SHERP

Preannouncement as a Deterrence in a Model of Safety Regulation

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Authors
Kim, JeongYoo; Koh, DongHee
Issue Date
1997
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 10 (No. 1 1997): 41-56
Keywords
preannouncement; credible message; cheap talk
Abstract
We will examine the role of preannouncement (cheap talk) in a model of safety regulation. It is asserted that if the authority can make a preannouncement, it may transmit credible messages and can induce a more socially desirable level of precaution of the potential injurer even if it is unbinding, because the authority and the agent have some interest in common, that is, to deter accidents.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1095
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.10(1) (Spring 1997)
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