirically unclear. Thus, this study considers the armed attacks on refugee camps, military training and recruitment, and the presence of armed elements as indicators of camp militarization.1

The use of violence by refugees and IDPs outside the camps and settlements raises the question of whether refugees and IDPs are passive victims or active political agents in the militarization of refugee camps. The most well-known case of refugee camp militarization occurred after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Perpetrators mingled with the victims in refugee camps in Zaire (DRC) to attract humanitarian assistance. This international support resulted

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1 Thus, criminal activities such as gender-based violence, rape, robbery, personal hatred, and revenge are not considered as activities for camp militarization.
in the regrouping of the militias, their gain of control in the camps, and the execution of attacks across the border in Rwanda (Stedman and Tanner 2003:1-2). Therefore, refugees and IDPs have increasingly gained the image of both the object under threat and potential threats themselves to national security. That is, refugees and IDPs are not just passive victims of humanitarian crises, but they are also actors who affect outcomes and process of political interactions in forced migration (Song 2011).

3. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CAMP MILITARIZATION

For analytical purposes, three theoretical approaches can be applied to the study of refugee and IDP camp militarization. First, the theory of lateral pressure provides a theoretical ground for the argument that armed groups attack refugee and IDP camps due to the lack of necessary resources. Choucri and North (1975) focus on the likelihood that the process of national growth leads to competition, conflict, and violence since a growing population experiences an increasing demand for basic resources. Like governments, armed groups need material and/or natural resources in order to support their population, and if the armed groups do not have necessary resources for survival, they must cross the borders of other groups, mainly using armed violence (Johnson 2010). Armed groups may loot camps for resources that they can instantly garner. They may forcibly recruit because they do not have the economic resources to pay for voluntary recruits. Sometimes, they use massive violence against targeted groups for long-term payoffs in resources.

Second, the militarization of refugee and IDP camps can be seen as an outcome of the interaction between governments, armed groups, and displaced people. In order to make any interactions possible, as the opportunity and willingness framework suggests, actors should have the capability to carry out their choice, within any environment, which is determined by examining the costs and benefits of the choice among a range of options, from no action to aggressive action (Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr 1990). The distance between a camp and the base of armed groups, for instance, defines the possibility of interaction (i.e. opportunity). When armed groups and refugees have the capability to reach the others, they have to examine the benefits and costs of their actions (i.e. willingness). The benefits vary, depending on their goals, from economic endowment to forcible recruitment. The costs range from no response at all to counterattacks against an attacking group to international condemnation and/or sanction. If there are not adequate protection services or if the host government supports militias, the cost of militarizing camps decreases and the militarization of the camps becomes a viable option for the armed groups and government-associated militias (Milner 2006; Johnson 2010).

Third, studies on collective action (Olson 1965) and rebel’s dilemma (Lichbach 1995) are also useful tools to investigate humanitarian camp militarization. Many studies on protests, social movements, and revolutions define political violence in terms of rational action by which the benefits of the action outweigh its costs for individual actors (Gurr 1970; Tarrow 1989) or collective dissidents (Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1995). For successful mobilization, rebels have to achieve cooperation among them, and they should also form coalitions between rebel groups, while governments try to forestall this revolutionary coalition (Lichbach 1995:255-58). When society becomes fragmented, competition between fragmented, armed groups over resources often intensifies. As an armed group implements a tactic to maintain the loyalty of dissidents and prevent their defection, the government should
minimize the possibility and consequences of the tactics used by the armed group, and vice versa. In other words, both government and armed groups can provide assistance and protection for refugees and IDPs and, at the same time, they militarize camps in order to keep refugees and IDPs within the camps cooperative and on their side.

That is, camp militarization can be seen as an outcome of the political process in which armed groups try to solve the rebel’s dilemma and governments try to impede the solution to the rebel’s dilemma. In this process, international humanitarian assistance and protection can be used by governments and armed groups to address the lack of resources and keep people on their side (Anderson 1999; Lischer 2005; Nahm 2007; Salehyan 2007). The large amount of humanitarian resources in refugee or IDP camps will increase the expected benefits from attacks on or the militarization of the camps by armed groups, and the presence of effective protection services in the camps will increase the expected costs of military actions within and around the camps.

Therefore, the following hypothesized relationships can be proposed (Song 2011:75-79). First, if the international community provides enough assistance and protection, forced migrants are less likely to militarize themselves than if they do not get enough protection services. As long as a host government and the international community actively engage in dealing with refugees who have crossed international borders, refugees are rarely motivated to join military actions. When the international community operates military protection and humanitarian assistance in a country of origin, IDPs are also less likely to join military action. However, the probability of being a refugee fighter from refugee camps is expected to be greater than that from IDP camps when the international community undertakes an engagement policy.

Second, if there are military protection services with scarce financial resources, the likelihood that forced migrants are affected by political violence around humanitarian camps will increase. Yet, political violence will be less likely to occur in such cases than when military protection is lacking. When the international community adopts a restrictive policy, displaced people are more likely to be IDPs. Consequently, the probability that they will join military actions from IDP camps is expected to be greater than the probability that people will join military actions from refugee camps. Displaced people who stay in IDP camps with a lack of resources are more likely to be desperate than those in refugee camps. Refugees might have to pay more to cross the border, but they are likely to recognize that although the resources are limited, they will receive much better assistance than IDPs.

Third, when the international community does not provide enough protection services, forced migrants are more likely to join military actions than if they had received adequate protection services. If the international community implements an engagement policy and provides more resources without military protection, the probability that people in refugee camps will join military actions or be affected by political violence becomes much higher than in other cases. A large amount of humanitarian resources without military protection may become potential resources that governments or dissident groups could viciously exploit. In addition, because of the principle of state sovereignty, a government in a country of origin is not able to keep track of rebels across international borders. In this case, normative imperatives to provide humanitarian assistance can result in collateral damage so that political violence persists and spreads around humanitarian camps.

Fourth, if the international community does not provide enough resources and protection services, displaced people will become desperate, and thus, they will be more likely to cooperate with rebel groups. They will be on the side of rebel groups as long as rebel groups
provide better assistance and protection than the government. If the international community is reluctant to engage in a forced migration crisis, the IDPs become the most vulnerable. As a result, the probability that people in IDP camps will join military actions is expected to be greater than the probability that people in refugee camps will be involved in military actions. This is the case not only because host governments are more likely to control international borders, including refugee camps, but also because it is preferable to repatriate people in refugee camps to their home countries.

Figure 1 illustrates the likelihood that refugees and IDPs will become involved in military actions. A U-shaped relationship can be expected between the level of international assistance and refugee-involved political violence when protection services are not operated well. In short, if military protection services are provided, the probability that forced migrants will join armed groups is lower than that of the cases without military protection services, regardless of the level of humanitarian financial resources. Insufficient assistance increases the level of dissatisfaction among displaced people in humanitarian camps, and then “fighting for self-protection” becomes a rational decision regardless of the existence of military protection. On the other hand, without military protection services, an excessive amount of resources that are allocated without deliberate strategies is likely to give armed groups the incentive to attack refugee groups and utilize their resources.

4. CASE ONE: DADAAB SOMALI REFUGEE CAMPS IN KENYA

4.1. Kenyan Government and Securitization of Somali Refugees

By the end of 2009, Kenya hosted almost all 353,000 refugees from its bordered countries of which Somali refugees numbered 310,300 (UNHCR 2010b). Although Kenya opened its borders in the face of the initial arrivals of Somali refugees in the 1980s, its asylum policy has been very restrictive based on two principles: the “abdication” of responsibility for refugees to UNHCR and the “containment” of the refugee population on the periphery of the state (Kagwanja 2002:102; Milner 2009:86-91). This refugee policy can be accounted for by the size and nature of Somali refugees, the reduction of international
support, and the Kenyan government’s increasing security concerns.

First, Somali refugees have remained the largest refugee group since 1991. The number of Somali refugees that flooded into Kenya is recorded at 95,600 in 1991 and 285,600 in 1992, consisting of about 71% of more 400,000 total refugees in Kenya in 1992. It was beyond the capacity of the Kenyan government to respond to this large number of refugees, and therefore, UNHCR and international NGOs were appealed to for their prompt involvement (Parker 2002). After 1995, the Somali refugee population remained relatively stable at around 150,000 until it increased again after 2007 due to the intense violence in Somalia. However, the stabilized size of the refugee population in Kenya was not viewed positively by the Kenyan government. Instead, the protracted situation has been seen in the seemingly unending nature of their stay and the limited prospect of solutions (Milner 2009:92). Therefore, there has been a rising concern among Kenyan officials that Kenya has hosted too many refugees for too long. Consequently, as Helton (2002) pointed out, Kenyan government officials in the 1990s deliberately chose to largely cede refugee affairs to UNHCR.

Second, the amount of humanitarian assistance has decreased; as a result, the burden of the Kenyan government to deal with the needs of refugees has increased. UNHCR’s expenditure for field operations in Kenya diminished from US $65.4 million in 1992 to US $33.3 million in 1995 to US $22.5 million in 2002. The refugee program has faced significant funding crises since the mid-1990s, as international aid on behalf of Somali refugees and other refugees in Kenya has been small and shrinking (USCR 2003). The decrease of international aid resulted in a number of cuts to education, shelter, sanitation, and protection activities in the Dadaab camps. The shortfall of international aid has made both government officials and the public believe that the presence of refugees caused burdens on host communities as well as the whole nation.

Third, the Kenyan government has consistently perceived Somali refugees as threats to national security. Therefore, the Kenyan government preferred the encampment policy. Kenya’s exceptional step of closing its border to prevent the arrival of Somali refugees in early 2007 is the best example of the securitization of Somali refugees. The Kenyan government justified its border closure by arguing that the group of refugees attempting to cross into Kenya contained elements of the Union of Islamic Courts, who were fleeing the advance of Ethiopian troops (UNHCR 2007). Kenya did not want to be held responsible for any possible actions carried out by the new waves of refugees. This attitude was magnified after the car bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in August 1998 and the Mombasa hotel attack in November 2002. The United States and Kenya linked the attacks to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network members as the same suspects operating in Somalia (New York Times 2002; 2003). However, there is no proof of the link between Somali refugees and terrorism; instead, a strong public perception linked the two (Adelman and Abdi 2003). Furthermore, refugee camps in the Dadaab have been framed as the base of armed trafficking and recruitment for armed factions.

4.2. The Risk Factors of Militarization in the Dadaab Area

4.2.1. Population

Dadaab camps are located in Kenya, 80km away from the Somali border, and 95% of the population in the camps are Somali refugees. These camps are the oldest and most congested ones in the world. They were set up in 1991 to accommodate 90,000 refugees, and they were
hosting more than 266,000 refugees at the end of 2009 (UNHCR 2010b). The camp’s infrastructure is old and in disrepair, and they are overcrowded even while the influx of refugees continues with more than 6,600 arrivals as a monthly average in Dadaab over 2009 (European Commission 2010). Durable solutions are very limited. Neither repatriation to Somalia nor integration into Kenya’s society is expected in the near future. Although more than 100,000 school-aged children are exposed to military recruitment, their political motivation to become involved in military actions is expected to be much less than original arrivals or new arrivals. Dadaab has 6,000 third-generation refugees, who are grandchildren of the original arrivals (International Herald Tribune 2010). The change in population of the Dadaab camps may have been factored into lowering the degree of the militarization of the camps.

4.2.2. Recruitment

Refugee recruitment contradicts the principle recognized in international law that refugee camps should be “exclusively civilian and humanitarian in character” (Human Rights Watch 2010a:55). Although there are no official reports on forcible recruitment in the Dadaab camps, officials working in the camps and many refugees have confirmed to HRW workers that both the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and al-Shabaab have been recruiting Somalia refugees to fight on their behalf since 2006 (Human Rights Watch 2009). Recruiters working for TFG, supported by the Kenyan government, have openly conducted a drive inside the camps to enlist refugees to fight al-Shabaab since October 2009. The recruiters promised high payments (between US $400 and $600) for the completion of military training and the same monthly amount upon deployment in Somalia. The recruiters also told the refugees that the force was backed by the United Nations and the United States.

Although publicly Kenyan national and provincial authorities deny any government involvement, the Kenyan military has actively participated in the recruitment process. A HRW report cites an interview with an anonymous Kenyan official already threatened retaliation if Kenya recruits Somalis to fight against it. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab and other Islamist insurgent groups are also recruiting in refugee camps and in other Somali immigrant communities in Kenya (New York Times 2009b).

In addition, many sources state that it is highly possible that al-Shabaab has infiltrated the Dadaab refugee camps and is also recruiting refugees. The European Commission, for instance, reports that there are “persistent rumors of presence of armed elements in the camp” (European Commission 2010:3). It is also reported that “[t]he Shabaab has already penetrated refugee camps inside Kenya, according to camp elders, luring away dozens of young men with promises of paradise and $300 each” (New York Times 2009a). However, although the United Nations reports that both sides in the war in Somalia have links with Kenya, including the training and recruitment of children and Kenyan citizens as well as false promises of financial remuneration (Africa News 2010), there is no official report on forcible recruitment.

4.2.3. Safe Haven

The Dadaab refugee camps are home to several former and active rebels. The leader of the Holy Spirit Movement, the predecessor of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Alice Auma Lakwena, escaped into exile in Kenya where she lived for 20 years until her death in January 2007. In the camp, she continued to inspire the devotion of a small group of followers who believed that she still possessed divine insights and could cure various diseases, including
AIDS. She acquired a cult status, power, and more rights based on her past (The Times 2007; The Economist 2007). UNHCR and the Kenyan government tolerated her and her status to keep the camp in order.

There are also signs that wounded rebels are being treated inside the Dadaab refugee camps. Although wounded fighters are likely to return to the battlefield in Somalia after being treated, they do not use the camp as a military base. In addition, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (UN Security Council 2010a) finds that leaders of al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the other main insurgent group in Somalia, travel with relative freedom to and from Nairobi, where they raise funds, engage in recruitment, and obtain treatment for wounded fighters. The Group reports that many of the fighters in Somalia are recruited through a support network in Nairobi consisting of wealthy clerics-cum-businessmen, linked to a small number of religious centers notorious for their links to radicalism. That is, leaders and supporters of armed groups appear more frequently in Nairobi urban areas than the Dadaab camps.

4.2.4. Weapons and Arms Trafficking

The Dadaab refugee camps have been considered a “nerve center for arms trafficking” through East Asia (Africa News 2000). A connection has been drawn between the presence of refugees and the flow of small arms into Kenya. While precise figures on small arms in general are “sketch at best” (Knickerbocker 2002), it has been argued that small arms originating from Somalia and Sudan are widely available in Kenya. An increase in the supply of small arms has consequently resulted in a significant fall in their price. As reported by IRIN (2003), an AK-47 assault rifle costs 60 head of cattle in northern Kenya in the 1960s, but the same rifle costs as little as the price of a chicken in today’s weapons’ market. Milner (2009:97) interviewed several Kenyan government officials who expressed concern that refugees were at least partially responsible for the proliferation of small arms in Northern Kenya and in urban areas.

However, it must be noted that weapons smuggled into and out of the camps have contributed to the growth of violent crime, such as banditry and paramilitary activities, in urban areas instead of militarizing refugee camps. In 2004, Oxfam also documented that most weapons come through the borders and are usually destined for markets in Nairobi’s crime-prone areas, calling on the Kenyan government and UNHCR to crack down on armed banditry (Africa News 2004). Regarding armed criminal activities, the UNHCR’s security package initiated in the late 1990s has reinforced the capacity of the Kenyan police to enforce law and order in and around the refugee camps by providing them with additional equipment. Milner (2009:99) shows that the total instances of violent crime fell from 300 in 1998 to 36 in 2003. Nevertheless, the efforts to link the spread of illicit arms to the Dadaab camps have continued as expressed in the former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi’s interview that refugees “abused the generosity of Kenyans” by bringing firearms into the country (BBC 1999). Due to this attitude of the Kenyan government, Somali refugees and the camps in Dadaab have remained securitized.

4.3. UNHCR and Security Protection

UNHCR’s primary concern is to maintain the humanitarian character of refugee and IDP camps. The most preferred and basic measures are ones that have to do with the distance and size of refugee camps. The “Ladder of Options” recommends that refugee camps should be
located more than 50km from the border with no more than 20,000 persons. The Dadaab camps are located around 80 kilometers from the border; yet, the size of the Dadaab camps is considerably larger than recommended, with an average of 170,000 to 260,000 refugees spread over three camps. UNHCR and several donors, including the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, have requested and insisted on the need for additional camps to decongest the Dadaab camps and to improve security. President Mwai Kibaki has agreed to provide humane and dignified amenities in the existing refugee camps and the establishment of new camps, but he has urged the international community and donors to lend their support to the Kenyan government’s effort to maintain the humanitarian character of the refugee camp (BBC 2009). In addition, President Kibaki has called for the proper screening of all incoming refugees in order to prevent the influx of illicit arms and light weapons.

UNHCR has implemented several measures and projects to increase the security of the camps. UNHCR has contributed financially to the recruitment and deployment of police officers, the purchase of communication equipment and vehicles, the construction of additional police posts, and the mounting of patrol groups (which include refugees) in the camps. In September 2009, UNHCR established a Security Partnership Project (SPP) with the objective of “improving systemic, predictable and effective responses to the security, and law and order challenges in and around the Dadaab camps.” The SPP consists of two components: the establishment, deployment, and yearly rotation of a dedicated Police Unit based in the refugee camps; and the establishment of a registration and screening center to enable a more systematic identification and separation of people who pose security threats (UNHCR 2010a:3; Human Rights Watch 2010b:21).

However, UNHCR is unable to carry out effective protection monitoring in the camps due to at least two factors. First, UNHCR has limited access to areas outside of its own compounds in the camps. UNHCR staff reports that when they wish to access any location where refugees live and work, they must be accompanied by police escorts; however, according to these staff members, on most occasions, there is a shortage of police escorts (Human Rights Watch 2010b). Consequently, four workers were kidnapped and killed, one kidnapped for ransom, two killed by individual attacks, and five injured by ambushes from 2007 to March 2010. Although the lack of security for humanitarian staff and workers has become a serious concern, the situation is much better compared to the insecurity in the IDP camps in Sudan.

Second, UNHCR staff members in Dadaab are overwhelmed by the many challenges posed by almost 300,000 refugees living in chronically underfunded camps designed for a population that is a third of that number. The challenges have been exacerbated by the long-term underfunding of UNHCR’s operations in Dadaab. UNHCR says that its limited number of staff is working overtime, always juggling different priorities and that it is over-stretched (Human Rights Watch 2010b). UNHCR has cautioned that security and limited access to every part of the refugee camps remain key obstacles to the immediate response to the needs of refugees.

4.4. Summary and Discussion

The Kenyan government has always viewed Somali refugees as potential threats and contended that Somalia refugees engage in arms trafficking and terrorism. It has been reported that the refugee camps are used for the storage of weapons, the hosting of former and active rebels, and recruitment by the Kenya government and the al-Shabaab network. However, in
practice, arms trafficking and security incidents were related to abuse by Kenyan police or banditry by organized armed groups. It implies that the Dadaab refugee camps have rarely been militarized, contrary to Kenyan officials’ arguments.

Main findings of this case study are as follows. First, this study appears to support the first hypothesized relationship proposed in the previous section because long-time international assistance and protection have kept the Dadaab camps from being highly militarized. Since the mass influx of Somali refugees into the Dadaab camps in 1991, the Kenyan government has called on the international community for immediate humanitarian support, and UNHCR has provided on average $35 million each year. Additionally, in order to enhance the refugee security, UNHCR has implemented preventive measures by facilitating the cooperative relationship among refugees and IDPs and between displaced people and local communities. As long as the international community provided the Kenyan government with increasing amounts of humanitarian resources, the Kenyan government was cooperative in refugee protection. However, as the amount of humanitarian resources decreased, the Kenyan government was not able to provide effective protection for refugees and humanitarian workers.

Second, the security-first approach of the Kenyan government has also played important roles in keeping refugees from becoming involved in military actions. Especially after the Nairobi U.S. Embassy bombing in 1998 and the Mombasa hotel bombing in 2002, the Kenyan government has adopted very restrictive refugee policies. Furthermore, when the post-presidential election crisis erupted in 2007, the Kenyan government faced domestic demands that it should spend financial resources on Kenyan civilians, rather than on refugees in the camps. The Kenyan government denied the entrance of Somali refugees and closed the Liobi reception center. As a result, the Kenyan government’s security-first policy has made it difficult for Somali refugees to militarize the camps.

This implies that the practice and effectiveness of the UNHCR operations largely depend on the cooperation and willingness of the host country. Due to the Kenyan government’s border closure, UNHCR could no longer have access to and register refugees at the border; thus, refugees had to find their ways to the refugee camps by themselves, and rebels could not be stopped at the border. Therefore, UNHCR and donors have expressed serious concerns about border closure and its consequences.

Third, although the decreasing amount of UNHCR’s financial support changed the attitude of the Kenyan government toward Somali refugees, it is hard to say that fewer humanitarian resources increase the likelihood militarization. The larger size of Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps have stayed for more than 10 years and most third-generation young people have never been to Somalia. While some young refugees are recruited with monthly payments for fighting in Somalia, most refugees become less interested in the politics in Somalia. They want to be integrated into the local communities. In contrast to the conventional expectation that protracted situations increase the likelihood of militarization, the protracted situation in the Dadaab camps have discouraged Somali refugees from becoming involved in military actions. Without the means and willingness to get involved in military actions, they have survived by relying on international assistance and protection.
5. CASE TWO: MILITARIZATION OF IDP CAMPS IN DARFUR, SUDAN

5.1. IDPs in Government-Controlled Areas

5.1.1. Population
The large camps are predominantly made up of African tribes, including Fur, Massaleit, and Zaghawa. The populations are mixed, but the majority is Fur, who account for roughly 70% in the Abu Shouk and Kalma camps and about 95% in the Zalingei camps (UNMIS 2007). The two Al Salam camps in North and South Darfur have grown more recently and they have become more heterogeneous because of a large number of new arrivals (Kahn 2008). Additionally, since 2000, the efforts of the Sudanese government to relocate IDPs and/or close the camps have changed the dynamics of the population in Darfur (UNHCR 2010b).

5.1.2. Presence of Armed Factions
It is difficult to prevent the movement of IDPs and other armed forces inside and outside IDP camps. Even though the camps are technically under the government’s control, the IDP leadership and members of armed forces hold public meetings. According to the UNHRC (2007), a 15 year old girl, recruited in May 2007, reported that recruitment usually took place following public meetings between JEM/Peace wing (JEM/PW) commanders and IDPs. However, there is no clear evidence regarding how frequently or how long the armed factions stay in IDP camps.

When government forces raided the Kalma camp in October 2007, they confronted the SLA/MM fighters. While various sources attested to the presence of these soldiers in IDP camps, a UNHRC report indicates that members of armed factions infiltrated the camps because of inter-tribal conflicts, with SLA/MM fighters arriving from outside to assist their Zaghawa supporters (UN Human Rights Council 2007). Conflict around the Kalma camp has frequently occurred and intensified during the process of the Doha peace negotiation in August 2010. This violent clash between some residents against the Doha talks and those who supported the talks highlighted the growing problem of the presence of weapons and armed elements inside IDP camps, which is a security risk and a violation of both humanitarian space and principles (UN Security Council 2010d).

UN field officials report that the presence of SLA/MM in other camps has prevailed, but the presence is often temporarily, deliberately established as leverage in negotiations with the government (Kahn 2008). On October 30, 2010, the elements of SLA/MM and SAF signed an agreement that involved the integration of SLA/MM refused to disarm his forces. With tensions rising, on November 21, SLA/MM and GoS exchanged fire near the Zamzam camp (UN Security Council 2011).

The outsourcing of policing by the Sudanese government has also facilitated the presence of armed factions in the IDP camps. Despite the strong level of support among IDPs for the non-signatory factions, and for the SLA/AW in particular, humanitarian workers report that the DPA signatories, such as SLA/MM and government-affiliated factions, are consistently present and active in the large camps (Khartoum Protection Steering Group 2008). The unofficial outstanding of state policing responsibilities to armed groups causes serious concerns about accountability, command and control, and the justice system in cases of abuse. The government has unrestrained access to most camps, being responsible for their
security and for maintaining their civilian and humanitarian character, but its neutrality is frequently questioned by IDPs and international actors, particularly in relation to disarmament initiatives (Refugees International 2007).

5.1.3. Recruitment and Security
Reports of recruitment have been common in organized IDP camps in the Nyala area, including Kalma, Dereige, and Al Salam, with SLA/MM, SLA/AW, SLA/Peace Wing (SLA/PW), and JEM/PW cited as the armed factions most frequently involved. Other groups, including the SLA/Abu Gassim (SLA/AG), were also mentioned as having been involved in forced recruitment from Manawashi and Duma, where there are substantial IDP gatherings (UN Human Rights Council 2007).

In July 2010, the United Nations reported that an estimated 2,000 children in this area still had to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into society and more than 500 children were associated with various armed groups, including JEM/PW, SLA/PW, and the Popular Forces for Rights and Democracy Movement (UN Human Rights Council 2010). Since released children may be re-recruited by other armed groups, the international community should provide more support for rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former child soldiers.

The Sudanese government considers the camp as “a haven for criminal activity,” with growing numbers of rival armed elements and rampant violence against minorities (Reyes 2008). Therefore, on August 25, 2008, Sudanese security forces entered the camp, allegedly with the intention of disarming and arresting those residents in possession of weapons, leading to 47 civilian deaths. The government accused armed rebel supporting groups such as SLA/AW for taking refuge in Kalma, while residents and armed groups accused government-backed forces of mounting a string of raids on the settlement (New York Times 2008). The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) strongly condemns the excessive, disproportionate use of lethal force by the GoS security forces against civilians, which violated their human rights and resulted in unacceptable casualties (BBC 2008). This incident served as a catalyst for UNAMID to establish a 24-hour presence in Kalma and highlighted the need for a concerted effort by political, military, and humanitarian actors to support activities to depoliticize the camp and promote a sense of collective responsibility for security among IDPs.

5.2. IDPs in Rebel-Controlled Areas

5.2.1. Population
IDP camps under the control of armed factions have certain commonalities. First, the distinction between civilian and military space is not clear. Second, the governance by armed factions has provided few civilian services. Human Rights Watch (2008a:17) reports that it is difficult to distinguish between the police and the military and that courts and detention facilities have been highly criticized for their inadequate training, lack of consistency, and abuses of subjects in detention. Third, due to the continued attacks by the GoS and GoS-aligned forces, the population in areas under SLA/MM, SLA/AW, and/or JEM is routinely displaced. Thus, population movement is ongoing and the social political environment has remained unstable (UN Security Council 2010b).

SLA/MM draws the bulk of its support from the Zaghawa community, with a more limited following from other tribal groups. The integration of SLA/MM into the political
process was slow, weakened the group’s local support, and did not happen until the end of 2008 (SIPRI 2008:58). In Jebel Marra, where SLA/AW has its main base, the population is predominantly Fur, which largely supports the movement. However, as serial clashes between the military and the insurgents continued, the local support decreased, and access to the areas, including Jebel Marra and Jebel Moon, has been restricted by the Sudanese government and SLA/AW (UN Security Council 2010c). Virtually all groups in these areas face restrictions on their freedom of movement. Thus, the security of residents in the camps has worsened.

5.2.2. Presence of Armed Factions

Since the signing of the Doha peace agreement (DPA) in 2006, the armed factions have increasingly fragmented, dissolved, and reformed. The government of Sudan and SLA/MM signed the agreement, but SLA/AW and JEM refused to sign it. After signing DPA, Minawi had less access to the rebel-controlled areas of Darfur but was able to move freely in the government-controlled areas. Signatory and non-signatory rebel groups fought each other instead of uniting against the government. Significantly, DPA also compromised the neutrality of the African Union (AU) peacekeepers, who were obliged to defend a deeply unpopular agreement that most rebels vehemently resisted. As a result, attacks on peacekeepers multiplied (Fadul and Tanner 2007). In 2006 alone, there were 39 attacks against humanitarian workers by which 27 UN workers, 44 INGO workers, and 13 other organizations related workers were killed, kidnapped, or injured.

Despite the competition among armed groups, some areas have remained consistently under the influence of particular rebel groups and are understood to be under their effective control. For example, the Jebel Marra area has been under the control of SLA/AW although its influence has weakened after factional fighting within the group as well as the attacks by GoS and SAF in October 2010 (Small Arms Survey 2010). Additionally, SLA/MM as a signatory to DPA has a legal right to hold arms openly in the areas of its control, however, its long-time enjoyment of local support has been eroded by its current inability or unwillingness to protect those living within its areas of control during 2009 and 2010 (UN Security Council 2010b).

5.2.3. Recruitment

There are reports of recruitment, including children, from all areas controlled by SLA factions. The SLA/MM is the group most consistently accused of forced recruitment, particularly in Gereida, where youths have reportedly fled the camp to avoid compulsory recruitment (UN Security Council 2006; 2007a). In April 2007, armed children believed to be as young as 12 were identified with SLA/MM in northern Darfur. Recruitment continued by SLA/MM, other SLA factions including SLA/AW, and JEM (UN Security Council 2007a). Although government and armed factions agreed to stop recruiting fighters in 2010, none of the main rebel groups stopped recruiting as fighting between the army and one of the main Darfur rebel groups, JEM, was on the rise in Darfur ahead of a referendum on southern independence (AFP 2010).

5.3. Insecurity and Restricted Humanitarian Assistance

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon presented to the Security Council an assessment of humanitarian conditions in Darfur as the following generalization: “The humanitarian
operation in Darfur has been successful in stabilizing the situation in the food security, health, nutrition, and water sectors” (UN Security Council 2010b:16). However, these claims are in contradiction with the fact that by November 2010, JEM, SLA/MM, and SLA/AW still had military resources for their armed movement and most humanitarian workers had retreated to the government-controlled urban areas. UNAMID has been prevented by the Sudanese government from traveling for assessment to the site of fighting and humanitarian distress.

Throughout the Darfur area, accessibility to the provision of humanitarian assistance has been deteriorating. According to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA 2009:4), the accessibility recorded the lowest score when conflict between government and non-signatory armed factions intensified in 2006. In December 2008, overall UN accessibility in Darfur slightly improved to 68%, up from 65% in October. However, access to rural areas in Darfur continued to be seriously constrained. NGOs and Red Cross/Crescent Movements may assist people in UN no-go or limited access areas, but they have become wary of access areas with a high risk of banditry and armed confrontations.

Humanitarian access in Darfur is primarily determined by a combination of three factors (UN OCHA 2009). First, the degree of general insecurity may require the United Nations and other humanitarian partners to suspend or limit operations in certain unsafe areas for certain amounts of time. Second, the continued harassment of humanitarian organizations and workers, including blanket denial of humanitarian access, bureaucratic obstacles, bullying, and temporary denial of access to affected areas and IDP camps, have frequently occurred. Third, targeted attacks on humanitarians and their assets, including the hijacking of cars and abduction of personnel, physical violence directed towards humanitarian workers, road ambushes, and armed break-ins in humanitarian compounds/centers, have deteriorated the security of humanitarian staff.

Unquestionably, the attacks on humanitarian workers have hampered the effective delivery of humanitarian resources to residents in IDP camps. Many workers have been killed, kidnapped, or injured. A study by the Humanitarian Policy Group (Stoddard et al. 2009) finds that from 2006 to 2008, more than 75% of all attacks on humanitarian workers took place in seven countries. Sudan is the top-ranked country with the highest number of incidents, followed by Afghanistan and Somalia, all with ongoing armed conflicts. However, the annual average attack rate was 27 per 10,000 workers, which has been decreasing from a high in 2006 of 66 per 10,000 workers. This is partly because armed conflicts were intensified most in 2006.

Attacks against humanitarian workers repeatedly occurred in Darfur. Between 2003 and 2010, a total of 302 workers were killed, kidnapped, or seriously injured; 77 (25%) workers were associated with the United Nations, and 190 (63%) were associated with INGOs. In 2006, the incidents occurred most frequently and the number of victims was largest. Before the signing of DPA on May 5, 2006, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had fought against the government of the Sudan. However, SPLM/A have been fragmented into many factions. SLA/MM lost the support from the non-signatory groups and instead, SLA/AW and JEM have gained that support. According to John Holmes (2008), attacks on humanitarians have reached “unprecedented levels,” with 11 staff killed, 189 staff abducted, 261 vehicles hijacked, 172 assaults on humanitarian premises, and 35 ambushes and looting of convoys in 2008 alone. After 2008, the number of attacks against humanitarian workers and victims decreased because the capability of armed factions has been weakened due to continued attacks by government forces.

Another obstacle that impedes humanitarian operation is the restriction on the
humanitarian workers’ movement. Since 2007, government or armed factions have denied UNAMID and other humanitarian organizations’ access to the areas affected by the fighting and to civilians caught up in the violence (UN Security Council 2010d; 2011). Most restrictions are imposed by the government in rebel-controlled areas. For example, between April and November 2010, there were 50 government-imposed restrictions out of 62 total incidents of restrictions of UNAMID or UN Agency movement; on the other hand, there were 8 incidents of restrictions imposed by armed groups in the period (UN Security Council 2010b; 2010c; 2011). The government also placed restrictions on humanitarian assistance by expelling 13 international NGOs and closing three Sudanese relief organizations after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for President Omar el-Bashir on war crimes charges in March 2009 (IRIN 2009).

5.4. Summary and Discussion

In the government-controlled areas, government-backed armed groups and the Doha peace agreement signatory armed group SLA/MM have an overt presence in the camp, although the presence of SLA/MM was temporarily established. Since the outset of the conflict in 2003, the Sudanese government has supported militias that deliberately target civilians from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit groups in the camps, who formed anti-government armed groups. The government or government-backed militias are often accused of excessive responses to violence in IDP camps in this area. On the other hand, in the rebel-controlled area, armed groups, such as SLA/MM, SLA/AW, and JEM, militarized IDP camps. However, due to both continuous attacks by the government and the fragmentation of armed groups after the signing of the Doha peace agreement, most armed groups lost their capability to launch armed attacks on other camps or on the government-backed military and/or facilities.

UNHCR’s humanitarian operations in IDP camps have been conducted mostly in the government-controlled area. Even though armed factions are present and government-supported militias attack IDP camps, UNHCR and other international humanitarian agencies have been able to reach IDPs in desperate need of assistance in this area. The accessibility to IDPs varies even in the government-controlled area. However, UNHCR and UNAMID have reported that when they are able to provide humanitarian assistance and protection services, IDPs are more supportive in the peace-building process. This seems to support the first and third hypothesized relationships, but for a more valid causal inference, in-depth data analyses are required in future studies.

The access of the international community to IDP camps in the rebel-controlled area has frequently been denied by the government and/or armed groups. The lack of humanitarian resources and excessive attacks on the camps by the government forces increased IDPs’ dissatisfaction with government-associated armed groups. Thus, SLA/AW and JEM have gained local support to continue their movement. In the worst case, IDPs and armed groups in this rural area attacked not only other camps in the urban area but also humanitarian workers to attain and manipulate humanitarian resources for their causes. Consequently, Sudan has been a top ranked country with the most violent incidents against humanitarian workers.

Without being able to protect humanitarian workers, most international humanitarian operations have been conducted in the government-controlled area, leaving IDPs in the rural area in jeopardy. In other words, if there are not enough international assistance and
protection services in the rural area, IDPs and armed groups militarize their camps to provide resources with which they can survive and continue their movement. This appears to support the third and fourth hypothesized relationships proposed in the previous section, even though the causal relationships need to be better articulated in future studies.

6. CONCLUSION

The general findings of this study are as follows. First, each incumbent regime in Kenya and Sudan has securitized refugees and IDPs. The xenophobic attitude of the Kenyan government toward Somali refugees resulted in the government’s refugee policy to restrict asylum for Somali refugees, culminating in an outright refusal of access during the Ethiopian campaign in Somalia in 2007. On the other hand, the Sudanese government has strong political interests in preventing ethnic based armed groups from mobilizing every resource for their armed movement. Although the government cannot control all areas, it tries to minimize the consequences of armed movement by imposing restrictions on humanitarian assistance to the rebel-controlled areas. At the same time, it places restrictions so as not to allow the international community to have access to sites where government forces are involved in human rights violations.

Second, the protracted situation in the Dadaab camps was not factored into the refugee camp militarization in Kenya, while the protracted situation in Sudan caused IDPs much anguish and, thereby, IDPs supported armed groups. The Kenyan government considers the protracted situation as a never-ending stay with the great possibility of militarization. However, Somali refugees are not politically interested in the political process in Somalia because most Somalis in the camps were situational refugees and many of them have never been to Somalia. On the other hand, the protracted situation in Sudan has intensified tensions within the camps and between government and armed groups, and it has also deteriorated the security of the humanitarian staff working there. Depending on whether armed movements are allied with the government or not, situations for IDPs in Darfur can be quite different.

Third, humanitarian assistance and effective protection have contributed to maintaining the humanitarian character of refugee camps in Dadaab, while the international presence in Darfur has been limited due to the widespread population, a lack of police escorts, and restrictions imposed by the government and rebel groups. Diminishing international support allowed the Kenyan government to justify its decision regarding the border closure, but active engagement by the international community in the Dadaab area has brought, to some degree, economic benefits to the area. In Darfur, the first obstacle that humanitarian organizations encounter is the security of their staff and civilians. Although the number of military conflicts and battle-deaths has decreased, attacks on humanitarian aid workers have increased and worsened the physical security of IDPs. Without the presence of international humanitarian organizations, armed groups easily militarize the camps under their control and continue military actions to obtain resources.

This study provides significant implications for the theoretical understanding of forced migration. It illustrates that both governments and armed groups experience lateral pressure; that depending on the capability and willingness of the government and armed groups, the likelihood and/or degree of militarization varies; that by militarizing camps, governments try to impede the solution to the rebel’s dilemma and armed groups try to solve the rebel’s dilemma. At the same time, refugees and IDPs become directly involved in military actions,
provide support for armed groups, and/or pursue humanitarian support within their camp by remaining away from military actions.

Additionally, the study of the militarization has to do with the protection of human security. The militarization of camps leaves the lives and livelihoods of refugees and IDPs in dire situations, and the desperate need of residents in camps increases the likelihood that those people will become involved in military actions. However, higher levels of international humanitarian engagement decrease the likelihood of militarization. Although humanitarian resources are often manipulated by government and/or armed groups, international support for refugees and IDPs is necessary for protecting human security. Furthermore, due to the expansion of the international refugee regime and the evolution of the international IDP regime, governments cannot arbitrarily refuse the international humanitarian efforts to protect the security of refugees and IDPs. This is an anomalous phenomenon that can hardly be explained by the traditional concept of state sovereignty.

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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND MILITARIZATION OF REFUGEE AND IDP CAMPS IN KENYA AND SUDAN


DC: US Committee for Refugees.

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