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Majority voting rules with quorums and status-quo bias

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Authors
정혜원
Advisor
주병기
Major
사회과학대학 경제학부
Issue Date
2013-08
Publisher
서울대학교 대학원
Keywords
Majority votingSocial choice theoryQuorumStatus-quoAbstention
Description
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부, 2013. 8. 주병기.
Abstract
In this article, we investigate majority voting rules and majority voting rules with quorums which take no social abstention decision and characterize these voting rules in the framework of May(Econometrica 20:680-684,1952).
Standard voting schemes allow society, confronting two alternatives, to choose abstention (namely social indifference between the two). However, in actual
politics, a resolute decision between the two has to be made. In this regard, we define alternative majority voting rules which take no abstention decision. - we call them "pseudo majority voting rules". Also, in actual politics, to obviate the case where an alternative is elected with very poor support, quorums are sometimes required of standard voting schemes. Regarding the problem of social abstention and quorums, we define "majority voting rules with quorums and status-quo bias" which which are similar to majority voting rules with quorums by Houy(Theory and decision 67(3):295-301, 2009) but which are biased in favor of the status-quo.
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/134598
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Dept. of Economics (경제학부)Theses (Master's Degree_경제학부)
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