러시아의 금융위기와 은행체계의 재편

Abstract

This paper aims to critically review the Russian financial crisis in August 1998 and the reform process in the banking sector from right after the financial collapse to recent period. Two major factors played decisive role in accelerating this crisis. From economic point of view, first of all, the government"s notorious budget deficit and the overvalued exchange rate of the ruble were prevail. In view of political aspect, it is important to note that the government"s economic program actually being implemented in the summer of 1998 had been designed to save from bankruptcy of the Russia"s largest banks.

The Russian banking system, which had been benefited from government"s economic program, especially the program of privatization, the issue of GKO and OFZ and foreign exchange business, were proved unable to adapt to new economic environment.

After the crisis, little progress has been achieved in banking sector reform. The draft of the essential law "On banking system restructuring" has not yet been passed in State Duma, which voted against to allowing the CBR to hold 49% of shares in the Agency for Restructuring of Credit Organizations. The Agency still does not have legal power to interfere in operations of commercial banks. The CBR continues to give credits to troubled banks. Lack of decisive government policy left the banking sector to continue melting away, while absorbing state credit. In the meantime, in many of regions, appeared the "financial separatism" which combined interests both of regional political leaders" and banks".