상장회사를 어떻게 규제할 것인가?

Abstract

The draft new Commercial Code contains special rules for governance of listed companies. These rules have been moved from the Securities and Exchange Act that will be abolished with the implementation of the new Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act in early 2009. This Article reviews and comments on the key provisions of the draft bill. This Article takes a structural approach to the regulatory framework for listed companies. The current regime as well as the draft bill does not focus on the inherent differences between closed companies and public (listed) companies. To date, the rules for listed companies have been promulgated whenever ad hoc regulatory needs arose. The outcome was unbalanced and somewhat confused system of today. This Article proposes the legislature to begin with a thorough contemplation on the differences between closed companies and listed companies in terms of investor protection. This Article also criticizes the current discrimination amongst listed companies based on the asset size, and suggests the legislature to focus also upon the number of shareholders. Then, the Article goes on comprehensively discussing such issues as independent director, preemptive right, appraisal right, takeover defensive tactics, stock options, cumulative voting, and shareholder rights. It critically analyses the draft bill from the perspective of investor protection in a globalizing world. It emphasizes the need to perform empirical studies regarding those important issues to secure the legitimacy for special rules of listed companies. Finally, this Article points out the importance of the enabling approach to the regulation of listed companies.