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Incentive Delegation and Collusion
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Mukherjee, Arijit | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-23T01:41:38Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-01-23T01:41:38Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2000-01 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.13 No.1, pp. 21-36 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1190 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In an infinitely repeated duopoly we show the implications of strategic incentive delegation. Whether incentive delegation makes consumers or producers better-off depends on the nature of competition. We explain that the presence or absence of incentive delegation may affect the interests of the consumers and the producers in a similar way. | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
| dc.subject | incentive delegation | - |
| dc.subject | anti-trust law | - |
| dc.subject | loss of profits | - |
| dc.title | Incentive Delegation and Collusion | - |
| dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
| dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
| dc.citation.endpage | 36 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
| dc.citation.pages | 21-36 | - |
| dc.citation.startpage | 21 | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 13 | - |
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