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Is Conceptual Analysis Still Sustainable?

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Authors
Han, WooJin
Issue Date
2002
Publisher
서울대학교 철학과
Citation
철학논구 Vol.30, pp.261-284
Abstract
Can conceptual analysis contribute to a physicalistic account of consciousness? Over time, there have been many objections to conceptual analysis, many of which might be due to the Quinean intuition against a priori analysis, and above all because conceptual analysis neglects the consideration of Kripkean possible worlds. David Chalmers(l996) and Frank ]ackson(l994, 1998) proposed a new version of conceptual analysis providing reductive explanation, one that allow어 conceptual analysis to be evaluated by Kripkean possible worlds. Their intention is that if a priori analysis includes the consideration of possible worlds, then it functions like a rigid designator. If a conceptual analysis of consciousness is a kind of rigid designator, consciousness is reduced to the conceptual analysis of it, since the necessary reductive explanation of consciousness by conceptual analysis is gained. Physicalists, for example, must explain consciousness in this way. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether or not the new version of conceptual analysis which Chalmers and Jackson(C&J) proposed is tenable by examining the objections of Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker (B&S) to their views.
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/11828
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Philosophy (철학과)철학논구(Philosophical forum)철학논구(Philosophical forum) 제30집(2002)
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