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Incentive Delegation and Collusion

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Authors
Mukherjee, Arijit
Issue Date
2000
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 13 (No. 1 2000): 21-36
Keywords
incentive delegation; anti-trust law; loss of profits
Abstract
In an infinitely repeated duopoly we show the implications of strategic incentive delegation. Whether incentive delegation makes consumers or producers better-off depends on the nature of competition. We explain that the presence or absence of incentive delegation may affect the interests of the consumers and the producers in a similar way.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1190
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.13(1) (Spring 2000)
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