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A Computational Test for the Existence of a Monotonic Core Payoff Configuration

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dc.contributor.authorSonn, SangYoung-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21T04:25:57Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-21T04:25:57Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 10 (No. 1 1997): 31-40en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1094-
dc.description.abstractThe objects of study In this paper are transferable utility games and prescriptions for such games In the form of an array of outcomes for all coalitions or payoff configurations. We aim to identify a necessary and sufficient condition on games for the existence of a payoff configuration which is a core allocation and also satisfies an equity requirement named population monotonicity. Unlike the conditions found In the previous literature. we identify an 'operational' condition: given a game. its zero-normalization is non-negative and the value of the objective junction in the linear programming problem associated with the game is zero at its solution.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectpayoff configurationen
dc.subjectpopulation monotonicityen
dc.subjectoperational conditionen
dc.titleA Computational Test for the Existence of a Monotonic Core Payoff Configurationen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor손상영-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.10(1) (Spring 1997)
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