SHERP

On the Coincidence of the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus in Queueing Problems

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Authors
Chun, Youngsub; Hokari, Toru
Issue Date
2007
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 20 (No. 2 2007): 223-238
Keywords
Queueing problems; Minimal transfer rule; Nucleolus; Coincidence
Abstract
Given a group of agents to be served in a facility, the
queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve
agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations
they should receive. As shown in Maniquet (2003), the minimal
transfer rule coincides with the Shapley value of the game
obtained by defining the worth of each coalition to be the
minimum total waiting cost incurred by its members under the
assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional
members. Here, we show that it coincides with the nucleolus of
the same game. Thereby, we establish the coincidence of the
Shapley value and the nucleolus for queueing problems. We also
investigate the relations between the minimal transfer rule and
other rules discussed in the literature.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1380
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.20(2) (Summer 2007)
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