SHERP

A Linear Compensation Scheme Resolving Inter-Departmental Conflicts

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dc.contributor.authorNam, Ick-Hyun-
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-05T03:41:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-03-05T03:41:44Z-
dc.date.issued1998-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Business Volume 4(2):27~54(1998)en
dc.identifier.issn1226-9816-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1840-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we deal with inter-departmental conflicts such as
marketing-manufacturing conflict We show that the popular
compensahon schemes such as the ones based on each party's own
performance and/or overall performance can not induce the Pareto-
Optimal effort from participants. By making one party's reward
dependent on the other party's performance in addition to its own and
overall performances. we can induce each party to put the Pareto-
Optimal effort. By constructing an appropnate compensation scheme,
we can resolve the conflict between participating departments and
induce optimal amount of cooperatwe effort.
en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCollege of Business Administration (경영대학)en
dc.subjectmarketingen
dc.subjectoperations Interfaceen
dc.titleA Linear Compensation Scheme Resolving Inter-Departmental Conflictsen
dc.typeSNU Journalen
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor남익현-
Appears in Collections:
College of Business Administration/Business School (경영대학/대학원)Dept. of Business Administration (경영학과)Seoul Journal of BusinessSeoul Journal of Business Volume 04, Number 2 (1998)
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