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Source of Moral Motivation

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Authors

김대현

Advisor
김현섭
Major
인문대학 철학과
Issue Date
2016-02
Publisher
서울대학교 대학원
Keywords
Moral JudgmentMotivational InternalismMotivational ExternalismMichael SmithInverted Commas Objection
Description
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 철학과, 2016. 2. 김현섭.
Abstract
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. One, I look to provide an unconventional yet plausible externalist account of the relationship between moral judgment and motivation. Two, in defending my externalist account, I present arguments against its counterpart internalist view. Regarding one, the framework of my position rejects both internalism and the Humean theory of motivation. In other words, I propose that the connection between moral judgment and motivation is intrinsic and contingent at the same time – that is, while the source of moral motivation is internal to moral judgment, it is not necessarily the case that moral judgments will always motivate. Regarding two, I specifically target an internalist account which I believe adequately contrasts to my position: Michael Smiths cognitivist internalist view.
Smith argues that a fully rational agent would desire accordingly to the normative reasons she accepts. Therefore, internalism is true and any agent who acknowledges some normative reason for action yet is not motivated appropriately is in some sense practically irrational. I question the idea that moral judgments are constrained by norms of rationality by providing arguments aimed to show that moral judgments are not subject to requirements of consistency, a key tenet of rational behavior. I further argue that internalist views such as Smiths make the mistake of conflating the action-guiding nature of morality to motivation
that is, what it means for something to be normative and for that something to be motivating.
In asserting my externalist position, I argue that within the deliberative processes of making a moral judgment, there are at least two distinct forms of commitment made understood as judging what is (morally) best and judging to do that which is (morally) best. This distinction between two ways of holding a moral judgment is then elaborated upon to show that it is the latter which is most aptly connected to motivation. Finally, I argue that the operative state within such moral judgments responsible for motivation is a higher degree of commitment by the agent whereby she turns an essential impersonal moral imperative into a personal imperative.
I conclude by addressing an internalist argument against the plausibility of an amoralist known as the inverted commas objection. Smiths version of the objection claims that an amoralist lacks sufficient mastery of moral concepts. I respond by arguing that Smiths account fails to accommodate a certain type of amoralist: one who has recently become that way. Additionally, I supplement my argument by claiming that the inverted commas objection conflicts with the part of our intuition that is influenced primarily by observational evidence.
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/131823
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