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Bargain for Exit

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dc.contributor.authorJun, ByoungHeon-
dc.contributor.authorYoon, ChangHo-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-16T05:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-16T05:05:23Z-
dc.date.issued1993-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 6 (No. 2 1993): 115-126en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1015-
dc.description.abstractWe examine an alternate move bargaining model of an exit process in a declining industry. We show that when firms negotiate with each other, the less profitable firm will be merged to be closed down. We find that the size of the firm will affect the division of the surplus created by the merger through cost effects. The smaller firm extracts more surplus than its value under continued operation because it has cost advantage.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectexit processen
dc.subjectSPEen
dc.subjectefficient exiten
dc.titleBargain for Exiten
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor전병헌-
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor윤창호-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.06(2) (Summer 1993)
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