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WTO Settlement of Trade Disputes

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dc.contributor.authorChung, JaeWan-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21T04:51:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-21T04:51:18Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 10 (No. 2 1997): 95-106en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1098-
dc.description.abstractThe settlement of trade disputes between two countries by the World Trade Organization (WTO) is determined by the optimal market shares for both plaintiff and defendant countries. The WTO process for a settlement is quasi-judicial. Given that the process for dispute settlement Is similar to that for the outcome of a chance experiment. I use an analytical framework based on von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions to determine the optimal market shares for both countries In each other's markets. This, In turn, ensures a Pareto optimum. I find that the effects of a retaliatory tariff on the market shares of both countries are dependent upon trade negotiators' attitude toward risk.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectWorld Trade organizationen
dc.subjectWTO processen
dc.subjectNeumann-Morgensternen
dc.titleWTO Settlement of Trade Disputesen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor정재완-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.10(2) (Summer 1997)
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