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The Incentive to Take Care and the Deterrence of a Nuisance Suit
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Wang, GyuHo | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T04:00:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T04:00:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.15 No.1, pp. 55-78 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/1261 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates three important issues in law and economics: the incentive to take care in the presence of nuisance suits, the incentive to bring about a nuisance suit by a plaintiff, and how to resolve a legal dispute. For this, we consider a three-stage game between a plaintiff and a defendant. We identity two types of equilibria one of which prevails, depending on the parameter values. The main results show that: generally the equilibrium level of care differs from the socially optimal care level; nuisance suits are not fully deterred; in some cases, litigation cannot be avoided because of the informational asymmetry. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | incentive to take care | - |
dc.subject | Nuisance suits | - |
dc.subject | Litigation | - |
dc.subject | Informational Asymmetry | - |
dc.title | The Incentive to Take Care and the Deterrence of a Nuisance Suit | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 왕규호 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 78 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 55-78 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 55 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 15 | - |
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