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Two-Stage Cournot Oligopolies with Industry-wide Externalities

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Authors
Okuguchi, Koji; Yamazaki, Takeshi
Issue Date
1996
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 9 (No. 1 1996): 1-16
Keywords
cournot oligopoly; Cournot-Nash; demand function
Abstract
A two-stage Cournot oligopoly with cost functions involving externalities is formulated. A unique subgame perfect Cournot-Nash Equilibrium is proven to exist under a set of reasonable assumptions. The existence proof consists of solving two fixed-point problems for the industry output. The perfect equilibrium is then compared with one-shot Cournot oligopoly equilibrium. The effects of entry are also analyzed. Our result will be illustrated using linear cost and demand functions.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1073
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.09(1) (Spring 1996)
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