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A New Perspective on Representational Problems

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Authors
Eliasmith, Chris
Issue Date
2005
Publisher
Institute for Cognitive Science, Seoul National University
Citation
Journal of Cognitive Science, Vol.6 No.2, pp. 97-123
Keywords
representationmeaningphilosophy of neuroscienceneurophilosophyneurosemanticspsychosemanticsphilosophy of mindneural representation
Abstract
I argue that current flaws in the methodology of contemporary
cognitive science, especially neuroscience, have adversely affected
philosophical theorizing about the nature of representation. To highlight
these flaws, I introduce a distinction between adopting the animal’s
perspective and the observer’s perspective when characterizing
representation. I provide a discussion of each and show how the former
has been unduly overlooked by cognitive scientists, including
neuroscientists and philosophers. I also provide a specific neuroscientific
example that demonstrates how adopting the animal’s perspective can
simplify the characterization of the representation relation. Finally, I
suggest that taking this perspective seriously supports in a specific thesis
regarding content determination: the statistical dependence hypothesis.
ISSN
1598-2327
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/70729
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Institute for Cognitive Science (인지과학연구소)Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학작업)Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학작업) vol.06 (2005)
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