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From Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy to War: the 1971 Crisis in South Asia

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Authors
Siddiqui, Asif
Issue Date
1997
Publisher
서울대학교 국제학연구소
Citation
Journal of International and Area Studies, Vol.4 No.1, pp. 73-92
Abstract
This study will try to demarcate the reasons for India and Pakistan shifting from policies of coercive diplomacy and deterrence respectively to one of war. The research puzzle that this essay examines is: Why did two countries that were trying to avoid a war in the early part of 1971 engage in full-scale military hostilities before the year was over? Indirectly, this essay also sheds light on another puzzle: Why did the Pakistani leadership, which perceived that it was unlikely to defeat India in war, launch an attack from its western wing on December 3, 1971? The position taken in this study is that the cost/benefit analysis for each country shifted in fervor of war because of the strategic interaction between the two over the course of 1971.In sum, this essay adds to the body of literature elucidating reasons coercive diplomacy and deterrence can fail.
ISSN
1226-8550
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/45957
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Graduate School of International Studies (국제대학원)Dept. of International Studies (국제학과)Journal of International and Area StudiesJournal of International and Area Studies vol.04 (1997)
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