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Transfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutions

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dc.contributor.authorChun, Youngsub-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21T01:12:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-21T01:12:31Z-
dc.date.issued1996-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 9 (No. 3 1996): 181-190en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1083-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether bargaining solutions are immune to the transfer paradox for n-person bargaining problems. We show that two families of bargaining solutions, one generalizing the Nash solution and another generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, are immune to the strong transfer paradox requiring the donor gains and the recipient loses. Also, we present examples demonstrating that the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are subject to the weak transfer paradox so that the donor and the recipient could gain together or lose together.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectbargaining solutionen
dc.subjectdonor gainen
dc.subjectKalai-Smorodinskyen
dc.titleTransfer Paradox and Bargaining Solutionsen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor전영섭-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.09(3) (Fall 1996)
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