SHERP

A Sorting cum Learning Model with a Moral Hazard Problem

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Authors
Cho, Joonmo; Nakibullah, Ashraf
Issue Date
1991
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 4 (No. 4 1991): 257-268
Keywords
Guash and Weiss; insurance models
Abstract
This paper investigates the existence of competitive equilibrium of an information game under the following circumstances: 1) A continuum of test qualities exists where each firm is able to choose one test. Firms offer contracts which are wage/test quality pairs, and they treat contracts of other firms as given. 2) The tests have two kinds of roles. First, as a productivity enhancing device, the tests enhance workers' productivity. Second, as a sorting device, the tests divide workers into those who pass and those who fail. However, tests have a moral hazard problem as a sorting device because workers may choose hidden actions to enhance their test scores. Under the above circumstances, distinctive features of the condition for the nonexistence of the competitive equilibrium are noticed: If a primary purpose of testing workers is to enhance workers' productivity, then the competitive equilibrium of the information game exists. However, if a primary purpose of testing workers is to sort out workers and the tests have a moral hazard problem, the competitive equilibrium does not exist.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/938
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.04(4) (Winter 1991)
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