법해석에 의한 모호성 제거의 불가능성

Abstract

Since interpretation is essentially creative, the law requires interpretive methods to

achieve coherence and authority. Many theories of legal interpretation have emphasized

text, intention, and purpose. Nevertheless, indeterminate law cannot lead to

one conclusion when it comes to a legal dispute. The indeterminacy of law entails

judicial discretion. The vagueness of law is the fundamental source of legal

indeterminacy. Vagueness is necessary, irreducible, and desirable therefore, the range

of indeterminacy is far-reaching. In addition, vagueness shows that each theory of

legal interpretation does not explicate the practice of law suitably.

First, textualism is mistakenly based on the descriptive theory of meaning. Legal

texts cannot even determine the limit of judicial discretion, because the notion

boundary of possible meanings disregards the problem of high-order vagueness.

Second, although intentionalism highlights the authority of law and democracy, both

of them can be supported without legislative intention. Moreover, legislative intention

is as vague as the text. Lastly, purposivism ignores the fact that law can be

understood without interpretation. Since the law is vague pragmatically as well as

semantically, purpose and context cannot exclude judicial discretion.

However, the methods of interpretation are worth examining. Appeals to them are

not mere ex post rationalizations of judicial decisions. They are indispensable for

understanding law and necessary rules of legal arguments, although they cannot

constrain judicial discretion.