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Equilibrium Inferences from the Choice of Forum

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dc.contributor.authorPark, Juhyun-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-16T05:44:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-16T05:44:51Z-
dc.date.issued1993-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 6 (No. 3 1993): 241-256en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1021-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a signalling model with two audiences. In which the relationship between the sender and one audience is reverse to that of the sender and the other audience. When the sender chooses a forum after observing his type, the receivers make inferences about the sender's type not only from the message but also from the choice of forum; this influences the equilibrium. We present two models and analyze .the equilibrium, which differ in whether the sender can commit the choice of communication or not.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectsignalling modelen
dc.subjectcheap-talken
dc.subjecttwo-audience modelen
dc.titleEquilibrium Inferences from the Choice of Forumen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor박주현-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.06(3) (Fall 1993)
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