S-Space College of Education (사범대학) Center for Educational Research (교육종합연구원) 교육연구와 실천 Journal of the College of Education (師大論叢) vol.15/16 (1977)
道德敎育의 認知的 接近은 과연 견지될 수 있는가
Viability of the Cognitive Approach to Moral Education
- Issue Date
- 서울대학교 사범대학
- 사대논총, Vol.16, pp. 33-46
- There is a notion fairly wide-spread among those concerned in moral education as well .as among the lay people that moral education is not so much about ‘knowing’ as about ‘doing’. Morality as a school subject is generally regarded as consisting of ‘doing’ in contrast with science, for instance, which consists of ‘knowing’ . This notion needs to be carefully examined before we arrive at an adequate definition of the nature and purpose of moral education. Particularly, the examination, in this paper, is directed toward answering whether or not the ‘cognitive approach’ to moral education is viable. In relation to the logical status of morality or ‘moral knowledge’ with regard to knowing and doing, the analyses so far have leaned heavily on the distinction, initially drawn by Ryle (1949), between ‘knowing-that’ and ‘knowing-how’. An examination of the analyses by Hartland-Swann (1956) and by Roland (1961) shows that a fundamental ambiguity remains in the concept of morality with regard to knowing and doing. The ambiguity is reflected in the proposals for moral education suggested by Scheffler (1960) and Archambault (1963). It is asserted, in this paper, that the recent trend of curriculum theory as represented by Bruner (1960) shows a good promise to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the teaching of morality as a school subject. In this trend, science as a school subject is defined not as topics but as a mode of operatioη or, to use a somewhat awkward expression, as ‘sciencing’. This interpretation, moreover, seems to be more faithful to the Ryle's original ‘distinction, which intimated that the useful distinction is not between ‘knowing-how’ (doing) and ‘knowing-that’ (knowing), but between intelligent and unintelligent knowing, regardless of ‘how’ and ‘that’. In line with this interpretation, the purpose of moral education can be defined as enabling the ‘intelligent moraling’ of the students. Accordingly, it seems to be of paramount importance in moral education to find out what constitutes the ‘intelligent moraling’. The results, it is hoped, will show that we will have to talk more about ‘knowing’ the morality and less about ‘doing’ the morality in moral education.