Publications
Detailed Information
Entry in a Network Industry with a Capacity-Then-Production Choice
Cited 0 time in
Web of Science
Cited 0 time in Scopus
- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2016-08-07
- Citation
- Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.29 No.3, pp. 411-429
- Keywords
- Network externalities ; Entry ; Deterrence ; Capacity choice ; Monopoly ; Duopoly
- Abstract
- This study investigates the effect of consumption externalities on entry decision in network industries. A non-monotonic relation exists in the monopoly/duopoly profit differential. A monopolist which has to pay a cost to maintain his dominant position, such as a license fee or lobby expenditures, can block more easily entry for a wide range of network externalities unless these externalities are not exceedingly intense. Therefore, network externalities work as an innocent barrier to entry. The capacity choice of the incumbent in a capacity-then-production model reinforces the innocent entry barrier effect for the potential entrant.
- ISSN
- 1225-0279
- Language
- English
- Files in This Item:
Item View & Download Count
Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.