SHERP

Collusion, Turnover, and Efficiency Wages in Organization

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Authors
Park, Jinwoo
Issue Date
1997
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 10 (No. 1 1997): 1-30
Keywords
self-enforcing mechanism; incentive scheme; side-transfer
Abstract
Using reputation as a self-enforcing mechanism, a dynamic model with one principal and two agents is developed to analyze the effect of collusion possibility on the structure of organization. The stage game played by the agents has a prisoner's dilemma structure. so that collusion is a dominated action. In a long-term relationship, however, the agents can collude as long as future benefits are sufficient. Without relying on any precommitment for the principal's incentive scheme, we found that costly rotation of the agents (reducing future benefits of collusion) and paying a wage higher than the market-clearing wage are optimal for the principal when monitoring technology is imperfect and the cost of replacing the agents is small. The optimal structure of organization in terms of wages and rotating schemes is also discussed.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1093
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.10(1) (Spring 1997)
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