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General Analysis of Horizontal Merger

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dc.contributor.authorOkuguchi, Koji-
dc.contributor.authorYamazaki, Takeshi-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-20-
dc.date.available2009-01-20-
dc.date.issued1994-07-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.7 No.3, pp. 279-290-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/1044-
dc.description.abstractA new method of proof is presented for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium in oligopoly with a merged entity and independent firms. The method is then applied to derive price-enhancing effect of an increase in the number of merged firms. On the basis of the existence proof and stability condition, a sufficient condition is derived for an increase in the number of merged firms to be profitable. This condition is illustrated for a simple case of linear demand and identical quadratic cost functions. Finally, a numerical example is given.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectoligopoly-
dc.subjectquadratic cost function-
dc.subjectCournot oligopoly-
dc.titleGeneral Analysis of Horizontal Merger-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage290-
dc.citation.number3-
dc.citation.pages279-290-
dc.citation.startpage279-
dc.citation.volume7-
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