SHERP

A Linear Compensation Scheme Resolving Inter-Departmental Conflicts

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Authors
Nam, Ick-Hyun
Issue Date
1998
Publisher
College of Business Administration (경영대학)
Citation
Seoul Journal of Business Volume 4(2):27~54(1998)
Keywords
marketing; operations Interface
Abstract
In this paper, we deal with inter-departmental conflicts such as
marketing-manufacturing conflict We show that the popular
compensahon schemes such as the ones based on each party's own
performance and/or overall performance can not induce the Pareto-
Optimal effort from participants. By making one party's reward
dependent on the other party's performance in addition to its own and
overall performances. we can induce each party to put the Pareto-
Optimal effort. By constructing an appropnate compensation scheme,
we can resolve the conflict between participating departments and
induce optimal amount of cooperatwe effort.
ISSN
1226-9816
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1840
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College of Business Administration/Business School (경영대학/대학원)Dept. of Business Administration (경영학과)Seoul Journal of BusinessSeoul Journal of Business Volume 04, Number 2 (1998)
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