The field of International Relations (IR) is motivated as much by the institutional dynamics of American universities and the internal rewards structure of tenure, promotion, and merit pay, as it is by wider scholarly recognition. This article discusses how the incentives of the U.S. academe influence IR theory and how it imitates the preferences of American foreign policy. Moreover, this article denotes that IR scholarship has abstracted away from the realities of international affairs and it does not speak of, or speak to those in the far away periphery. It concludes by discussing two promising movements: Global IR and Planet Politics. Global IR involves rebuilding the theories of IR by incorporating contributions from the periphery, whereas Planet Politics is a manifesto for rewriting IR as a set of practices based on the concept of Anthropocene by proposing a new ontology that is driven by the dread of planetary extinction.

Keywords knowledge production, core-periphery, International Relations theory, academic survival, productivity and professionalization

Introduction

The field of International Relations (IR) reflects the power-centeredness of the United States and the academic dominance of the American academic institution. After Great Britain passed the baton to the United States in the early twentieth century, the United States has become the dominant actor both in the world of international relations and in the academic study of IR. The United States has been able to devote more resources towards IR research and it has, according to Richard Little, “the necessary critical mass in large numbers of fields” to be at the “cutting edge of research developments” (Friedrichs 2004, preface). Growth of IR theory has mimicked the tilt in balance of power towards the United States and it reflects the broad predilections of U.S. foreign policy.

International Relations theory as it evolved within the American academy constructed its theoretical paradigms such that the periphery did not fit into
its grand narrative and became the feared “other” that needs to be categorized, scrutinized, and theorized. The “other” features into the scholarly narrative only as an object of American security interest and as empirical data, but it does not reflect the needs and concerns of the theorized other. For instance, American IR does not speak of, or speak to the Indian or Chinese audience nor has it internalized their perspectives and problems. Students at Indian universities believe that IR does not speak of them or their national experiences; hence, they feel alienated from IR theories (Gaffar 2015, 72). Peripheral states are not the primary focus of IR because it is too closely aligned either consciously or unconsciously with the foreign policy intentions of the United States or more broadly with the West.

As early as the mid-1970s, scholars began noticing the American dominance of IR theory, and the cause of the underdevelopment of IR was placed on the “political preeminence of the United States” (Hoffmann 1977, 48). However, only now is there a growing self-realization among IR scholars both in the United States and in the non-West that IR is an American dominated discipline. According to a recent survey, nearly 70 percent of the respondents agreed that “IR is a Western/American dominated discipline” and surprisingly 75 percent of the respondents located in the West concurred (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al. 2016, 21). Findings from this survey also support the prevailing view that there is a division of labor in which scholars in the West are theory-builders and the “non-West supplies raw data for theory-testing” (ibid., 22). This pattern of geographic bifurcation is a “simple product of the sheer volume of the American IR scholarship” that reaps the “structural benefits of sheer market size” (Biersteker 2009, 309, 321). There is more of everything: more world-class universities that teach IR, more students studying IR in undergraduate and graduate programs, more libraries, more books and journals, more conferences, and of course more jobs. American IR is also highly insular and its “theoretical constructs, frameworks, and debates are essentially driven” by the national security concerns of the United States (ibid., 321). This scholarly hegemony is a direct reflection of the preponderance of American power, a demonstration of its theoretical primacy, and the linguistic dominance of the English language as the primary mode of scholarly communication.

In this article, I argue that the study of IR is intimately associated with the academic incentives of the American universities and the internal demands of tenure, promotion, merit pay, and broader scholarly recognition. In this system, scholarship is an outcome of survival in the academic labor market, which is driven by the exigencies of the “publish or perish” model (Drezner 2012; Morgan 2010; de Rond and Miller 2005). Scholarship is incentivized so that faculty members are required to be productive, rigorous, and meet the demands of peer review to remain a scholar. One of the byproducts of this academic survival model is scholasticism, which is a “tendency for research to become overspecialized
and ingrown,” and dominated by methodological approaches such as statistical modeling and rational choice approaches (Mead 2010, 453). American IR has become a discipline that speaks to itself for itself and is driven by scientism and quantitative rigor that privileges certain types of methodologies in the search for broad paradigmatic truths (Kristof 2014; Maliniak et al. 2011; Mead 2010; Tickner and Wæver 2009). In this system—although well intentioned—scholars are motivated to discover universal truths that govern all of IR wherever it may be practiced. It is expected that scholars undertake particular types of research driven by models of hypothesis testing and large-N statistical analysis because of the incentives associated with professional advancement (Bauerlein et al. 2010).

International Relations scholarship has abstracted away from the realities of international affairs (Kristoff 2014; Campbell and Desch 2013). A survey of nearly 1,800 IR scholars revealed that nearly 40 percent of them believe that IR scholarship has little direct relevance for decision makers, nor does it impact the broader public debate on foreign policy (Yester 2009). International Relations scholars and their scholarship are not taken seriously because they are characterized as mere salaried employees and “one-dimensional people” who lack the breadth and depth of experience “to give them a sense of the reality of international relations” (Kurth 1998). This expanding gap between the academic and policy making world is a function of academic culture, its reward system, and modes of knowledge production (Lepgold and Nincic 2010, 14). International Relations scholarship is oriented towards technical sophistication, whereas policymakers are interested in finding immediate solutions and answers to pressing problems. The perceptual gap between policymakers and academics is a consequence of the academic culture and its incentive system that skews research more towards abstractedness and methodological sophistication (ibid., 16).

The disciplinary expansion of IR as a social science and the increasing abstraction in an effort to become more scientific and rigorous is one of the reasons for this alienation from the applied world. This article asks the question of whether this type of theoretical research, dispassionate and devoid of social context and meaning, and focused on far-away lands that one rarely visits, really produces any real knowledge or understanding, or are we academicians doomed to consume such knowledge that constrains our ability to think outside the set paradigms that are created in the isolation of the American ivory tower.  

This article is divided into nine sections. The first section examines why IR is still an American social science and as a corollary the second section investigates why there is no credible non-Western IR theory. Specifically, in the first section, the discussion focuses on IR in the United States as an academic enterprise that is carefully organized and deeply influenced by the grand paradigmatic debates. In the next four sections, the primary focus is on the institutionalization of the research process that is driven by scholasticism, the increasing professionalization of the discipline of IR, and an analysis of how scholarship is incentivized. The
The objective is to highlight how the incentives in the center influence scholarship in the core and how it impacts institutions in the periphery, where incentives for scholarly activities, particularly theoretical development, are highly limited. In the two penultimate sections, the focus is on how the periphery is framed as a threat within IR literature and how this contrasts with the way IR is received as a discipline in South Asia, or more specifically India.

The last section briefly discusses the movement towards *Global IR* and *Planet Politics*. *Global IR* involves rebuilding the theories of IR by incorporating contributions of the “non-Western peoples and societies” as expressed in the Presidential address at the International Studies Association meeting in 2015 and elaborated in the subsequent publication of a special issue of the *International Studies Review* (Acharya, Bilgin, and Ling 2016). *Global IR* aims to work with the existing framework, but also seeks to infuse these frameworks with the experiences of peoples, places, and things from the non-West, whereas *Planet Politics* appeals for a complete overhaul of the ontology of IR. The manifesto of *Planet Politics* proposes a new ontology that is driven by the dread of planetary extinction (Burke et al. 2016). *Planet Politics* calls for rewriting and rethinking international relations as a set of practices by drawing on climate science, environmental humanities, and international law (ibid.). It is a proposal for changing the ontological assumptions of IR theory and breaking away from the priorities based on Westphalian sovereignty.

The Still American Social Science of International Relations

The American field of IR theory has defined the discourse on conflict and peace over the last century (Acharya 2014; Walt 2011; Bert 2004; Acharya 2007; Smith 2000; Krippendorff 1987; Holsti 1985; Hoffman 1977). Pre-eminence of the United States in the world of international politics since the early part of the last century has led to the theoretical ascendance of IR as an academic discipline that is centered in large public research universities and among elite private institutions. According to Steve Walt (2011), IR continues to be “an American Social Science” because of the “relative dearth of ‘big thinking’ on global affairs from people outside the trans-Atlantic axis, including continental Europe.” According to Walt (ibid.), “big thinking” refers to “ideas and arguments that immediately trigger debates that cross national boundaries, and become key elements in global conversation.” IR is still viewed as an “American Social Science” because “major powers inevitably spend a lot of time thinking about global affairs and rest of the world pays a lot of attention to what thinkers in the major powers are saying because they worry about what the major powers are going to do” (Walt 2011, 2005).

Undoubtedly resource advantages and scholarly networks are only part
of the explanation; the reason for the American preeminence in IR is because the academic climate in the United States is more conducive to “wide-ranging thought and debate” (Walt 2011). In the periphery, especially non-democracies are unlikely to generate independent thinking because the academic system is closely tied to the state. Walt’s argument, however, misses several of the key contributions made by IR scholars such as Kishore Mahbubani of Singapore, Kanti Bajpai and Raja Mohan from India, and Wang Jisi from China, to name a few. But the point that Walt (ibid.) is making is that American IR is universal in its scope, reflected in its big thinking with a broad range and wide appeal. Regional IR instead is primarily focused on the immediate concerns in its neighborhood. For instance, almost all of Indian IR scholarship remains centered on India’s territorial and strategic conflict with Pakistan and China and its relations with other South Asian countries. However the argument regarding academic freedom rings true, especially in authoritarian states, where social science scholarship exists only to reinforce the state policies and projects, and academics are expected to guide and serve foreign policy thinking (Gaffar 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Tickner and Wæver 2009).

The Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) states that from the very beginning “social sciences and human sciences dealing with ‘national history’ were subject to political and bureaucratic steering” (UNDP 2003, 73–74). In particular, we can see that the “intervention of politics and laws associated with politics… directly and invisibly draw red lines for research in the humanities and social sciences” (ibid., 76). AHDR also points out that strained relations and political friction between Arab and Western states have undoubtedly affected knowledge production in the Arab world (ibid., 75). Furthermore, over-dependence on Western sources, especially on American IR scholarship, has constrained independent “big thinking” by Chinese academicians (Qin 2007). A majority of the books written by American scholars of international relations are translated into Chinese, which subsequently shape how “Chinese approaches” are “mediated via theory as practiced in the English-Speaking, mostly US-dominated Western world of IR” (Hellman 2011, 8).

Indian scholarship is enfeebled by local factors such as a lack of resources, language competency, lack of institutional support, and political infighting. Moreover, the lacuna in “big thinking” is caused by Western IR theory that “has acquired Gramscian hegemony over the epistemological foundations of the disciplinary core of Indian” IR theory (Behera 2007, 342). IR in Asia has adopted the master research narratives and intellectual dispositions developed in the United States (Alagappa 2011, 196). Easily available off-the-shelf theories from the United States have further compounded the resistance or disdain for theory in India (Jaffar 2015; Barsur 2009). Theorizing is viewed as a waste of time, a luxury, and as a vacuous exercise in armchair intellectualism that is not connected to the immediate real world issues and local politics (Jaffar 2015; Bajpai 2005). Indian
students perceive IR as a subject that does not speak to them or of them (Jaffar 2015, 72). Importantly, they are not able to relate to the names, places, locations, and experiences from which IR theory is derived.

Why Is There No Non-Western IR Theory?

A long overdue trend has begun in IR to explore the question: “Why is there no non-Western international relations theory” (Acharya 2014; Shilliam 2011; Tickner and Wæver 2009; Acharya and Buzan 2007; Behera 2007). In “Advancing Global IR” Acharya (2016, 4) proclaims the need to “embrace greater diversity by including and recognizing ‘places, roles, and contributions’ of ‘non-western’ peoples and societies.” The only way IR can overcome the dominance of American theories is by incorporating ideas, concepts, and theories from other parts of the world (ibid., 6). International Relations theories produced in the United States are characterized as universal theories, and they very well might be accepted as such. The problem however is that such theories maybe speaking to the “interest of sustaining the power, prosperity and influence” of the location within which it is produced and it is unlikely that the producers of such knowledge possess the necessary self-awareness to recognize it (Acharya and Buzan 2007, 2; Friedrichs 2004).

There is growing realization that theory “is always for someone and for some purpose,” that all “theories have a perspective,” and that those perspectives “derive from a position in time and space, specifically social political time and space” (Cox 1981, 128). It is important to recognize that “ideas have national origins” and it is important to examine how knowledge is produced and disseminated and how this process “varies across countries and over time” (Campbell and Pedersen 2014, 2). Steve Smith during his Presidential Address to the International Studies Association (ISA) pointed out that:

[the] discipline of International Relations is complicit in the constitution of the world of international relations; I want to claim that there can be no such thing as a value-free, non-normative social science; I want to claim that the ways in which the discipline, our discipline, not their discipline or the U.S. discipline constructs the categories of thought within which we explain the world, helps to reinforce Western, predominantly U.S., practices of statecraft that themselves reflect an underlying set of social forces (Smith 2004, 499).

Importantly, the emerging realization is that there is “no ‘purely’ academic perspective that is isolated and protected from the sway of power” (ibid., 500). The challenge is to break the “monopoly over the construction of theoretical knowledge” that fundamentally “depicts the problem of inequality in both
international relations and International Relations” (Ayoob 2002, 29). This knowledge monopoly faithfully dovetails as to “what forms the legitimate subject of study in IR,” and it determines “who gets to make the rules within which international relations proceeds and who decides how and where to enforce them” (ibid.; Woods 1996, 25). Although scholars of IR are bound by a common interest, “theorizing gravitates around a number of theories ‘made in the U.S.’” (Wæver and Tickner 2009, 1).

Knowledge production in the periphery is automatically drawn to the “made in the U.S.” label because interesting and clever sets of theories are readily available off-the-shelf and easily accessible because of the global reach of the United States. The reach of the American made IR theory is so strong that one could “travel the world making references to IR theory entirely produced by American Scholars” and local audiences would be familiar with the theories and the arguments (Biersteker 2009, 324). American academia, however, is unlikely to have paid any corresponding attention to the languages, discourses, and important theoretical adaptations and insights of what is happening in the periphery (ibid., 324). This deeply rooted logic of core-periphery dynamics boxes-in the scholarship in the periphery and limits its ability to attract the same level of intellectual attention. The “scientific cores are hard-pressed to recognize non-Western or Southern intellectual contributions as equals without undermining their own power, privilege and place in the world knowledge chain” (Tickner 2013).

The knowledge hegemony of the core has an exaggerated impact on the periphery because it suffers from resource constraints, political meddling, and access issues such as “library holdings, physical safety in the street, and weekly working hours, to hurdles related to language, epistemology, and perspective” (Wæver and Tickner 2009, 1). In addition, “social organization influences intellectual patterns: how scholars work, what they are recognized and rewarded for, and what kinds of practices rule the field, are important factor in determining what kinds of scholarship are eventually produced and which, among these, comes to count as superior scholarship” (ibid., 2). This complex interplay of power, knowledge, access, resources, and institutional advantages impact knowledge production and privilege the core over the periphery, and confines the periphery to the knowledge boxes that are external to the social and political realities of the periphery.

Paradigmatic Knowledge Production in the Center

International Relations is typically organized along major theoretical traditions or paradigms; namely realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, feminism, and so on. Various scholars have labeled these paradigms or analytical perspectives
differently; some refer to them as realism, rationalism, neoliberalism, and constructivism while others label them as realism, liberalism, and reflectivism (Kurki and Wight 2007, 24-25). Reflectivism is an encompassing definition used to amalgamate a wide variety of alternative perspectives on IR theory such as post-modernism, feminism, constructivism, Marxism, critical international political economy (IPE), and critical theory. However categorized, the broad contours of theoretical debates in IR theory fall into three fundamental and inescapable paradigmatic boxes of Realism (war, security, and military), Liberalism (trade, finance, and institutions), and normativism (ideas, norms, and identity) (Smith 2000; Walt 1998). Although each paradigm is divided along positivist and non-positivistic lines, there is little ontological, epistemological, and methodological diversity especially amongst scholars falling within the realist or liberalist paradigm. A survey conducted by Maliniak et al. (2011) finds that nearly 90 percent of articles adopted a positivist framework, overwhelmingly employ quantitative methods, and contained abstract theories. “The flight from reality has been so complete that the academics have all but lost sight of what they claim is their object of study” (Shapiro 2005, 2). Substantive debate with American IR has focused on “extolling, in the abstract, the virtues of a specific analytical perspective to the exclusion of others” in which exacting formulations that seek to fit into one of the paradigmatic boxes—realism, liberalism, and normativism—“sacrifice explanatory power in the interest of analytical purity” (Katzenstien and Okawara 2001/02, 154, 167). It is “becoming increasingly difficult for scholars to disabuse their students of the notion that in international relations, paradigmatic clashes are what scholarship should be about rather than the disciplined analysis of empirical puzzles” (ibid., 154). Academicians operating within the American university system are sensitized and socialized into particular ways of organizing their thoughts, framing the arguments, and generating empirical evidence and fitting such evidence into the defined theoretical paradigms. The discipline mirrors the camp structure of societies, and these camps “develop particularistic notions of the international” and they “follow particular personages and texts, often interact minimally with one another, and can be unfamiliar with texts and theories that do not concern them” (Sylvester 2007, 559). Wæver and Tickner (2009, 2) believe that “intellectual structures impact upon social relations: the form of knowledge and especially the dominant conceptions of (social) science and of theory are important elements in the social regulation of scholars.” Conflict and violence in international relations is understood through three grand paradigms—realism, liberalism, and normativism—and its various intramural variants (Biersteker 2009, 310-311). One of the perverse outcomes of viewing the world through the prism of competing paradigms is that data is made to fit theory when reality is incredibly more complex (Katzenstien and Okawara 2001/02, 167). International Relations theories simplify complexity, excise
uncomfortable problems and indicators, and provide a distilled and smoothed out picture of the world. Advancement of knowledge through these paradigms is considered to be a part of the social scientific process. Hence, major arguments within IR are focused on inter-paradigmatic debates such as realist-neorealist, realist-liberalist, neoliberal-neoliberal institutionalism, epistemological debates over positivist versus constructivist, and ontological debates over what should be the unit of analysis. Scholarly journals that devote extensive space to intramural theoretical debates such as *International Security*, a premier journal, have “less space for other articles” (ibid., 154). Because scholarship is only possible through a disciplined approach to writing and developing arguments that grasp the modalities of presenting and communicating information that is comprehensible through certain theoretical prisms and field-wide paradigms, anyone publishing outside the paradigms are likely to have minimal impact on the discipline.

Compounding this issue is the extraordinarily high demand for publications, even among smaller universities and colleges; in particular the demand to place articles in highly regarded journals and submit book manuscripts to university presses have motivated IR scholars to engage in paradigmatic debates and make clever, but modest claims by relying on theoretical models using advanced statistical and game-theory models. The prestige of publications, faculty productivity, and higher visibility also attracts private donors—typically alumni who have achieved a measure of success since graduation—to contribute to their alma mater. The ability of the universities to secure large financial contributions from alumni allows them to build a substantial endowment that provides them greater flexibility in recruiting high quality students, granting financial aid, and providing better infrastructure and facilities.

University administrators “care directly about the size of the endowment” because of the private benefits associated with a large endowment (Brown 2014, 960). Earnings from endowments controlled by the universities allow them to weather the vagaries of market forces, to reduce their dependence on state funding, curb political pressure, protect their rankings, attract quality faculty and students, and channel more resources towards research. Endowments also allow universities more independence from local politics. So the loop of quality and quantity of publications has a direct and consequential impact on the prestige, ranking, and bottom line of the universities.

**Institutionalization of the Research Process**

During his visit to the prestigious University of Cambridge’s Politics department, leading American IR theorist, Steve Walt, while addressing an audience of doctoral candidates, advised them not to “publish journalism or blogs” but “stick with scholarly journals,” to prevent being judged unfavorably “when applying
for academic jobs later on” (Rafaty 2014). Publishing outside of their narrow specialization, going to conferences not related to their area of specialization or engaging in any form of public intellectual activities outside of their particular specializations such as writing in popular presses, penning newspaper and magazine articles, blogging, or tweeting is regarded as un-scholarly, especially early in the career; such activities are often dismissed as pop IR (Kristoff 2014; Straumsheim 2014; Kemp 2008; Tribble 2005).

Public intellectualism is typically regarded as the exclusive domain of established scholars, who have tenure and full professorships and there is little consequence if they were to engage in public intellectualism, as seen by examples of Nobel Prize winning Princeton economist Paul Krugman who writes regularly for the New York Times. To a certain extent contradictory goals of the university and academe clash in this regard; the public relations office at universities prefer to promote high-profile professors as a recruiting tool and generate funds for the endowment, but the staid world of the academe frowns upon public intellectualism and places greater value on rigorous research that advances paradigmatic debates. International Relations scholarship in the United States is exceedingly programmed and driven by institutional exigencies, financial motivations, and personal advancement. In many ways IR has become relatively unconcerned with the immediacy of actually understanding the conflicts that it seeks to study, explain, and solve because it has become more concerned with the gains from the placement of publications and how these publications will impact personal advancement.

War and the grotesque human rights violations in Syria have had little impact on the theories of IR in galvanizing the international community to prevent such atrocities (Llewellyn 2013, 23). By taking refuge itself in the ivory tower, IR has become “extraneous and unable to limit enduring calamities,” and IR theory has lost its “ability to influence policymakers” (ibid., 23). International Relations theory is more preoccupied with intramural debates on realism and liberalism and failed to understand or predict the sudden end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of the bewildering array of competing arguments and endless methodological debates, the academic study of IR has become introverted and inward looking and disconnected from the policy world and practical relevance (Lepgold and Nincic 2001). In a broad survey of the field from 1980 to 2006, Maliniak and his co-authors (2007, 2) show that scholarly works in IR do not offer policy suggestions and even if they did offer policy advice, it did not carry any practical importance and was unlikely to be seriously considered.

Institutionalization of research enterprises shapes the questions and the outcome of the explanations. Studying certain topics that bubble to the surface such as the rise of China, the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or the U.S. policy towards the Middle East from
within the grand-paradigmatic framework receive more credence than obscure topics such as the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, the cultural genocide in Tibet, religious oppression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, the long running civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the various ethnic and civil conflicts that African countries are grappling with. If a newly minted doctoral student is presenting a job-talk on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, then the first question to be thrown at the candidate during Q&A is “why should we care?” This is not to suggest that academics do not care about these countries, but they are more interested in the theoretical contributions that these cases—Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—provide towards addressing the grand-paradigmatic debates. The intrinsic relevance of these countries is less interesting because the focus is primarily on theory development and flushing out the implications of inter-paradigmatic debates (Tickner and Wæver 2009). However, “paradigmatic debates rarely succeed” in producing better theory because such debates are “bitter, repetitive, and inherently inconclusive” and it prevents the search for alternative explanations (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02, 182).

The selection of editors and the choice of peer reviewers for journal manuscripts and research proposals and the composition of major fellowship competition committees are highly politicized (Biersteker 2009, 311). Social scientists play critical gate-keeping roles and “discipline-defining” roles and promote the tendency towards intellectual reproduction (ibid.; Paul 2009; Hoffmann 1977). Placing articles in premier academic outlets facilitates the perpetual game of moving-up in the rankings in which faculty productivity is an important factor (Dearden, Grewal, and Lilien 2014).

Two fundamental requirements for making theoretical claims are expertise and authority, which leads to the question: who is an expert and how does that expert assert their authority? If expertise and authority is based on some type of validation then such validation requires a system of institutional hierarchy that enables such validation for facilitating expertise. Universities serve as centers of hierarchy for such institutional validation of knowledge production (Campbell and Pedersen 2014; Slaughter and Leslie 1999). The sheer number of American higher education institutions, 4,726 as of 2013 (U.S. Department of Education 2013), provides a significant edge in the knowledge market.

Growing Professionalization of IR

Professionalization is understood as a process in which “the academic community of IR scholars has achieved sufficient autonomy from political and economic powers in society to establish purely academic-based internal principles of regulation, so that debate over the truth and/or quality of research becomes the primary format for regulating practices” (Tickner and Wæver
The American Political Science Association (APSA)—which boasts a large number of IR scholars as its members—has overwhelmingly turned into a “tweed guild since 1948” dominated by professional academics (Desch 2013, 25). A byproduct of this professionalization is conference attendance, seminar participation, and workshop organization. The IR field has witnessed a significant increase in the number of submissions each year to the annual International Studies Association Conference (ISA) along with the proliferation of regional and sub-regional conferences and professional associations. The ISA claims 7,000 members worldwide, with “six geographic subdivisions, 29 thematic groups, and 4 Caucuses” (ISA 2016).

The number of paper-submissions for the Annual ISA conference has increased from 5,692 individual paper submissions in 2010 to 8,295 unique individual submissions for the 2015 New Orleans convention, which featured 1,250 panels/roundtables (ISA 2015). Undoubtedly ISA 2015 was a resounding success, but what could explain a sudden explosion in the number of paper submissions? Has the sudden upsurge been caused by a growing interest in the state of world affairs or is it due to the growing push to present papers at conferences as a part of scholarly engagement and the incentives associated with conference travel and presentation? Faculty members in most four-year colleges that award bachelor’s degrees are required to demonstrate that they have an active research agenda. One way of demonstrating scholarship is by presenting a paper in a major disciplinary conference. Although conference presentations do not factor in heavily in the annual assessment, it is definitely required to demonstrate scholarly engagement and learning.8

Conference attendance suggests that professors are engaging in scholarly activity and exchanging the latest trends and developments in the field with colleagues and thereby improving their scholarship and teaching. Despite budget belt-tightening and austerity measures, universities are expected to at least partially support one conference attendance every year. A whole secondary industry has grown with the professionalization of IR; namely journal publishers, major university and private book presses, textbook publishers, software peddlers, newspaper and other assorted pamphlet vendors who congregate in large numbers at conferences to sell their wares. Professors are only eager to score some free stuff and market these products to their students so that they also may profit from this activity.9

Knowledge is produced, packaged, and sold not only for the sake of scholarly propagation, but it also keeps fueling the neoliberal process of commercial production of knowledge (Slaughter and Leslie 1999). This is a “distinctly North American style of knowing” that involves the “conjunction of corporate funding, state support, and the flexible managerial systems of university governance” (Rafael 1994, 41). This process of knowledge commodification involves packaging and selling knowledge as a marketable product; more tangibly it involves the
selling of textbooks, teaching materials, and software packages (Alonso 2010; Muchie and Xing 2006).

Conferences are sites of knowledge dissemination, places to find jobs, venues to showcase talent, secure grants, and a location for meeting granting agencies for funding. These socio-professional interactions occur in the sylvan surroundings of grand hotels located in great cities and in pleasant settings (Sylvester 2007, 560). Professional interactions serve the broader purpose of marketing scholarship. So the question that needs to be asked is why is this scholarship being generated; what purposes do they serve; and for whom is it intended. Much of this scholarship is produced in the context of professionalization within the field of IR that may have unintended professional, intellectual, and policy consequences—a sort of trickle-down effect—but it is not necessarily aimed for the betterment of those it incorporates into its empirical analysis.

Research and Academic Survival: The Push for Increased Scholarly Productivity

Pressure to increase scholarly productivity was most spectacularly revealed in the controversial policy launched by the former Governor of Texas Rick Perry (Mangan 2010). An attempt to quantify faculty productivity was made at the Texas A&M system in 2009 in a report entitled “Texas A&M University System: Academic Financial Data Compilation” ostensibly with the purpose of enhancing faculty productivity (Simon and Banchero 2010). Similarly, Richard F. O’Donnell, Special Advisor to the Board of Regents at the University of Texas, was tasked with authoring a report on faculty productivity. This report—“Higher Education’s Faculty Productivity Gap: The Cost to Students, Parents & Taxpayers”—classified faculty members teaching and researching in public universities in Texas into five categories: “Dodgers, Coasters, Sherpas, Pioneers, or Stars” (O’Donnell 2011). Dodgers and Coasters were rated as the least productive faculty based on their “dollar value of external research funding” and “course load based on credit hours taught.”

The most preferred category of professors in the O’Donnell report were obviously “Pioneers and Stars,” who “are the highly productive research faculty, measured by external research dollars raised,” and “blaze new trails in research, most often in science, technology, engineering and related fields.” The academic stars are the most valued faculty members because they are “highly productive faculty who do a lot of teaching and a lot of funded research.” Sherpas are the contingent or temporary faculty who “do all the heavy lifting on the teaching front and bear a disproportionate part of the teaching load; they are mostly adjuncts or other non-tenured faculty.” A significant conclusion extracted from the O’Donnell report is that more than half of the faculty—mainly Dodgers and
Coasters—from the University of Texas and Texas A&M should be fired (Cahalan 2011). The report made little mention for the need to reduce the dependence on adjunct faculty or increase hiring of more tenure-line faculty. Understandably the publication of this “Faculty Productivity Gap” report and the highly politicized atmosphere in higher education in Texas has ignited a discussion on the role and function of higher education (Jaschik 2011).

Framing the Periphery as a Threat in the IR Discourse

Scholarship produced in interstitial centers such as university centers and think tanks in Washington contribute to the national security goals of the United States. What are the arguments for and against bombing Iran? How to build a proper sanctions regime targeting Iran and North Korea? What weapons are ideal for anti-terror operations in foreign locations? Why is supporting Israel critical for the U.S. Middle East policy? Even broader discussions regarding democracy and development get securitized in which democracy promotion and economic development become diplomatic tools rather than mere theoretical explanations (Aning 2010; Higgott 2004). For instance, the India-Pakistan military conflict is framed as a national security threat to the United States because of the possibility that this conflict could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange and present a threat beyond the region (Hanauer and Chalk 2012). Framing the India-Pakistan conflict as a national security threat to the West makes it “global.” If the conflict remains localized with limited impact for the “West” then such regional conflicts are seen through the prism of humanitarianism such as the ongoing civil war in the Congo (Llewellyn 2013).

Pakistani nuclear weapons were not considered a threat during the Cold War because the United States looked the other way as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network secretly began assembling the Islamic Bomb with Chinese and North Korean assistance and through espionage (Corera 2006). United States tolerated Pakistan’s secret nuclear program because it needed Pakistan’s support to wage a covert warfare against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Crile 2007). Since the mid-eighties, the Indian academic and policy community had persisted in their claims that Pakistan trained terror groups operating in border areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border present a threat not only to India, but they are also a global security threat. However U.S. security policy constructs produced in knowledge centers that fit American national security objectives did not view Pakistan as a threat, but only as an ally with a problem.

After the 9/11 terror attacks, the threat perception shifted overnight and both the academic and policy community in the United States arrived at the assessment that terror groups operating in Afghanistan/Pakistan now represent a “global” threat. Some theoretical “core categories and assumptions about world
politics” are West-centric and it typically understates and misrepresents the “role of what we now call the global south in security relations” (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 330). The growing interest in Pakistani state and society is compelled by the decade long American military campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan which began in October 2001 because of the security threats to the United States and to the “West” from the rest (Zakaria 2009).

Terrorism and nuclear weapons in the hands of the terror groups or unstable Pakistani generals is a “global security” threat, but as long such threats are localized then they are not global, urgent, or relevant (Allison 2005). The global south is invisible to the north, and conflicts that occur over there “are understood under the rubric of “small wars” or asymmetric conflict” and they are treated as being peripheral to the “main action among great powers” (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 330). Similarly southern anti-colonial resistance or national liberation movements are labeled as “terrorism,” and perceived to be less morally acceptable (ibid.). Hence, IR theory is intimately connected with the “needs of the national security state,” which offers nothing more than “weakly theorized, putatively scientific, repetitive rationalizations for U.S. military policies” (Gusterson 2007, 165).

In the U.S. centric security discourse, the term global has become a synonym for us against them. Picking up the cues from their professors, students on American campuses in IR courses rely on the first person plural to discuss international events. They use descriptors such as, “The Persian Gulf War is something we fought”; Terrorist attacks issued toward the United States are aimed at us” (Marks 2002, 26). The reliance on first person plural becomes particularly problematic when students from other countries are present in the classroom (ibid., 30). A visiting professor from Australia, Jamie Miller, teaching World History in the United States, perfectly sums the “we” problem.

My students, however, tended to see things in a relentlessly America-centric fashion. It was a constant challenge in my “Modern World History” class to get students to stop referring to the United States as “we” and “us” and historical government policy as “ours.” (Once I observed this surprising tendency among my students, I noticed that American historians often did likewise in the books I read, especially when commenting on contemporary or recent history.) Students simply had no experience of taking themselves outside the shoes of Americans and viewing historical issues in which the nation was involved from a detached, third-party perspective (Miller 2004).

**Studying IR in the Periphery: The Emblematic Case of India**

Scholarship in the periphery has not demonstrated the ability to box-out the paradigmatic dominance of IR produced in the core because the “construction
of a consensus that context-free knowledge is assumed to be universal and valid across time and space (Shilliam 2011, 13). Another reason for this is because the IR core in the West, or more particularly the United States, is presented as the center of knowledge creation and the periphery has become “the projected ‘other’ through which the disciplinary core is reinforced” (Wæver and Tickner 2009, 1). The sheer volume or the industrial scale of scholarly output coming from the United States is simply unmatched and it naturally dominates the discipline. If one wants to study IR, it is almost de rigueur that scholars from the periphery need to visit the United States, engage with IR scholarship, and seek to publish in American IR journals (Hellman 2011). Canonization of some texts that are “used and re-used in many courses” reminds the students that these “texts are part of a fundamental core” that defines the discipline (Medina 2014, 72). The process of organizing a syllabus is an ontological challenge for a scholar in the periphery who has to balance local issues with concepts from abroad (ibid., 72).

An attempt at fostering alternative non-American or non-western perspectives is gaining some momentum (Acharya 2016; Shillman 2011; Acharya and Buzan 2010). However these alternative modes of inquiry have yet to evolve into a full-fledged intellectual movement with the ability to challenge the overwhelming hegemony of American IR. The objective is not oriented towards nativism, but the aim is to create spaces for alternative ways of conceptualizing the IR problematic outside the bounds of dominant theoretical paradigms (Behera 2010). A singular challenge is that “there is no simple or direct route into non-Western thought understood as a sui generis and transparent archive” (Shilliam 2011, 15). One should not assume that the archive of non-Western thought is “simply waiting to be fully opened, thus revealing a pristine world of discovery” because non-Western thought has always been present “in ways that tend to essentialize and exoticize non-Western culture” (ibid.). Furthermore, it cannot always be “assumed that scholars hailing from outside of the Western academy represent authentic and pristine traditions of non-Western thought” when in fact such thought has already been filtered through “centuries of colonial and imperial relations” (ibid., 16). As in the case of India, which was under British colonial rule for over three centuries, the linguistic influence, political structure, and knowledge construction was mediated through the colonial project; so when the colonialists involuntarily departed, colonial ideas were deployed by Indian intellectuals in the construction of the post-colonial state.

International Relations in India is as much an outcome of the colonial legacy as it is of anti-colonialism and anti-Western thought, which influenced the project of state and nation building. Post-colonial India sought to expand and develop the territorial dimension of the colonial state and reassert its imagined and real glory by drawing on its past. In India, and more broadly in South Asia and other post-colonial states, the study of IR became associated with the project of nation building (Alagappa 2011). Social science knowledge produced in South
Asia is “an accomplice to the project of the state” (Uyangoda 1994). South Asian scholars seem to be exclusively preoccupied with their own national security concerns. Indian IR scholarship is predominantly oriented towards the India-Pakistan conflict and India-China strategic competition. The reverse situation holds in Pakistan where the focus is entirely India centric, largely the military and nuclear threat posed by India. In Sri Lanka, the scholarship was dominated by the long-running ethnic conflict and its political aftermath. International Relations produced within the national-security context of individual states tend to prioritize local concerns, but the localized focus of the peripheral scholarship forces the periphery to box itself in within its geographic boundaries. There is very little space for universal or big picture thinking and the scholarship is empirically oriented and governed by immediate national security concerns.

The state is intricately intertwined with IR scholarship in South Asia because IR departments (almost all social sciences and general sciences) are funded and managed exclusively by the state. South Asian universities primarily focus on undergraduate teaching with the exception of national research universities. Focus on undergraduate education is the primary focus of social science departments. In India, the main centers for IR research are Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), the University of Delhi, and Jamia Millia Islamia University also in Delhi. Similarly, the National Defense University and Quaid-i-Azam University are the key places for IR research in Pakistan and they are located in Islamabad. Social science research in Sri Lanka is concentrated at the Center for Policy Research and Analysis (CERPA), the Institute of Policy Studies, and the University of Colombo (Wickramasinghe 2008). In South Asia, IR scholarship is geographically concentrated in the capital and it is intimately tied to the power structures of the state. This close association with the power centers of the state also demonstrates how the study of IR is uniquely considered a domain of the state because “vital data is lodged within the state,” and the “states are stingy” and only share such data with those it considers central to its purposes (Bajpai 2005, 24).

South Asian IR is hobbled by structural, institutional, and infrastructural issues such as the lack of support for academic research and over-emphasis on teaching, the lack of funding for travel and research, and the lack of a well-knit community of IR scholars. Also, perhaps there is a grudging acceptance that Western IR theory may have gotten it right (Acharya and Buzan 2009; Bajpai and Mallavarapu 2005). The India-Pakistan conflict, the Kashmir issue, the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, the border issues with China along the Himalayan frontier, and the refugee problem with Bangladesh are the main foci. American IR scholarship has moved towards theory building and hypothesis testing, whereas South Asian IR has proceeded in the opposite direction. There is strong resistance to theory, even denigration of theory or studied indifference in the quest to become functional, relevant, and practical (Jaffar 2015; Bajpai 2005,
Indian IR is dominated by descriptive area and relational studies (Alagappa 2011, 215). Theorizing in IR is often dismissed as an elitist armchair intellectual exercise, which does not reflect the urgency and immediacy of policy challenges confronting the state. Only one strand of theorizing has assumed much significance within South Asian IR, which is realism and nuclear strategy with its emphasis on power and the primacy of the state (Chan 2002).

Many scholars have internalized the inability of Indian IR to breakout of the Western modes of thought or theoretical parameters and they are obsessed with relying on Western thought as a critical reference point (Bajpai and Mallavarapu 2005). There is no South Asian IR theory output because of the “uncritical acceptance of Western theory, a lack of confidence to take on Western theorists, and blind deference to scholars from prestigious Western institutions” (Acharya 2007). By definition the discipline of IR is viewed as being atheoretical—not amenable to theorizing—and as something that they could be easily picked up by reading newspapers and magazines. Indian students typically view the study of social science and particularly IR as an “inferior social science” with limited practical applications and job prospects (Bajpai 2005, 28). Only a select number of IR courses are offered as a part of international studies program; besides theory and methods courses are limited and they are “poorly conceived and taught” (Alagappa 2011, 215).

Given the dominance of the United States, which is acutely felt in the field of IR, it becomes almost inescapable that even knowledge generated in the outer periphery and in the conflict-ridden parts of the world have to pay homage to the theoretical output coming out of the American universities. Adding to the dominance of the American thinking is the very high degree of state control of university curriculum and low-value placed on social science research, especially in fields such as IR, anthropology, history, and sociology (Acharya 2010). It is inevitable that social science scholars based in India have to work within the paradigmatic frameworks established by American IR scholars because it is easier to rely on ideas already out there rather than attempt anything independently because there are no incentives for such endeavors (Bajpai 2005).

Post-colonial aversion to foreign involvement was so paramount for India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that he kept foreign agencies away from the Indian academe, especially in the study of IR (ibid.). Indian IR never embarked on a serious critique of the state or its policies and as a consequence this has “completely stifled the scope of its intellectual inquiries” (Behera 2009, 153). Nehru completely “dominated policy-making” and “intellectual analyses of foreign affairs” (ibid., 94). Indian expertise on foreign affairs continues to be concentrated in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and other alternative venues were not developed. Although India has produced diplomats of international stature, it has failed to produce any IR scholars of global repute (Paul 2009, 132). In India, faculty members are not evaluated on the basis of teaching
scores derived from student surveys and “publish or perish” is not a factor (ibid., 135).

One overarching theme that has characterized the expansion of social science research in Sri Lanka since the mid-1980s is the eruption of ethnic conflict that tore apart the state and society until the decisive military operation in 2009 in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers) was destroyed. Ethnicity as a social science category is entirely a derivative of European nation-state construction and it does not fit very nicely into multi-ethnic states such as Sri Lanka. The majoritarian ethnic practices of the Sinhala led government in the post-colonial state accepted the colonial model of “three ethnic identities—Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim—and the four religious identities—Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Islam—that are constantly referred to as historically evolved identity forms” when in fact they were socially constructed (Uyangoda 2001, 77). These sets of ethnic and religious identities were “collectively produced, reproduced through propaganda, surveys, teaching, and research” and they were arbitrarily imposed on Sri Lanka with “little sensitivity to the fact that people do not live their everyday life” based on their ethnic identity” (ibid.).

Naturalization of ethno-religious identity in a post-colonial democratic state increased competition for goods, territory, and positions within the society and this spurred competition between the majority and minority groups, which eventually culminated in the calls for separate sovereignty for the minority Tamils that degenerated into sustained, acute, and brutal violence. Clearly in this case, the adoption of Western social constructs—ethnic and religious identity—in the context of post-colonial majoritarian democratic processes produced policies of exclusivity that produced intense conflict. Violence in Sri Lanka was not the result of spontaneous instances of real or imagined ethno-religious discrimination by the majority against the minority, but the violence was the direct result of identity construction into specific ethno-linguistic groups in a multi-ethnic state experiencing majoritarian democracy. When the majoritarian group—the Sinhalese—attempted to dominate the positions of power, educational leadership, and commerce through discrimination and disenfranchisement of the minority Tamils, it spurred inter-ethnic competition and organized violence.

Once the episodes of violence began increasing in frequency and the local scholarship became exclusively preoccupied with finding the roots of the ethnic conflict—the Sinhala-Tamil divide—and its manifestations (Wickramasinghe 2008; Jeganathan 1998). A consequence of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict was that “intellectually sterile themes” imbued with the “ubiquitous ‘conflict resolution’ rhetoric” dominated the social science discourse in Sri Lanka (Wickramasinghe 2008, 6). In Sri Lanka, donor-driven scholarship and writing focused on narrow issues such “models of political participation” and “peace-building” that stifled innovation and limited the range of local choices by framing issues through concepts developed from the outside (Orjuela 2010). Funding to address the Sri
Lankan civil war was not entirely driven by altruism; rather it was also targeted to stop the flow of refugees into the West (Wickramasinghe 2008). Violent crimes and episodic instances of mass violence are widely prevalent in the Western world, but Africans do not arrive in the Western world offering their expertise to resolve the violence (Smyth 2005, 11). However, the opposite is true in the case of violence in Africa or South Asia. This is because intervention in Africa or South Asia is driven and “shaped by the world order, and by power relations between the nations-of-origin of the outsider and the nation they work in” (ibid.).

Global IR and Planet Politics as Alternatives to Paradigmatic Core-Centric IR

Some regard American scholarly hegemony as entirely legitimate for defensible reasons, and believe that this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon (Mearsheimer 2016, 147). Others argue that IR theory confronts enduring problems and they are universal in scope because they deal with issues such as causes of war, conditions of peace, anarchy, power, state, sovereignty, law and order, governance, institutions, and non-state actors (Ikenberry 2009, 204). These issues are present on a global scale and every country confronts them, but with “differences in orientations and foci” (ibid.). Mearsheimer and Ikenberry, among others, persist in believing that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the state of affairs in IR or the range of issues that it is seeking to address.

Global IR represents an acute realization that scholarly research on IR produced in the United States and other parts deemed as the West are not entirely value-neutral and unbiased (Acharya 2016). There is a certain cost associated with IR theories centered in the core that seek to explain the world. Such theories systematically downplay the influence and impact of scholarship and contributions made by the periphery and it ignores the deep-rooted racism, colonialism, and extraction structures that contributed to the peripheralization of the periphery. Global IR is a call for explicit recognition and inclusion of peoples, places, things, and experiences from the periphery (Hurrell 2016, 149). The answer does not lie in reverting back to narrowly constructed national IR schools, which in fact would be counterproductive. It is a proposal for developing alternative theories of IR that have origins in the periphery (Acharya 2011). The aim of Global IR is to function within the existing frameworks and paradigms by being inclusive, self-aware, and sensitive to contextual knowledge.

The manifesto for transformation of IR outlined in Planet Politics proposes a radical overhaul by completely altering the ontological foundations using the concept of Anthropocene. Authors of Planet Politics contend that IR has failed because it is not able conceptualize and generate useful theories to explain extinction events—climate change, species extinction, and carbon pollution—
confronting the planet. The authors of the *Planet Politics* manifesto argue that the discipline of IR is “organized around a managed anarchy of nation-states” and bound by walls of sovereignty; it is not situated to recognize the sum total of human interaction across the biosphere (Burke et al. 2016, 501). According to them, IR theory has not dealt with the growing ecological pressures and the march towards extinction seriously. The urgent call delivered in *Planet Politics* implores IR scholars to make the Anthropocene the central ontological focus of their research and recognize other living species and ecologies as fundamental to the survival of human habitat. *Planet Politics* is a declaration for transgressing the bounded conversations that happen within IR and engage with wide array of groups both within and outside the academia. The strength of *Planet Politics* lies not only in the sense of urgency it displays in confronting the political economy of extinction, but also in not respecting the core-periphery divisions and the boundedness of sovereignty. *Planet Politics* is also a call for greater inclusivity of other species and ecologies and offers them legal protections. It moves to jolt the ethical framework of IR to be responsive to the high probability of mass extinction. Ultimately *Planet Politics* is truly global in its foundations because it is concerned with planetary health and long-term survivability rather than being focused on narrow territorial conflict and inter-state competition. In every way, *Planet Politics* is a manifesto to overcome the ontological limitations of IR that is tied to the notions of state, sovereignty, and security.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I have sought to show how the institutional structure of American academia and its incentive system shapes knowledge production and its consumption in the core and periphery in IR. Particularly this article has made the argument that IR theories are dispassionate and driven by methodological scholasticism, and are not prepared to address big questions regarding extinction and planetary survival because misplaced incentives are forcing IR to become out of touch with new realities. One reason for this core-periphery separation is the deep theoretical penetration of American IR and its methods everywhere. This American social science of IR is driven by citation counts and dominated by scholasticism. Overwhelming advantages in size, resources, and incentives enjoyed by the West have made it very difficult for the non-West to generate original scholarship and become more than mere objects of study. The number of academic institutions, resource advantages, and academic incentives of merit-based pay, promotion, and tenure, and professionalization have made IR an American social science without any credible non-Western alternatives. Moreover, the rather uncritical acceptance of IR theories produced in the core combined with the disdain for theoretical work has led to the peripheralization
of the periphery. The “increasing reflexivity and a blindness to core-periphery relations” is not because of some lacuna, but that is how the discipline works (Inayatullah 2013). Why some academic trends gain traction while others are abandoned is not a matter of oversight, but it is governed by deliberate decisions (ibid.).

All knowledge is generated within a particular social and academic context, hence the environment and the conditions within which such knowledge is created regulate which trend becomes prominent and which does not. Since theories are always for someone and for some purpose, it has a tendency to alienate the people, places, and things to which it does not speak of (Cox 1981). Global IR speaks to this lacuna in IR theory and it seeks to rebuild the IR theories by incorporating contributions of the “non-Western peoples and societies” and Planet Politics is an appeal for a comprehensive overhaul of the ontology of IR based on the concept of Anthropocene, and plea to account for human activities that is pushing the planet inevitably towards extinction. Both Global IR and Planet Politics are promising trends in IR theory that demand an explicit reconceptualization of IR theories to confront pressing and immediate problems that the world is facing such as the bitter regional conflict in Syria and Yemen, and destructive environmental havoc caused by the carbon pollution of from industrial activities. Planet Politics is a proclamation for confronting the critical challenges facing the human condition in the twenty-first century and an argument for stepping away from notions of state sovereignty, boundaries, and territoriality that has dominated IR theorizing.

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Notes

1. American and British Universities are consistently in the top-25 in the World
University Rankings (Times Higher Education 2016). United States and the United Kingdom also draw the most foreign students (UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2014).

2. According to the 2014 Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey of worldwide IR faculty, “77.26% of scholars concurred that there is a difference between IR” as practiced in the United States and regional IR scholarship (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al., 22). Although this survey did not include participants from Southeast Asia, India, Japan, and China, it could be inferred that this trend is likely to be equally pronounced in these countries. This survey did however include several countries from South America.

3. International Studies Review is the flagship publication of the International Studies Association (ISA) and a recent special edition (2016, Vol. 18, Issue 1) is entirely devoted to exploring the topic of Global IR. The term Global IR seems oxymoronic; is not IR global by definition! Well it is not apparently, which is the starting claim of this project of remaking IR into a global discipline.

4. Although the relative number of advertised faculty positions is still high compared to other countries that house IR departments, the total number of jobs in the field of political science has gradually declined over the past decade (Straumsheim 2013).

5. The United States is considered to be the core and the non-West is made of East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; this is the traditional formulation. But European IR, especially French, Italian, German, and Nordic IR have sought to carve an independent theoretical niche for themselves. The status of English IR is somewhat nebulous with one foot in the United States and the other in continental Europe (Friedrichs 2004).

6. South Asia includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, and now Afghanistan.

7. Job talk is a formal presentation followed by a question-answer session that determines the intellectual caliber and fit of a candidate for the advertised faculty position.

8. In smaller colleges, conference papers are counted towards scholarly advancement and they are appropriately weighted for tenure and promotion.

9. There is a rapidly expanding trend in the American academia in which faculty members are treated as those providing a “consumer service” and students are regarded as “consumers” (Perry 2014).

10. The Board of Regents is the governing body for The University of Texas System and is composed of nine members appointed by the Governor of Texas. However, such appointments are highly politicized and based on a patronage system. More than 60 percent of the appointed regents have made financial contributions to the Governor’s political campaign (Fain 2010).

11. One of the more disturbing trends in American universities is the rapid expansion of the temporary teaching pool that has increased 286 percent (Fruscione 2014; Curtis and Thornton 2014).

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