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A Refutation of Smiths Objection to Externalism
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2012
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 철학과
- Citation
- 철학논구, Vol.40, pp. 113-128
- Abstract
- There are two views of the relationship between moral judgment and motivation. First of all, internalism argues that the relationship between moral judgment and motivation is internal and necessary. They insists that it is a conceptual truth that if an agent judges that it is right to x in certain circumstances C, then that person is
motivated to x in C, at least absent of a weakness of will. Externalism, on the other hand, contends that the relationship
between moral judgment and motivation is external and contingent. The motivation to do x does not directly follow the judgment that
doing x is right. Thus, the externalist argues that there is a person who judges that doing x is right but is not motivated to do x
although he does not have a weakness of will. This type of person is an amoralist. The existence of amoralist is why some object to
internalism.
- Language
- English
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