SHERP

Socialist Egalitarianism and the Agency Problem in China's Economic Reform

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Authors
Lee, Keun; Mark, Shelley
Issue Date
1989
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 2 (No. 4 1989): 383-402
Keywords
Chinese worker; dual collusion; two tiered incentive systems
Abstract
This paper analyzes empirical consequences of inter-firm egalitarianism in the implementation of the profit retention and bonus payment systems in China's economic reform since 1978. It is shown that due to the emergence of hierarchical collusion among the local state organs, the manager, and the worker, retained profits and bonuses per worker became more or less levelled across firms. As a result, final firm and worker benefits were very weakly related to actual firm performance.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/883
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.02(4) (Winter 1989)
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