Publications

Detailed Information

Information acquisition in common value auction

Cited 0 time in Web of Science Cited 0 time in Scopus
Authors

강두성

Advisor
김진우
Major
사회과학대학 경제학부
Issue Date
2014-02
Publisher
서울대학교 대학원
Keywords
common value auctionInformation acquisition
Description
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부, 2014. 2. 김진우.
Abstract
This paper deals with the information acquisition in a common value auction model. In the simple case of two bidders, we reach the conclusion that the conventionally known statement that the auctioneer's revenue is higher in the case of English auction than in the second price auction at equilibrium after each bidder's optimization is not quite true, but the contrary is correct.
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/134622
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:

Altmetrics

Item View & Download Count

  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Share