Publications

Detailed Information

State and Wage Policy: Implications for Corporatism

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorSong, Ho Keun-
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-06T07:18:37Z-
dc.date.available2014-01-06T07:18:37Z-
dc.date.created1996-
dc.date.issued1996-12-
dc.identifier.citationKorea Journal of Population and Development, Vol.25 No.2, pp. 269-286-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/85272-
dc.description.abstractFocusing on the change in state wage policy and conflicts surrounding wage negotiation, this paper addresses three questions; first, what are principles of former state wage policy and how does the ultra elitist agreement differ from the previous wag!? policy?; second, why did organized labor tolerate wage concession through the 'ultra elitist agreement' which entirely excluded worker participation?; third and finally, what kind of customs and rules are observed in workplace wage negotiation? The analysis of survey data reveals that under the restriction of enterprise unionism, wage negotiation at workplaces has developed rules and customs that actually surpass firms boundaries. The negotiation result of reference firms is aken as the most decisive index in wage negotiation. Without state intervention, it is likely that these rules would be institutional foundation for 'sectoral corporatism.'-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherPopulation and Development Studies Center, Seoul National University-
dc.titleState and Wage Policy: Implications for Corporatism-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitleKorea Journal of Population and Development-
dc.citation.endpage286-
dc.citation.number2-
dc.citation.pages269-286-
dc.citation.startpage269-
dc.citation.volume25-
Appears in Collections:
Files in This Item:

Altmetrics

Item View & Download Count

  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Share