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Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 1996-07
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.9 No.3, pp. 181-190
- Keywords
- bargaining solution ; donor gain ; Kalai-Smorodinsky
- Abstract
- We investigate whether bargaining solutions are immune to the transfer paradox for n-person bargaining problems. We show that two families of bargaining solutions, one generalizing the Nash solution and another generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are immune to the strong transfer paradox requiring the donor gains and the recipient loses. Also, we present examples demonstrating that the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are subject to the weak transfer paradox so that the donor and the recipient could gain together or lose together.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
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