SHERP

Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions

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Authors
Chun, Youngsub
Issue Date
1996
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 9 (No. 3 1996): 181-190
Keywords
bargaining solution; donor gain; Kalai-Smorodinsky
Abstract
We investigate whether bargaining solutions are immune to the transfer paradox for n-person bargaining problems. We show that two families of bargaining solutions, one generalizing the Nash solution and another generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are immune to the strong transfer paradox requiring the donor gains and the recipient loses. Also, we present examples demonstrating that the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are subject to the weak transfer paradox so that the donor and the recipient could gain together or lose together.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1083
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.09(3) (Fall 1996)
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