Although there has been considerable interest in the role of voluntary associations as main players of civil society in improving participatory democracy, few researchers have explored this relationship empirically and cross-nationally. This paper addresses two research questions: (a) Do consequences of voluntary associations for participatory democracy vary from country to country? For this question, I investigate whether associational membership strengthens, weakens, or leaves unchanged the effects of socioeconomic resources measured by educational attainment and family income on political participation. (b) Why do the cross-national variations in the role of voluntary associations as a political equalizer occur? I argue that political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged is more likely to be mitigated by voluntary associations in countries where civic resources such as civic virtue and social trust are facilitated via associational experiences than in countries where they are not. A comparison of 36 countries concerning the role of associationalism in achieving participatory democracy is made by analyzing the 2004 ISSP data. The results suggest that the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members are better constrained in countries where civic resources are developed through associational activities. That is, political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged will be reduced by voluntary associations depending on their capacity to develop civic virtue and social trust.

**Keywords:** civility, political participation, voluntary association, political inequality, comparative analysis

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Introduction

What is the primary role of voluntary associations for democracy? Do voluntary associations improve the quality of representative democracy? Voluntary associations undergird the creation and maintenance of democracy (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002; Cohen and Rogers 1995; Dahl 1961; Gutmann 1998; Fukuyama 2016; Gutman 1998). Ever since Toqueville (2004 [1845]) observed that the strength of American democracy rested on the participation of ordinary citizens in associational activities and political affairs, a vast amount of studies have claimed that active involvement in politics by virtue of membership in voluntary associations contributes to the consolidation of democratic institutions and advances the equalization of political influences.

Given that the privileged with higher education, more income, and higher social standing are more likely to participate in politics (Armingeon and Schädel 2015; Kim 2011; Lijphart 1997; Schlozman et al. 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), voluntary associations, as the most important players of civil society, have been depicted as helping the disadvantaged with lower education, less income, and lower social standing to overcome the barrier for engagement in democratic politics (Chambers 2002; Polletta 2002; Przeworski 2016; MR Warren 2001; Rosenblum 1998). They are identified, in the literature, as the most influential facilitators of political participation by inculcating civic resources such as a sense of civic duties and responsibility, social trust, civic skills, and political interest and efficacy (Achen and Hur 2011; Dagger 1997; Fukuyama 1995; Kymlicka 1998; ME Warren 2001; Thorson 2012), by mobilizing money, time, and efforts (Gerber, Green, and Lamier 2008; Knoke 1990b; Leighley 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), and by serving as the instrumental means for specific political interests and causes (Berry 1999; Burns 1994; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Clemens 1997; Kaufman 1999; Tilly 1997).

Implicit in these accounts is the assumption that voluntary associations may improve participatory equality by drawing people, especially the socially disadvantaged who lack necessary resources and access to politics, into the political arena beyond the level that their resources may allow. Put differently, it implies that associational membership can reduce the impact of individual resources such as educational attainment and family income on political participation at the individual level. Although voluntary associations are
regarded as the means for expressing political voices of the disadvantaged in almost all democratic societies, surprisingly little empirical evidence exists to confirm the notion that associational membership is influential enough to overwhelm the effects of individual resources on political participation (Fernandes 2015; Fishman and Lizardo 2013). This equalizing effect of voluntary associations has been empirically untested indeed, it has been comparatively ignored except for the phenomenal study of *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison* by Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jea-on Kim (1978). Thus, we know very little about the extent to which associational membership modifies the impact of socioeconomic status on political activity, and even less about its varying consequences for participatory equality in diverse institutional settings today.

What are the mechanisms by which voluntary associations lead to political equality or inequality? Under what circumstances will political inequality due to the unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources be reduced or intensified? Do consequences of voluntary associations for participatory democracy vary from country to country? Why do the cross-national variations in the role of voluntary associations as a political equalizer occur? In this paper, I argue that voluntary associations are more at risk for intensifying political disparity in countries where they cannot inculcate civic resources in the mind of citizens.\(^1\) Without civic resources fostered through associational life, the inequality in political influence between the privileged and the disadvantaged will get deeper even among association members as the effects of the other two factors of political mobilization and interest pursuit on political participation get stronger. Two processes by which associational activity ends up deepening participatory inequality are elaborated in countries where civic resources cannot be developed by voluntary association. First, when political participation is instrumentally determined, the privileged with higher education and more income are more likely to detect and exploit rewarding opportunities to project their preferences and demands into political decision. This tendency can be explained by the fact that the privileged not only receive more returns from

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\(^1\) As suggested in my previous paper (Kim 2011), “by civic resources and politically desirable traits, I mean the attitudinal attributes such as civic virtue and social trust relevant to participation in civic and political affairs. On the one hand, trusting citizens will be less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior, rather, they are more likely to participate in politics to enrich their surroundings because they comply with the requirements of democratic practice based on the belief that others will also comply. On the other hand, virtuous citizens will be the ones who regard political participation as a necessary contribution to the good of the community (Kim 2011: 127).
political action, but also have quality connections with political elites or public officials who can exert their influence on the policy-making process (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Second, when the decision to participate stems mainly from strategic mobilization by parties and political organizations, this also results in the aggravation of participatory disparity because the request for political action tends to target people who occupy the upper social strata (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 30-31; Schier 2000: 7-41; Skocpol 2003, 2004). As a combined result of rent-seeking political action by association members and mobilization efforts by political recruiters, voluntary associations can hardly reduce participatory inequality in such countries where voluntary associations cannot function as a civic educator.

Using the 2004 ISSP datasets, this paper attempts to shed light on varying consequences of voluntary associations for participatory democracy in socially, politically, and culturally different contexts from a comparative perspective. To this end, this paper investigates whether associational membership strengthens, weakens, or leaves unchanged the effects of socioeconomic resources measured by educational attainment and family income on political participation especially among association members in each country. In short, this paper examines the hypothesis that the effects of educational attainment and family income on political participation among members are better constrained in countries where voluntary associations can inculcate civic resources than those in countries where they cannot. By doing so, it fills the gap in the empirical research on the role of voluntary associations as an equalizer of political influences. Furthermore, by conducting a comparative study, this paper provides empirical grounds for the question of whether identical or contrasting settings of civil society lead to similar or dissimilar foundations of participatory democracy.

Social Inequality, Political Inequality, and Voluntary Associations as Equalizing Forces

Social inequality and political inequality go hand in hand in that those who have more socioeconomic resources tend to participate more in politics than those who have less (Erikson 2015). The educated and the affluent are more likely to possess knowledge that makes it easier to sort out the intricacies of political procedure, cognitive abilities that can process complex political information, and social skills that help interact smoothly with others (Jacobs
and Skocpol 2005: 31-32; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996: 11-38; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1982). They also have expansive personal networks closer to the center of far-flung political information and opportunities. In contrast, the networks of the less affluent and the less educated are more likely to be encapsulated and localized such that they fail to provide much diversity and richness in political information and opportunities (Burt 2005; Granovetter 1973; Fisher 1982; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprangue 1993; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Laumann 1973; Wellman 1978). Overall, the privileged participate more in politics than the disadvantaged. It appears to be inevitable that inequality in socioeconomic resources leads to inequality in political voices. “In terms of whose concerns are expressed, it matters who participates because the preferences and demands of participants will be better represented in the policy process” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 227). If the messages to policymakers are skewed in favor of the educated and the affluent, then the democratic principles of equal responsiveness to all will be compromised.2

While the prediction about equal political influence in conjunction with the unequal distribution of socioeconomic resources paints a grim picture, scholars in social science have placed great hope in the role of voluntary associations to equalize political voice across lines of education and income (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005: 49-57). By articulating the preferences and demands of citizens and establishing effective channels by which various political voices can be heard, voluntary associations decrease the impact of educational attainment and family income on political participation at the individual level, thereby leading to greater political equality at the societal level. Many sociologists and political scientists have believed that the derivatives of associational life can compete with individual socioeconomic variables in determining the level of political activity.3

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2 Needless to say, a high participation rate in a given country does not necessarily warrant that participatory democracy will flourish. Participation is one thing democracy is another. However, it is certain that political participation from a wider section of population is essential to participatory democracy in the sense that the demand of ordinary citizens can be best represented in the policy process when they participate actively in politics. Democracy will become fragile or superficial if voting is the only form of political practice (Muller and Seligson 1994).

3 See Fung (2003) for the review of the roles of voluntary associations for participatory democracy. He acknowledges that there is no consensus on the ways in which associations contribute among scholars. He instead recapitulates the ways that voluntary associations enhance democracy: through the intrinsic value of associational life, fostering civic virtue and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and
Broadly speaking, the side benefits of associational membership found in the existing empirical research, which eventually rival the impacts of socioeconomic resources on political participation, can be classified three ways.4

Firstly, associations instill psychological resources critical for political action in the mind of citizens. They are imbued with civic virtue (Grönlund, Setälä, & Herne 2010. Galston 1991; Frisco, Muller, and Dodson 2004; Krishna 2002; Letki 2004; Pykett & Schaefer 2010), norms of reciprocity and generalized trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998), and other communication skills and political orientations (Ayala 2000; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Brady, Verba, and Scholzman 1995; Green and Brook 2005; Paulsen 1991; Pollock 1982), and are thus more likely to participate in politics. Members are motivated to take political action beyond the level that their resources permit as they obtain subjective civic competence and trust of others through cooperative work. ME Warren (2001) maintains that voluntary associations contribute to democracy in a way that they have developmental effects on citizens such as boosting political efficacy, serving as collectors, organizers, and conduits of political information, teaching political skills, and developing civic virtue including norms of reciprocity and generalized trust. In particular, democratic institutions become more transparent, accountable, and systematic as much as ordinary citizens possess social trust and civic virtues because they stimulate more political involvement.

Secondly, associations directly and indirectly operate as a nexus of political mobilization. It is no doubt that associational membership enhances the quantity and quality of social networks. Social ties strengthened and enlarged through the membership give people access to a wide range of political opportunities (Crenson 1978; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990; Leighley 1995; Mutz 2002a, 2002b; Teorell 2003; Weatherford 1982; Zipp and Smith 1979). Such ties disseminate political information and mobilize sentiment, which eventually increase the probability of political participation

4 People do not join voluntary associations in order to gain civic resources or get involved in politics. Instead, they learn civic attitudes and get exposed to political information and opportunities in the course of meeting personally and socially valuable ends. Moreover, the primary aims of most associations are neither to teach members civic attitudes nor to encourage them to take part in politics. Actually, association-based political action is very much a minority affair (Ulzurrun 2002; Moyser and Parry 1997). In this sense, it is appropriate to regard civic virtue and social trust as byproducts or side benefits trained and reinforced in associational activities independent of the explicit purpose that specific associations serve (Gutman 1998: 4).
Quality of Civil Society and Participatory Democracy in ISSP Countries

(Abramson and Claggett 2001; Gould 1991; Knoke 1990a; McAdam 1986; McClurg 2003, 2005; Smith and Zipp 1983; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). Members in voluntary associations are more likely to participate in politics because they are accessible and susceptible to mobilization (Rosenston and Hansen 1993: 83-88). On the one hand, voluntary associations are direct agents of mobilization. Group leaders, parties, and political activists induce members to participate in politics. They contact and request members to support their cause in particular issues and to give votes, money, and time. On the other hand, even when associational activities are not directly related to politics, the politically meaningful contacts are most likely and frequently to occur in the context of voluntary associations (Abramson and Claggett 2001; Huckfeldt et al. 1995). Thus, members in apolitical associations such as sport clubs are also exposed to political stimuli such as political discussion over community matters, candidates, and campaign and eventually recruited into political action (Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990). In sum, members in voluntary associations are given information about the issues at stake and the opportunities to affect them. The mobilization process within voluntary association thus helps citizens overcome hurdles caused by the lack of socioeconomic resources.

Thirdly, membership can be used as an instrumental tool for raising political voices. Members may utilize their membership as a channel for expressing their political views to politicians and for pressing their demands in the policymaking process (Goldberg 1996; Moyser and Parry 1997; Tilly 1997). As Madison (1788) and Tocqueville (2004[1845]) regarded associational membership as the single best means of assuring the representation of privatized group interests, it is somehow natural to assume that people form and enter voluntary associations to expand and sustain their political influence and power. In fact, all types of voluntary associations have a huge political stake in local and national politics (Kaufman 2002: 85-100). For instance, mercantile and commercial associations provide businessmen with valuable private forums to share information, negotiable deals, sway policymaking process, and form exclusive cartels (Burns 1994). On the other hand, voluntary associations channel the voices of the disadvantaged into the political decision by helping them to actively get involved in politics. For example, politically underrepresented groups such as blacks, immigrants, and women also found organizations of their own (Clemens 1997; Skocpol 1992). These organizations serve the minority groups as a vital political vehicle for the communication and articulation of their social and political concerns. Thus, voluntary associations are expected to create arenas in which their
members articulate demands for specific policies, to take political action, and then to influence political outcomes. These three mechanisms implicitly claim that voluntary associations improve participatory equality by drawing people, especially the socially disadvantaged who lack necessary resources and access to politics, into the political arena beyond the level that their resources may allow. Namely, the byproducts or side benefits of associational life may interfere with the extent to which socioeconomic resources determine the level of political activity. Therefore, associational membership can reduce the impact of individual resources such as educational attainment and family income on political participation.

Voluntary associations always increase political participation in any context. However, the prevailing factors that link associational membership with political activity vary from country to country (Koopmans 2004; Paxton 2002; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). The most notable is that whereas the effectiveness of membership as a political mobilizer and an instrumental vehicle is found to be consistent across countries, the extent to which they foster the politically desirable traits, particularly civic virtue and social trust, is not (Booth and Richard 1998; Gambetta 1993, 1998; Ulzurrun 2002; Freitag 2003; Krishna 2002; Labigne, 2012; Muller and Seligson 1994; Newton 1999: 170–4, 2001; Stolle and Rochon 1998). Hence, it is possible to think of civic virtue and social trust as the intermediaries making common vibrant associational cultures result in differential consequences for participatory equality among countries. Given that associational membership facilitates individual political engagement and thus diminishes the political disparity between the privileged and disadvantaged (Ahlquist and Levi 2013), if we find a weakness in its role as an equalizing force in some countries, the lack of capacity to generate civic virtue and social trust could be the culprit.5

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5 Paxton (2002) argues that voluntary associations help maintain democracy by affecting both the quantity and quality of political participation by citizens. Quantity refers to the amount of political participation engendered by membership in voluntary associations. Quality means the nature of political participation. The quality is high when participation is based on the democratic dispositions of civic virtue and social trust. Therefore, she unwittingly acknowledges that the combination of quantity and quality of participation through associational membership can only make democracy feasible. In other words, the cultivation of democratic dispositions is indispensable to the improvement of participatory democracy (Paxton 2002: 258-9).
How Political Disparity can be Intensified by Voluntary Associations

The process through which voluntary associations without capacity to produce civic resources exacerbate political disparity is rather straightforward to describe. As was illustrated earlier, associational membership elevates the level of political activity and brings forth participatory equality in three ways: 1) By cultivating politically desirable traits including civic virtue and social trust, 2) by furthering political mobilization, 3) by furnishing efficient channels for diverse political voices. Remember that, among these three participatory factors derived from membership, only the cultivation of civic virtue and social trust has been found to be inconsistent across countries. In my view, therefore, if the membership merely increases political participation without developing civic virtue and social trust, it seems reasonable to conclude that it does so by furthering mobilization and serving as a political vehicle. When one of the three is absent, the relevance of the other two grows. That is, increased political participation should be mostly attributable to the second and the third of the three factors above. Furthermore, I argue that political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged due to the differences in socioeconomic resources will not be diminished if political participation among members is only driven by the pursuit of their own benefits or in reaction to the requests from those who belong to the community with which they identify. How is this corollary possible?

The notion that associational activities may only represent divisive group interests and thus promote factionalism as opposed to civic resources is consistent with the picture envisioned in the Federalist No. 10 written by James Madison (1788). In that paper, he describes voluntary associations as a political means for raising and realizing factional interests. Thus, political participation of association members is confined to their financial and political interests in the fiscal policy of government (Kaufman 1999). When associational membership mainly functions as an instrumental tool to secure greater leverage in the polity, those from the upper segments of society are more likely to take advantage of any available rewarding opportunities than those from the lower ones. As Wuthnow (2004) points out, the privileged who are well-endowed with a variety of kinds of resources participate more in politics than do the disadvantaged because they not only have access to the right information and channels, but have more direct and greater stakes in politics, suggesting that they have more incentives to take political action.
Consequently, the distribution of political activities and their benefits tend to be skewed in favor of the rich, the powerful, and the educated (Schlozman et al. 2005). On the other hand, the participatory gap also exists among associations because each may have different levels of available resources and organizational capacity (Walzer 2002: 39-41). Needless to say, associations composed of high-status members are more likely to overcome the hurdles posed by the logic of collective action than less resource-rich associations of similar size and a similar intensity of concerns. Resource-poor associations are less effective in helping members to tap into the flow of political opportunities, which may reinforce indifference among members toward civic engagement. Furthermore, participatory inequality tends to be durable through the exclusive networking of well-endowed associations (Tilly 1997). Members in those associations monopolize political information and channels, thereby amassing and reproducing their wealth and social standing (Useem 1984). As Skocpol (1999) worries, the political voices of well-endowed associations will prevail in the policy process and thus social inequality will be noticeably aggravated by the very existence of voluntary associations.

It is well known that the mobilization process is most effective in equalizing political influences between socioeconomic levels because it provides all citizens the chance to participate in politics regardless of their wealth or social standing (Leighley 1996; Rosenston and Hansen 1993; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). Political mobilization within associations is expected to mitigate the political disparity that the difference in individual resources would give rise to. Thus, the likelihood to participate escalates as members are invited by political actors such as group leaders, party activists, and group operatives. However, it seems unrealistic to presuppose that the chance to be mobilized is evenly distributed within associations. It might be more reasonable to assume that political mobilization is directed more at the privileged than at the disadvantaged (Hill and Leighley 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 30-31; Schier 2000: 7-41). In actuality, as Verba, Scholozman, and Brady (1995) show, the white, the affluent, and the well-educated receive more requests to participate than do the black, the poor, and the less educated. From the viewpoint of political recruiters, the strategy of targeted mobilization in terms of socioeconomic status is extremely rational in the sense that it pursues the greatest effect with the least effort. They must carefully identify and motivate the particular segments of the public most likely to be active for particular issues to maximize the efficiency of their mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 20-37). Thus, political recruiters
tend to contact members with higher income and more education, as they are the most likely prospects to be actual participants. In addition, the odds of being requested may increase as the higher education and income place themselves at the central positions of social and political networks, a good indicative of an effective dissemination of political information and a strong political influence to others (McClurg 2004). In a similar vein, the differences in socioeconomic resources among associations also intensify the stratification of political participation because the recruiters target the ones composed of members with higher social and economic status (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Abramson and Claggett 2001). Thus, political stimuli such as information about politics and requests to participate are circulated differentially among associations. It is less likely for members in the resource-poor associations to have an equal chance to be offered those stimuli as much as are those in well-endowed ones (Berman 1997; Riley 2005; Wuthnow 1991). In short, by making political participation possible “by invitation only”, the mobilization serves to reinforce political disparity (Hill and Leighley 1994; Schier 2000). Participatory inequality worsens and becomes perpetuated by the fact that members with more resources and members in well-endowed associations are much more likely to be in the middle of the mobilization process. Paradoxically, even political mobilization, known as the most decisive reducer of participation disparity, widens rather than narrows the gap in political influences between the socially and economically privileged and the disadvantaged. Therefore, in the absence of civic resources, voluntary associations exacerbate rather than mitigate political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged (Fishman 2016). Basically, I believe that the increased political activity via associational membership may actually do more harm than good for democracy, if not elicited by civic resources.

Data and Methods

Measures

The 2004 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) citizenship module data are analyzed to compare the role of voluntary associations in 36 countries in achieving participatory democracy. The 2004 ISSP includes various topics about citizens’ civic attitudes and political identities as well as their social and political activities. Furthermore, the 2004 ISSP module asks
whether respondents belong to four types of voluntary associations, including (1) Labor Union, Business, or Professional Association; (2) Sports, Leisure, or Cultural Group; (3) Church-Affiliated Group; (4) Other Groups.

An index of political participation, which will serve as a dependent variable in the analysis, was constructed by adding the number of self-reported political acts in which respondents engaged at least once in the last twelve months. The 2004 ISSP includes the battery of political acts asking whether a respondent signed a petition, boycotted products for social or political reasons, took part in a demonstration, attended a political rally, contacted officials or politicians to express one’s opinion, donated money, contacted media, or involved in internet political forum in the past year. Thus, it is an additive index with each counted as one act, an eight-point scale for overall political participation. This index, though not exhaustive, captures essential dimensions of political behaviors derived from private motivations to communal causes.

An index of civic virtue is constructed by adding the ten items asking citizens’ attitudes about civic duties, liberal virtue, and civility that encourage individual political involvement. Respondents were asked to give a score between 1 (Strongly Disagree) and 7 (Strongly Agree) for each item, so the index ranges from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 70. The battery of civic virtue questions asks how important each of ten items is including Always vote in elections, Never try to evade taxes, Always to obey laws and regulations, To keep watch on the actions of government, To be active in social or political associations, To try to understand the reasoning of people with other opinions, To choose products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more, To help people in our country who are worse off than yourself, To help people in the rest of the world who are worse off than yourself, To be willing to serve in the military at a time of need is to be a good citizen. Social trust is measured by a four point scale asking “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” The ranges of possible responses are 1: You almost always can’t be too careful in dealing with people, 2: You usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people, 3: People can usually be trusted, 4: People can almost always be trusted.

Educational attainment and family income are adopted as measures for socioeconomic resources in that they represent the critical sources for

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6 Employing an additive scale for overall political participation as a dependent variable rather than constructing eight different models for individual political acts would be more appropriate in the interest of conducting a comparative study because some concepts of the same political acts vary in meaning across countries (Kim 2011: 135).
political life such as money, social standing, and civic skills (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980). Based on the degree that respondents received, education is collapsed into four categories of “less than high school diploma”, “high school diploma”, “some college”, and “college diploma or more.” I set “less than high school diploma” as a reference category. Family income is also aggregated into five groups of “the lowest quartile”, “the second quartile”, “the third quartile”, “the top quartile”, and “missing (don’t know/refused).” The missing category is included not only because its number is substantially high for both countries, but also because it possibly reflect certain characteristics of respondents. “The lowest quartile” is the reference. Some background characteristics such as age, race, gender, marital status, working status, religious denomination, parental status indicating presence of children under age eighteen who need parental care, region of residence, and type of community, are included as controls in all models of this paper.

**Methods**

Figure 1 and Figure 2 are histograms for the distribution of the political participation index in the United States and Korea. Figures indicate that the data are strongly skewed to the right and are not normally distributed for all groups. Thus, the figures suggest that OLS regression would be inappropriate. The typical strategy to handle this type of count data is to use the Poisson Regression Model (King 1989). In the Poisson distribution, however, the variance of the dependent variable equals its mean. In other words, this model assumes that people with the same independent variables are expected to have the same number of events, which is not realistic because actual data are always under- or over-dispersed. In this case, it is widely recommended to use a negative binomial regression model.

Voluntary associations improve participatory democracy by reducing the impact of socioeconomic resources on political participation in three ways. Among three participatory factors stemming from associational activities, only the development of civic virtue and social trust is not consistent across countries whereas political mobilization by political recruiters and interest pursuit by members are found to be constant in the comparative research. Hence, I will first explore the ability of voluntary associations to produce civic virtue and social trust. It enables us to conjecture whether voluntary associations function as a “school for democracy” and eventually mitigate participatory inequality in each country.
Second, in order for my argument about intensification of political inequality to be justifiable, voluntary associations should enhance political activity in any context. Thus, it is critical to confirm whether voluntary associations really increase political participation. By running a negative binomial regression of political acts on associational membership, I attempt to verify the significant relationship between associational membership and political participation. Figure 1 shows the distribution of political acts in the United States, with voluntary members participating more than nonmembers. Figure 2 presents similar data for Korea, illustrating the same trend. These findings support the hypothesis that voluntary associations play a crucial role in increasing political engagement.
political participation in all ISSP countries. I assume that voluntary associations likely intensify political disparity where they draw members into political action without fostering civic virtue and social trust. Without such civic resources, the inequality in political voices across socioeconomic lines gets deeper even among association members as the effects of other two factors of political mobilization and interest pursuit on political participation get stronger.

Finally, instead of searching similar or different conditions among ISSP countries or constructing a general framework explaining the cross-national variations, I try to verify the hypothesis that voluntary associations increase or reduce political inequality depending on their capacity to inculcate civic resources in the mind of citizens. In order to see how socioeconomic resources interact with the context of voluntary association, I split the sample into members and nonmembers and run a negative binomial regression for members in each country. Members are those who belong to one or more voluntary associations while nonmembers are those who belong to none. Special attention will be given to the effects of educational attainment and family income on the number of political acts among members. Specifically, given that associational membership facilitates political participation in all countries, I hypothesize that the effects of socioeconomic resources among members are weaker in countries where voluntary associations inculcate civic virtue and social trust than those in countries where they cannot develop such civic traits. Incident rate ratios for the number of political acts rather than the difference in the number of political acts will be calculated effectively to show the cross-national variations.

Results

Effect of associational membership on civic resources in 36 ISSP countries

Table 1 classifies voluntary associations of 36 ISSP countries into four groups, excluding Denmark and Mexico, according to their capacities to produce civic resources. To obtain the list, I ran two OLS regression of civic virtue and social trust for each country, controlling for socioeconomic resources and other variables. This two-by-two table is constructed based on the effect of associational membership on two dependent variables at the 0.05

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7 Denmark (96.1%) and Mexico (93.5%) will be eliminated in the analyses that follow because their membership rate is so high that we cannot expect its discernible effect on any variables of interest in this section.
significance level. If voluntary associations have a significant impact on both civic virtue and social trust, I put these cases in the upper left cell of Table 5 (Group I). In contrast, if associational membership affects neither civic virtue nor social trust, these cases are located in the lower right cell (Group IV). The countries whose voluntary associations affect either civic virtue or social trust are placed in upper right or lower left cells, (Group II or III), respectively.

Table 1 shows that association members in Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, US, and Venezuela have greater civic virtue and social trust compared to nonmembers, indicating that voluntary associations produce civic resources in these countries. In contrast, associational membership in Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Korea, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Uruguay fosters neither civic virtue nor social trust. Given that voluntary associations increase political participation in any context and that the two other participatory factors of political mobilization by political recruiters and instrumental pursuit of members are consistent across countries, the equalizing role of voluntary associations should depend on their capacity to develop civic resources. Therefore, voluntary associations are expected to diminish the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation in countries classified as Group I in Table 1. On the other hand, voluntary associations may result in the aggravation of political disparity in countries in Group IV. In short, it is expected that the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members will be stronger and more significant in countries in Group IV than those in Group I.

Judging from the rationale that the cultivation of civic resources by voluntary associations determines their success as an political equalizer, countries located in Group II and Group III such as Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Flanders, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Taiwan shows a moderate tendency that the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members are stronger than those in Group I and that they are weaker than those in Group IV. In my view, however, they are likely to be closer to countries in Group I in that associational membership significantly affects at least one of the two civic resource variables in those countries.

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8 Brazil and Portugal are classified in Group IV despite their voluntary associations having significant impact on either civic virtue or social trust. It is because their significant effects on social trust in Brazil and on civic virtue in Portugal are negative.
TABLE 1
A List of ISSP Countries by Capacity of Voluntary Associations to Develop Civic Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic Virtue</th>
<th>Significant</th>
<th>Insignificant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>US, Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>Group II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Group III</td>
<td>Group IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insignificant</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Great Britain, Flanders, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Taiwan</td>
<td>Korea, Austria, Brazil†, Cyprus, Hungary, Philippines, Poland, Portugal‖, Russia, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Associational membership significantly and negatively affects social trust
‖ Associational membership significantly and negatively affects civic virtue

Effect of associational membership on political participation in 36 ISSP countries

Figure 3 displays incidence rate ratios of association members to nonmembers for the number of political acts in 36 ISSP countries. The incidence rate ratios for all countries are significant at the 0.05 significance level. Incidence rate ratio rather than difference in the number of political acts is estimated from the coefficients of negative binomial regression results, which is standardized and appropriate for a cross-national comparison. The significance level test and differences in the number of political acts between categories are not sufficient to simultaneously compare the results of many countries. The simple difference in counts is hardly intuitive because the relative importance of one political act varies from country to country. In short, it is neither direct nor standardized. For example, members in Great Britain and Australia report 0.36 and 0.52 more political acts compared to

9 See Appendix 1 for the example of analysis on the United States and Korea.
nonmembers, respectively. At a glance, the effect of associational membership on political participation seems stronger in Australia than in Great Britain. According to Figure 3, however, the incidence rate ratios for both countries are identical, meaning that members compared to nonmembers, while holding the other variables constant in the models, are expected to have the same rate of 1.60 times greater for political acts. Thus, incidence rate ratios allow us to make a direct comparison of cross-national variations than difference in the number of political acts.

Does associational membership always boost the level of political activity in all countries? Mere membership in voluntary associations positively and significantly affects political participation in all ISSP countries. The results suggest that voluntary associations facilitate political participation by furthering political mobilization and serving as a political vehicle even when their educating function is lacking in many countries. Note that among the three participatory factors elicited by associational activities, civic resource-related variables are only included in the model because the other two factors are not available in the 2004 ISSP data. Thus, the significant impact of associational membership on political participation in each country largely reflects the influence of political mobilization by political recruiters and interest pursuit of members. Therefore, the political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged among members are likely to be intensified where civic virtue and social trust are not cultivated but political activities are increased by associational membership.

Figure 3 indicates that almost all countries in Group IV, with the exception of Austria, Slovenia, and Poland, are ranked in the top third on the incidence rate ratio of members to nonmembers for the number of political acts. In contrast, the incidence rate ratios are below 2.00 in all countries in Group I though they are statistically significant. For example, members in Russia are expected to report political acts in the last year 3.04 times more than nonmembers, while it is just 1.39 times in Switzerland. Since substantial part of the associational membership’s impact on political participation is composed of political mobilization and interest pursuit, Figure 3 implies that political participation is more influenced by the other two participatory factors in countries in Group IV than in countries in Group I. In addition, the results of other analyses, though not reported in this paper, also confirm

10 As expected, associational membership significantly affects neither political participation nor civic resource in Denmark and Mexico where more than 90 per cent of population belong to voluntary associations. The results of negative binomial regression for entire population are virtually the same as those for association members in both countries.
that the effects of civic virtue and social trust on political participation are consistently significant and strong in Group I countries whereas they are meager and weak in Group IV countries.

All in all, political activities in Group I countries are shaped by all three participatory factors via associational activities while they are mainly structured by political mobilization and interest pursuit in Group IV countries.

**Fig. 3.**—Incidence Rate Ratio of Members to Nonmembers for the Number of Political Acts in 36 ISSP Countries
countries. Therefore, I conclude that the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members are stronger in Korea, Austria, Brazil, Cyprus, Hungary, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, and Slovenia compared to those in the United States, Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela, and Uruguay. I also expect that the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members in Group II and Group III countries are similar to those in Group I countries. It is not only because voluntary associations in these countries significantly and moderately increase the level of political activity, but also because civic virtue and social trust are better created by voluntary associations than are they in Group IV countries. Members in voluntary associations in Group IV countries are most at risk for political inequality between the privileged and the disadvantaged.

Varying consequences of voluntary associations for participatory democracy in 36 ISSP Countries

Do educational attainment and family income equally influence political participation? Previous studies point out that these two most important measures of socioeconomic resources differentially affect the level of political activity. It is well known that the effect of educational attainment compared to family income is found to be more consistent and stronger in many countries (Leighley 1995; Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995). It is certain that education and income have differential impacts on political participation in many countries. Thus, it is necessary to treat education and income separately when discussing the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation. I will probe how they work differently and distinctively in affecting the level of political activity among association members in the analyses that follow.

Figure 4 is a graph showing incident rate ratios of all educational categories to the reference category among association members for the number of political acts in countries in Group I and Group IV. A reference of “less than high school” is set at 1 on the graph. Each value on the graph indicates an incident rate ratio of each educational category to the reference for the number of political acts. Dotted lines represent incidence rate ratios for Group IV countries while solid lines stand for Group I countries. Among countries in Group I, it appears that incidence rate ratios of all educational categories, with the exception of the highest category in Norway, Finland, and Latvia, are all below 2.00. The difference in political participation between
different educational categories among members is relatively slight in these countries. On the other hand, among countries in Group IV, a line of incidence rate ratios on the graph, with the exception of the Philippines and Portugal, is fluctuating from one to another educational category within countries. It suggests that political participation among members is much affected by educational attainment in these countries.

Figure 4 clearly indicates that the incidence rate ratios of higher educational categories to the reference among members are generally higher in Group IV countries than in Group I countries. For example, members with “high school diploma,” “some college,” and “college graduate or more” compared to “less than high school diploma” in Poland, while holding other variable constant, are expected to have a rate 3.60, 3.42, and 2.69 times higher for the number of political acts. The corresponding numbers for the Australia are 1.02, 1.32, and 1.44. Figure 4 exhibits that the effects of educational attainment on political participation among members are weaker in countries where civic virtue and social trust are developed through associational activities (solid lines) than in countries where such civic resources are not created (dotted lines). Therefore, judged from the remarkable differences in the effects of educational attainment on political participation between two

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11 See Appendix 2 for the example of analysis on Japan.
groups of countries, the results imply that voluntary associations better improve participatory democracy in countries in Group I than in countries in Group IV. The results support my hypothesis that voluntary associations can reduce political inequality depending on their capacity to produce civic virtue and social trust.

The consequences of family income for political equality among members are less convincing compared to those of educational attainment. Furthermore, it comes as a surprise that no differences in the effects of family income between higher quartiles and the lowest quartile are found in almost all countries. The incidence rate ratios are all virtually 1.00, suggesting no difference in the effect of family income on political participation exists in those countries. Though not conspicuous, nevertheless, Figure 5 shows that family income are more influential on political participation among members in countries in Group IV than those in Group I. Specifically, the levels of political activity among association members in Portugal, Poland, Hungary, and Korea are more likely to be shaped by family income than those in other countries on Figure 5. For example, members in the second, the third, and the top in family income in Portugal are 1.16, 1.68, and 3.33 more times likely to participate in politics than those in the lowest income quartile. In Finland, the corresponding numbers are 1.05, 0.83, and 0.91, controlling for the effects of other variables. Thus, the results moderately confirm my prediction that

Fig. 5.—Incidence Rate Ratio of Family Income for the Number of Political Acts among Association Members in Countries at Group I and Group IV
political inequality due to the unequal distribution of income are more likely to be mitigated by voluntary associations in countries where civic virtue and social trust are fostered by associational activities than in countries where they are not.

Figure 6 is a graph displaying incident rate ratios of all higher educational categories to the lowest category among members for the number of political acts in countries in Group II and Group III of Table 5. Dotted lines represent incidence rate ratios for countries in Group II while solid lines stand for countries in Group III. No actual difference in the effect of educational attainment on political participation among members is found between Group II and Group III. Actually, the impact of education in these groups of countries is quite similar with that in Group I countries. The incidence rate ratios of all higher educational categories compared to the lowest category for political acts range from 1.00 to 2.00 with some exceptions such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Ireland.  

When compared to countries in Group IV, however, educational attainment is less likely to affect political participation among members of countries in Group II and III. In general, voluntary associations tend to equalize political influences across socioeconomic lines.

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12 I will not scrutinize the highest incidence rate ratios of all educational categories in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian case will be considered to be an outlier in this paper.
in these countries. Results suggest, therefore, that participatory inequality caused by the difference in educational attainment can be reduced by voluntary associations as long as they can develop either civic virtue or social trust.

As shown in Figure 7, the effects of family income on political participation among members are almost identical with those of educational attainment in countries in Group II and Group III. Compared to countries in Group I and Group IV, however, the patterns of influence by family income differ from those of educational attainment. The incidence rate ratios of higher income quartiles to the bottom quartile among members are higher in Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Taiwan than those in countries in Group I. It suggests that political inequality due to unequal distribution of income is less likely to be mitigated by associational membership in some countries in Group II and III compared to that in countries in Group I. On the other hand, Figure 7 indicates that the effects of family income on political participation are more constrained by associational membership in countries in Group II and Group III compared to countries in Group IV. Therefore, the results reveal that voluntary associations in countries in Group II and III are less likely to facilitate participatory democracy than those in countries where both civic virtue and social trust
are developed through associational activities (Group I) and more likely to do so than those in countries where they are not (Group IV).13

Discussion

In this paper, I hypothesize that political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged can be reduced by voluntary associations depending on their capacity to facilitate civic virtue and social trust. Specifically, the effects of education and income on political participation among members were better constrained in countries where civic virtue and social trust were developed by associational membership compared to those in countries where such civic resources are not.

Though not perfect, the results from the analyses of 36 ISSP countries support my hypothesis that political disparity between the privileged and the disadvantaged will be reduced by voluntary associations depending on their capacity to develop civic virtue and social trust. The results in this paper make us skeptical of what has been practically conventional wisdom that there is always a positive relationship between vigorous associational activity and participatory democracy. Under certain circumstances, associational activities and political equality can be reversely correlated. Accordingly, this paper also questions a longstanding belief in the social sciences that voluntary associations in all contexts function as a school for democracy, a civic organizer, and an agent of political equality (Kim 2011).

To be fair, it should be noted that, in the developed democracies, voluntary associations amplify political influence of those who already have socioeconomic resources because they are able to more effectively associate, which in turn help them accumulate their wealth and power (Hicks and Swank 1992; Skocpol 2004; Wuthnow 2004). As Michael Walzer writes, “it is

13 As mentioned above, this paper exclusively deals with political activity among members. Since the focus is on the role of voluntary associations in achieving participatory equality in 36 different countries, analysis of nonmembers is not considered. Nevertheless, it would be meaningful to briefly compare the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation between members and nonmembers in each country because it also gives us an insight into the relationship between voluntary associations and participatory democracy. According to my own analyses, the incidence rate ratios of socioeconomic resources on political participation among members, with some exceptions, are lower than those among nonmembers in countries in Group I, Group II, and Group III. In contrast, they are higher compared to those among nonmembers in countries in Group IV. Thus, results moderately support my argument that participatory democracy is more likely to be achieved by voluntary associations as they can foster civic resources in the mind of citizens.
a general rule of civil society that its strongest members get stronger. The weaker and poorer members are either unable to organize at all – or they form groups that reflect their weakness and poverty” (Walzer 2002: 39). Archon Fung also points out, “Existing structures of interest groups frequently reinforce material inequality and social exclusion, and so reduce the quality of democratic governance on egalitarian grounds. Even as associations contribute to representative democracy by socializing individuals and teaching them political skills, they may also erode the quality of representation by reinforcing and exacerbating social and material inequalities” (Fung 2003: 530). Among Washington advocacy groups in the United States, businesses and industries enjoy more overrepresentation than any other interest (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). I agree with them. Their criticisms of voluntary associations, however, are not necessarily contradictory with the notion that greater participatory equality may prevail if more people organize themselves and participate in politics. Actually, their criticism explicitly or implicitly acknowledges that participatory democracy may prevail especially among those who belong to voluntary associations because their common membership can mitigate the influence of socioeconomic resources on political participation. Accordingly, findings of this paper may bolster rather than negate their argument in that voluntary associations can contribute to the quality of democratic governance on egalitarian grounds by altering the degree that socioeconomic resources determine political influences.

If most voluntary associations are built and dominated by the privileged, the political participation increased through associational membership will be songs only for “the upper class accent” and ultimately exacerbate the existing political. The political interests of the disadvantaged receive much less associational representation in politics. On the other hand, if a large number of voluntary associations are composed of socially, economically, and attitudinally mixed people or organized by relatively underrepresented minority groups, the story would be reversed. The question is whether we can calculate how disproportionate political activity of members is. How can we determine whether or not political activity of voluntary associations is biased in favor of the privileged in each country in general? Are there absolute criteria? I do not think that they exist. In this sense, the strategy to focus on the extent to which associational membership modifies the effects of socioeconomic resources on political participation at the individual level enable us effectively to show direction and degree of influence that voluntary associations have on participatory democracy. Furthermore, under the lack of
comprehensive data, I think that this is the most realistic way to diagnose the equalizing role of associationalism. Based on these methodological considerations and analysis of survey data at the individual level, as I did in this paper, we will be able to speculate and infer whether participatory democracy is being improved or deteriorated.

Furthermore, this paper does not concern the differential effects of different types or kinds of associations on civic virtue and social trust. This paper only examines differential processes of participatory equalization between members and nonmembers in each country. It can be problematic because the effects of similar voluntary associations on participatory equality may vary from country to country. Therefore, future research should consider the potential variations in the role of the similar voluntary associations to participatory democracy across countries.

Voluntary associations are neither inherently good nor inherently bad for political equality. Rather, their consequences for participatory democracy are actually dependent on their ability to develop civic resources and to drive citizens into political action and vary from country to country. However, it would be a little risky to rely fully on the existence or absence of civic resources to explain the distinctive difference in the role of voluntary associations in improving participatory democracy in all countries. There are always distinctive country-specific causal variables that link associational membership with political equality in each country. The findings presented in this paper can enrich our knowledge about the role of voluntary associations in politics and their sociological consequences in different societies, and will, it is hoped, stimulate further empirical research into the impact of voluntary associations on participatory democracy cross-nationally so that a more accurate view of their role is developed.

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Appendix 1: Coefficients from OLS Regression of Civic Virtue and Social Trust on Associational Membership and Socioeconomic Resources

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Civic Virtue</th>
<th>Social Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associational Membership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Virtue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma</td>
<td>0.47 (0.71)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>2.34 (0.98) **</td>
<td>-0.33 (0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate or More</td>
<td>2.25 (0.80) ***</td>
<td>-0.17 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.38 (0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third quartile</td>
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<td>-0.48 (0.83)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Top quartile</td>
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<td>-0.49 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.12 (1.33)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>1.93 (0.51) ***</td>
<td>2.35 (0.69) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>2.32 (0.67) ***</td>
<td>4.41 (1.05) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 or older</td>
<td>3.95 (0.81) ***</td>
<td>3.10 (1.05) ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Races</td>
<td>2.49 (1.02) **</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.77 (0.43) *</td>
<td>0.68 (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-1.25 (0.50) **</td>
<td>1.10 (0.66) *</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.00 (0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>1.48 (0.65) **</td>
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<td>Civic Virtue</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.95 (0.71)</td>
<td>2.23 (0.92) **</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.55 (0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.06 (0.63)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Living in South (Youngnam)</td>
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<td>-1.04 (0.57) *</td>
</tr>
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<td>Big city</td>
<td>0.98 (0.57) *</td>
<td>0.05 (0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>0.12 (0.62)</td>
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<td>48.99 (1.22)</td>
<td>50.95 (1.20)</td>
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R squared

Number of cases

<table>
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<tr>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1318</td>
<td>1186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1372</td>
<td>1254</td>
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</table>

Note.—SEs in parentheses.

* P<0.1, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01, two-tailed tests.
Appendix 2: Coefficients from the Negative Binomial Regression Models of Political Acts on Socioeconomic Resources by Associational Membership

Japan

<table>
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<th>Socioeconomic Resources</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Non-Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma</td>
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<td>-0.04 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.17) *</td>
</tr>
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<td>Some College</td>
<td>0.48 (0.15) ***</td>
<td>0.06 (0.23)</td>
<td>0.80 (0.21) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate or More</td>
<td>0.39 (0.16) **</td>
<td>0.14 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.23) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second quartile</td>
<td>0.27 (0.14) *</td>
<td>0.14 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.19) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third quartile</td>
<td>0.34 (0.14) **</td>
<td>0.34 (0.20) *</td>
<td>0.30 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quartile</td>
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<td>0.28 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.52 (0.20) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused/Don't know</td>
<td>0.10 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.28)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
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<td>35-54</td>
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<td>-0.07 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.19) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.07 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.22)</td>
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<td>-0.17 (0.14)</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.15)</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominant Religion 1†</td>
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<td>0.23 (0.14) *</td>
<td>0.26 (0.14) *</td>
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<td>Dominant Religion 2</td>
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<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.16)</td>
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<td>-0.16 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Virtue</td>
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<td>0.02 (0.01) **</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td>0.17 (0.06) ***</td>
<td>0.19 (0.09) **</td>
<td>0.15 (0.09) *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Associational Membership                       | 0.41 (0.09) *** |           |             |
### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
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<th>Non-Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-2.96 (0.55)</td>
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<td>Over-dispersion parameter</td>
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<td>0.30 (0.14)</td>
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<td>694</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi-square</td>
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<td>25.36</td>
<td>69.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
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<td>-616.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.**—SEs in parentheses.

* P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001, two-tailed tests.

† Dominant Religion 1: Buddhism