SHERP

The Optimal Government Shareholding Strategy and the Cost Structure

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dc.contributor.authorHuang, ChinShu-
dc.contributor.authorLee, JenYao-
dc.contributor.authorChen, ShihShen-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30-
dc.date.available2009-01-30-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics 19 (No. 2 2006): 251-274en
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1354-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes government's optimal shareholding strategy within the framework of the mixed oligopoly. It is found that: (1) When both public and domestic firms have the same cost coefficient, the government's best policy is to adopt the full mixed oligopoly. (2) When the cost coefficient of the public firm is lower than a threshold value, the government should opt for a full mixed-oligopoly policy. However, when the public firm's cost coefficient is higher than the threshold value, the government should privatize the public firm completely and exit the market. The single mixed oligopoly is just an alternative proposal when it fails to transform all of the private firms into mixed ownership enterprises.-
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSeoul Journal of Economicsen
dc.subjectpublic firmen
dc.subjectmixed oligopolyen
dc.subjectPrivatizationen
dc.subjectmixed ownership enterpriseen
dc.titleThe Optimal Government Shareholding Strategy and the Cost Structureen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.19(2) (Summer 2006)
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