Publications
Detailed Information
Institutional Investment Horizons and CEO Compensation
Cited 0 time in
Web of Science
Cited 0 time in Scopus
- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2011-06
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Business, Vol.17 No.1, pp. 93-136
- Keywords
- Ownership ; Institutional investors ; Investment horizons ; CEO compensation
- Abstract
- I investigate the relation between the structure of CEO compensation and
the investment horizons of a firms institutional investors and find results
consistent with the assertion that short-sighted institutions focus on shortterm
earnings leads firms to grant more options with higher sensitivity to
stock price. In contrast, the percentage holdings of long-term investors are
negatively correlated with the use of options and the sensitivity of total CEO
equity incentives to changes in stock price. Further results suggest that
firms with higher short-term institutional ownership are more concerned
about a negative earnings surprise and that when determining annual
bonuses, they punish their CEOs more severely. In total, the analyses
provide evidence that the investment horizon of institutional investors is
associated with firms CEO compensation policies.
- ISSN
- 1226-9816
- Language
- English
- Files in This Item:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.