S-Space Graduate School of International Studies (국제대학원) Dept. of International Studies (국제학과) 국제지역연구 국제지역연구 vol.02 (1993)
인도네시아 정치발전에 관한 연구 - 이슬람과 군부의 세력경쟁을 중심으로
Islam and Military in Contemporary Indonesian Politics
- Issue Date
- 서울대학교 지역종합연구소
- 지역연구, Vol.02 No.4, pp. 123-176
- Indonesia is one of the biggest Islamic states in the world that consists of Muslims of 88 per cent among its entire population. In tradition, Islamic states have pursued the establishment of the state governed by divine laws so called Syariah on the basis of the union of church and state. Since independence, this politico-religious trend has been also frequently witnessed in Indonesia.
During the Second World War, Japan attempted to politicize Masyumi for her political purpose in Indonesia. As a result, Masyumi emerged as one of the most powerful political parties during the period of parliamentary democracy in Indonesea between 1949 and 1957.
After Indonesian military (ABRI) won the day in a political power struggle against Islamic fundamentalists, they supported Soekarno"s Guided Democracy during the period of 1957 to 1965. During this time, the military strengthened their political power through Dual Function by which they took charge of national defence and public security as well as political roles.
After the coup d’etat of 1965, in an effort to weaken the potential political power of Islamic groups, Soeharto’s military government under ‘Orde Baru’ (New Order) replaced Islamic state ideology with Pancasila ideology which put its main focus on ‘Unity through Diversity.’
Since the middle of the 1980s, Soeharto’s popularity has gradually declined and his unpopularity was reflected in the result of the 6th Indonesian national election held in June, 1992. In consequence, post-Soeharto’s political structure now appears as one of the main issues in Indonesian politics.
Accordingly, it will be interesting to predict several possibilities in post-Soeharto’s Indonesian politics at the end of the 1990s. First, given the fact that Indonesia has been deeply influenced by capitalist economy under Soeharto"s Orde Baru for more than 30 years, the advent of Islamic state has very limited possibility. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Islamic groups including fundamentalists will make strenuous efforts to extend their political power which has been shrunk under Soeharto"s military government. Second, ABRI has been divided into two factions, hard-liners and soft-liners. If Golkar is disorganized, there is a possibility that the two military factions compete for the support of Islamic groups. In this power struggle, considering political changes in Indo-China, and East Timor affair, the military soft-liners might win the day. And they, with conservative Islamic groups, would lead post-Soeharto’s Indonesian politics. Finally, at any rate, one should not underestimate Soeharto’s influence over the future Indonesian politics for his ‘family business.’