SHERP

Observation of Common Retail Cost under Exclusive Dealing

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorHamada, Kojun-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T06:32:28Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T06:32:28Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 18 (No. 1 2005): 1-20en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1329-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines whether the manufacturer should observe the common retail cost when exclusively delegating a retailer to sell her goods. We show that the expected sum of profits between the manufacturer and retailer is greater when the former does not observe the cost ex ante than when they do. However, the manufacturer cannot acquire a greater expected private payoff when not observing the cost, regardless of the optimal contract. Even if the commitment to not observe the cost alleviates competition, the manufacturer must always pay higher information rent than the increasing payoff to the retailer.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectContract theoryen
dc.subjectExclusive dealingen
dc.subjectretail costen
dc.titleObservation of Common Retail Cost under Exclusive Dealingen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.18(1) (Spring 2005)
Files in This Item:
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse