미국의 로비 제도 도입에 대한 이론적, 경험적 연구

Abstract

This paper aims at critically examining on the introduction of the American lobbying system into Korea. Theoretically, the lobby system has produced inequality in political power which places priority in organized interest groups such as business and labor. Importation of the lobby system to Korea would only act to expand inequality of power, when one considers the political access channel is severely inclined towards the social and economic power group. In the empirical context, it would be premature to introduce the lobbying system. The related groups and citizens have not yet received information, therefore there can not be public consensus or academic arguments. Viewed from the institutional context, the American lobbying system has been complementarily cooperated with PAC and Washington Representatives. Another aspects which must be take into accounts is our emotional attitudes which regard interest groups and lobbyists as selfish actors or vicious brokers. We can not expect the lobby system could firmly settle down in Korea. Given the aforementioned aspects, introduction of the American lobbying system must take into consideration our political, structural context and the more macro, long term perspectives.