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Labor Contract, Asymmetric Information and Business Cycles

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dc.contributor.authorShin, Ilsoon-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-21T07:38:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-21T07:38:54Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 10 (No. 3 1997): 237-272en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1106-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, a heterogeneous agent model of workers and employers is developed with differing information structures. In particular, the static implicit contract is introduced into otherwise standard dynamic equilibrium business cycle model by embedding the state-contingent wage-hour outcomes from the labor contract with the firm's capital accumulation decision. With this model, it is discussed whether this model's implications are different from those of standard general equilibrium business cycle model and implicit contract model. Compared to the prototype general equilibrium model, the labor contract feature, especially under asymmetric information, improves the predictions for the relative fluctuation and the correlation between hours and real wages. On the other hand, the dynamic general equilibrium consideration also help to overturn the unsatisfactory features in the previous contract theory.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectheterogeneous agent modelen
dc.subjectbusiness cycle modelen
dc.subjecthours and real wagesen
dc.titleLabor Contract, Asymmetric Information and Business Cyclesen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor신일순-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.10(3) (Fall 1997)
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