전략적 상호작용과 남북한 협력의 가능성 - 게임이론적 분석

Abstract

We have witnessed a fundamental change of international political structure in the Far East Asian region. The series of change seemed to bring a new chapter of reconciliation and cooperation for the two Koreas. But unfortunately, the relationship between them has not shown any significant development. It implies that the international political change was not sufficient to guarantee a coordination between the two Koreas. Therefore, this study introduces another plausible element of foreign policy (domestic uncertainty) to explain the current deadlock and to find the conditions of coordination. From the analysis, the current deadlock, either military or economic, was diagnosed as coming from both Koreas" "Military-Oriented" type. I find that it is not easy to derive an economic coordination by a negotiation responder"s shift from a "Military-Oriented" type to an "Economy-Oriented" type in the case of the two Koreas. It is mainly due to the belief system of both states on their strategic interactions. My main results show that getting an "Economy-Oriented" initiator is almost sufficient to achieve an economic coordination in a negotiation between the two Koreas. Considering the gap of economic power between the two Koreas and North Korea"s stagnating economic situation as well as the analysis of the model, I have conjectured that in the future North Korea is very likely to adopt a "Economy-Oriented" type in order to utilize an economic coordination. I have maintained also that the North Korean shift to an "Economy-Oriented" type should come from some domestic change to represent the preference ordering of an "Economy-Oriented" type properly.