Publications
Detailed Information
Coalitional manipulation on hierarchies
Cited 0 time in
Web of Science
Cited 0 time in Scopus
- Authors
- Advisor
- 주병기
- Major
- 사회과학대학 경제학부
- Issue Date
- 2016-08
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 대학원
- Keywords
- Hierarchy ; Revenue sharing ; Allocation problem ; Reallocation-proofness
- Description
- 학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부 경제학전공, 2016. 8. 주병기.
- Abstract
- We consider the problem of allocating revenues that are generated on a hierarchy. We investigate allocation rules that prevent coalitional manipulation by reallocating revenues among agents in a coalition. The formation of a coalition is restricted by the hierarchical structure
coalitional reallocation is feasible when the coalition is connected and includes the boss at the top of the hierarchy. We characterize a family of reallocation-proof rules, which are called generalized transfer rules. Under a generalized transfer rule, each agent takes a fixed fraction of her revenue and pays the rest to her superior. We also offer characterizations of some specific rules in the family.
- Language
- English
- Files in This Item:
- Appears in Collections:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.