Verfassunggebung und Verfassungsänderung in Korea : insbesondere in bezug auf die erste Änderung der Juni-Verfassung

Abstract

The main purpose of constitution making and constitutional amendment in the

constitutional history of modern Korea has been the extension of the president's

term in office. As the new regimes without democratic legitimacy called themselves

according to the ordinal number of republics, so were the names given to

the constitutions in the same way. This practice of naming constitutions has become

seldom with democratization. We can understand the Korean constitutional

history as process of overcoming authoritarian system, so it seems legitimate to

give two democratic constitutions of 1960 and of 1987 special names of

April-Constitution and June-Constitution.

The June-Constitution of 1987 is the first constitution with stability and normative

power, though it was a result of constitutional amendment through the procedure

prescribed in constitution. It seems, therefore, possible that the new constitution

made in the system transition can be seen as constitution making in spite

of the procedural way of constitutional amendment. So long as a new constitution

in the future doesnt destroy the fundamental basis of constitutional democracy it

will be only an amendment of June-Constitution.

The object of the ongoing discussion about the constitutional amendment encompasses

almost all areas of the constitutional law. But the focus and the main political

drive of the discussion lies in the form of government. None of the classical

form of government like presidential, parliamentary and hybrid system can in itself

promise a success. The more important thing is the question, whether the political

culture is mature enough and the governmental form matches the political culture.

Parliament which functions well and is willing to compromise, democratic and stable

party system and the consensus on the form of government belong to the political

culture. It is doubtful, if a constitutional amendment of the governmental

form could strengthen theses preconditions. A model example of the constitutional

amendment without factual constraints was the revision of the Swiss Federal

Constitution of 1999 which came to a conclusion after 34 year long debate.