Publications
Detailed Information
Vertical Integration for Quality Signaling
Cited 0 time in
Web of Science
Cited 0 time in Scopus
- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2010-10
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.23 No.4, pp. 533-567
- Abstract
- In the presence of consumers incomplete information of firms
ability to produce quality components, we analyze firms incentive
to commit to a long-term relationship as a way to convince consumers
about forming a high-type pair. In contrast to the result
of no brand leverage obtained by Choi and Jeon (2007), our analysis
demonstrates that a brand-named firm can restore its leverage
by committing to a long-term relationship. To overcome the time
inconsistency problem in a long-term contract, firms may utilize
vertical integration with relation-specific investment. This signaling
motivation for vertical integration is different from the explanations
that currently exist.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
- Files in This Item:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.