Publications

Detailed Information

Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions

Cited 0 time in Web of Science Cited 0 time in Scopus
Authors

Chun, Youngsub

Issue Date
1996-07
Publisher
Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.9 No.3, pp. 181-190
Keywords
bargaining solutiondonor gainKalai-Smorodinsky
Abstract
We investigate whether bargaining solutions are immune to the transfer paradox for n-person bargaining problems. We show that two families of bargaining solutions, one generalizing the Nash solution and another generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are immune to the strong transfer paradox requiring the donor gains and the recipient loses. Also, we present examples demonstrating that the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are subject to the weak transfer paradox so that the donor and the recipient could gain together or lose together.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1083
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:

Altmetrics

Item View & Download Count

  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Share