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Wonder, Time, and Idealization

— On the Greek Beginning of Philosophy —

Klaus Held*

Today the spirit of science is extending itself over the entire globe. Technology, the most significant result of that scientific spirit, has brought about an incomparable improvement of the quality of life enjoyed by advanced industrial societies. It has, however, also produced the environmental problems that have made obvious to everyone the deep crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a historical crisis, it is prudent to consider the beginnings of the development that led to such a crisis, for only in light of its beginning can what the crisis truly consists of be seen. Therefore, contemporary philosophy is presented with the urgent task of making present the beginning of science — its emergence with the Greeks — and of thinking through this beginning critically. At its inception, science was still one with philosophy. On the emergence of the philosophical-scientific spirit, the Greeks themselves offer a relevant formulation. Namely, in Plato's *Theaetetus* (155c-d) and in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (982b11 ff.). Both classical thinkers claim that wonder, *thaumázēin*, motivated the emergence of this spirit.

The capacity to wonder or to be astonished is from the first observable in all humans and even in children. But in the way that

* 독일 Wuppertal대

wonder was experienced by the Greeks at their thinking's outset, this "feeling," this "mood," or this "attunement" took on a particular form. That form first placed its mark upon European culture with the Greeks and it affects all human life today through the "globalization" of the scientific spirit. Thus, a philosophical consideration of the origin of this spirit must begin with the question of how Greek *thaumazein* distinguishes itself from the possibilities of wonder and amazement that are proper to humans in general. Philosophers have, until now, passed over this simple question, although it has long been common to hold up *thaumazein* as the motivation for the emergence of philosophical thinking.

This question may be characterized as genuinely phenomenological insofar as phenomenology has, since its founding by Edmund Husserl, given itself the task of analyzing the entire wealth of human experience and has not limited itself to the realm of sensation. Martin Heidegger, in his lecture course during the Winter Semester of 1937/38, first posed the phenomenological question of how the philosophical experience of wonder distinguishes itself from the general human experience of wonder. This course was then published under the title "Grundfragen der Philosophie" as Volume 45 of Heidegger's collected works. I would like first, following Heidegger's lead, to undertake a description of philosophical wonder. Thereby, a second task will present itself, the task of describing the manner of experiencing time upon which this wonder is based. In doing so, I will attend specifically to Plato's discussion thereof. In the third and final section of my considerations here, I would like to illustrate how "idealization" follows from wonder and the accordant experience of time, "idealization" being that mental operation which, according to Husserl, has determined the consequent development of European

culture in its scientific character from Plato and Aristotle up to the contemporary crisis mentioned earlier.

I

Plato and Aristotle understand the particularity of philosophical wonder in that it makes it possible for humans to arrive at questions that lead to *aporias* and then to answer such questions. Wonder itself, therefore, does not possess any especially great significance for them. It is nothing more than a *pathos*, a “suffering” to be overcome, one that constitutes the incentive to advance towards the scientific resolution of certain *aporias*. The disquiet that arises through these *aporias* motivates scientific curiosity, after the satisfaction of which the feeling of wonder itself would rightly vanish. Philosophers up to today have, to a large extent, adhered to this traditional understanding of *thaumazein*, but in doing so they neglect a simple, prior question: How is it that, in the condition of philosophical wonder *itself*, it resolves curiosity's thirst for knowledge? What is properly philosophical in philosophical wonder?

Heidegger poses this very question in the lecture course mentioned earlier. He observes that the previous interpretation of *thaumázein* is followed, as it were, by the movement stemming from this *pathos*, namely, curiosity's movement in striving for knowledge, which is motivated by wonder. This movement drives philosophy from its very outset away from the attunement of wonder. Against this, it is the phenomenologist's task not to allow him or herself to be carried away by this movement, but to concentrate, following Husserl's famous maxim, on the “Sache selbst” or on “the thing itself.” This thing

itself is, in the present case, the philosophical experience of wonder. The first step in the consideration of the beginning of philosophy must take the form of a descriptive lingering within the *pathos* of wonder.

In his lecture course, Heidegger shows how the philosophical attunement of *thaumazein* distinguishes itself from those forms of being astonished or wondering about something, which are well known to us from pre-philosophical life and which are present in all cultures. These forms of wonder can be divided into three primary types: the astonishment at something surprisingly new, the admiration of an exceptional human being and the marveling at something great or elevated. In all three cases, wondering itself has the character of being sparked by something uncommon, unfamiliar, something that calls forth the attention of the wondering individual. This attention directs itself at something particular, which stands in contrast to a familiar background and which deviates from the self-evidence of the familiar. Thereby, the familiar, the background itself, is indeed somehow implicitly conscious for the wondering individual, but it is not as such attended to or thematized. It is in play, but only in a concealed manner. That wonder which awakens philosophy radically distinguishes itself on precisely this point, for it concerns the background of the familiar itself. This previously self-evident and concealed background itself steps now to the fore and appears as what is utterly non-self-evident and unfamiliar.

In order to understand the emergence of philosophy, we must describe with as much precision as possible the relationship that holds between the occurrences that were conspicuous before this emergence and their background. I intend the concept of "occurrence" here to be understood very broadly. It can refer to a thing, a subject matter, a

person, an event, an institution, a thought or anything with which we concern ourselves in our speech and in our activity. That we can understand the occurrences that present themselves to us at all is explained by the fact that they arise in a context with other occurrences. By way of the meaning it has for me, every occurrence refers to other occurrences, which are not of a merely arbitrary sort, and these occurrences then, for their part, refer me to certain additional occurrences. Thus, through such referential complexes, a circumference of possible experiences is outlined, which encompasses each occurrence. The appropriate designation for such a circumference is the term "horizon," since the original Greek term from which this term stems referred to the circumscribing outline of our visual field.

Because occurrences refer not only to other occurrences within the same horizon but also to other horizons, there is a complex of meaningful references wherein any and all horizons belong. This "universal horizon," thus understood, is the "world." Indeed, this usage of the concept of "world" accords with our everyday language. In everyday speech we use this word first and foremost not as a term for the whole of all beings, but rather with 'world' we understand the encompassing play-space in which we orient ourselves in our every comportment. Through the indirect influence of Husserl, it has become common to understand "world" in this sense as "life-world." The life-world is the absolutely encompassing whole that draws itself around all individual occurrences. This whole is present for us only as a background, which normally does not attract our attention. It does not constitute what Husserl calls a *Thema* or a "topic" for us, as do the individual occurrences that arise out of or in front of this background. Rather, the background remains for us "unthematized" and, in this sense, hidden.

Phenomenologically, we are able to make a fundamental distinction with respect to this experience. On the one hand, there are the activities within which each respective occurrence appears to us. As subjects, we have the power to execute certain activities or fail to do so. They are the possibilities that stand at our disposal in our comportment. These activities, as subjective possibilities, stand over against that which confronts us respectively in a certain correlation to them as the objective content of our experience. Openly employing Husserl's terminology, one could term the moments of subjective activity "noetic," while one could term "noematic" the correlative moments of content that confront one objectively. The life-world, as the encompassing unthematized background of our comportment, is indeed not an object, but it belongs in a certain sense on the side of the objective content for it constitutes the play-space for the appearing of manifold occurrences. This play-space, without having been made into an object, is constantly there for us insofar as we are always following in our comportment some meaningful references signaled through horizons.

On the other hand, in order for this to happen, the references, that is, these "transitions" from a certain occurrence, towards which my comportment is presently directed, to other occurrences, to which I could turn, must be constantly there as self-evident possibilities. This can only be the case insofar as we have these possibilities *as familiar* simultaneously in our possession, so to speak. Thus, such familiarities or, to employ a more phenomenologically expressive term, habitualities, constitute, as Husserl formulates it, the subjective side, to which the horizons as the play-spaces for the objective content correspond. We can orient and move ourselves about in certain horizons with an unthematized self-evidence only because these

horizons are anchored in subjective familiarities. And thus, the encompassing whole of the life-world as horizational is the correlate to the familiarity-character of our comportment, it is the whole context of the familiar. This whole can only serve as the self-evident hidden background for our comportment because it is familiar.

With this it becomes clear that it must be the world, as that which is to this extent familiar, which loses its self-evidence in philosophical wonder. Through *thaumazein*, the world steps forth out of its hiddenness and becomes, under names such as *kosmos* or *physis*, a subject for philosophy at its outset. However, something surprising occurs here. The references, which constitute the horizon of the life-world, are known to us, as mentioned earlier, as possibilities for our own comportment. That is, expressed in Husserl's language, they are "Vermöglichkeiten," or enabling possibilities. If, through philosophical wonder, there occurs a radical break with the characteristic familiarity of the life-world and if, thus, the world becomes wholly non-self-evident, this entails for us a disrupting, overturning experience. The world comes loose from its anchoring in our subjective condition, within which it was able to wholly retain its unthematized self-evidence. It confronts us then as something that recoils from our subjective possibilities and, thereby, explodes the correlation between the familiarity of the human subject and the world as universal horizon. The world shows itself in *thaumazein* as something that is "more" or "other" than a mere correlate of our familiarity. But, when concretely observed, what is this experience through which the world, so to speak, detaches itself from our subjective possibilities?

II

As a familiar referential complex, the world is the correlate of these possibilities. Every reference passes over from one actual, realized, subjective possibility to possibilities that, in the moment when the reference occurs, indeed are not yet realized, but which could be realized in a present that remains in the future. Every referential possibility can become a familiarity because it is fully self-evident for us that we have at all times the ability to extend our experience by following some line of reference. It is self-evident that we can pass on from an engagement with one given occurrence that is actually confronting us to an engagement with certain other occurrences.

In life-worldly experience, it is already a possibility that any given referential context can break off. That is, any one of the occurrences, which we had counted on to become present on the basis of a certain reference, can fail to become present. This happens again and again in our comportment and can, therefore, also be anticipated and expected as a possibility. We cannot, however, anticipate that the referring to further subjective possibilities itself and, thereby, that the becoming present of respective occurrences as such will cease to occur. We trust implicitly, therefore, that the future present of possible occurrences, which is anticipated in our subjective possibilities, will in every case become the actual present for at least one of these occurrences. This fundamental trust of everyday life in the life-world explains why the world appears to us with unthematized self-evidence as a referential context that cannot itself

cease to be.¹⁾

If the world is experienced in philosophical wonder as something that recoils from the subjective possibilities of human beings, then that means that, within the referential context, the passing from an actual, experienced occurrence to another occurrence, that is, from the expected to the actual present, loses its self-evidence. And with this it is implied that philosophical *thaumazein* is a peculiar shock to the trust in the continued existence of the world. This trust is based neither on theoretical knowledge nor on proofs, but rather it can be said to give us life in the form of a ground-laying attunement or mood, which pervades our everyday life. Therefore, the shock experienced with respect to this trust can only be "emotional," can only occur as an attunement and is, then, a matter of the *pathos* of *thaumazein*.

Because everyday life is borne by the trust in the becoming present of subjective possibilities, the continual passage of time into a new present appears normal. That is, if relative to a certain subjective possibility, the passing on into the present does not occur, the remaining withheld of this present is judged according to the normal movement of becoming present and it appears accordingly as an abstaining or lacking of that which can be expected. It appears as a

1) This, it may be remarked in passing, may well be the reason for the incapacity of the ancients to think the absolute end of the world. Characteristically, even Thomas Aquinas, although bound as a Christian to believe in the end of the world, saw himself nevertheless as unable to set aside the ancient conviction in the eternity of the world. The possibility of the unrestricted negation of the existence of the world with Descartes is nothing but a methodical thought experiment, which cannot at all be verified in a philosophically reflective experience.

privation. In the attunement of philosophical wonder, we are fallen upon by the terror that it is in principle unknown whether any of the expected futures within our subjective possibilities will become present at all. Thereby, the self-evident expectation of the present loses its meaning as what is normal. From the perspective of this everyday expectation, time owes it to human beings, so to speak, to make good presently on their expectations and, if it withholds what was expected, this has in principle the character of an exception. This relation between the normal and the exceptional case is turned on its head by the shock of *thaumazein*. What appeared in the attunement of everyday life as the exception, the remaining withheld of the new present, becomes the ruling element in the attunement of wonder. Every factual instance of an occurrence's becoming present appears as an astonishing granting of the un-expectable.

The ground-laying everyday attunement, in which we trust in our referential possibilities and, thereby, have possession of, so to speak, the world as self-evident, unthematized and familiar, depends on the fact that we do not allow the reversal of this attuned situation to arise, through which becoming present appears as the granting of the unexpected. This reversal is the explicit experience of mortality. The shock of this experience is something philosophy has in common with many religions. In everyday attunement, time is experienced as the passing of the future into the present. The experience of mortality in the attunement of philosophical wonder acts as a shock to the trust in the arriving of the present. This, however, is only possible insofar as the arriving receives another goal, so to speak. For, an "arriving" can be meaningfully spoken of here, only if it concerns a passing of the temporal dimension of the future into another temporal dimension. If the present is ruled out as this temporal dimension, there remains

only the past. In the shock of philosophical wonder, the experience of time is transformed: out of time as the passing from the future to the present. out of the time of unbroken pre-philosophical familiarity, there arises philosophically experienced time, time as the passing of the future into the past.

These reflections receive a startling confirmation in that Plato, the forefather of the classical philosophical tradition, puts into words precisely this philosophical experience of time. This occurs in the later dialogue, the *Timaeus*, in the very first philosophical “definition” of time. There, Plato describes time as an image of *aiōn*, of eternity, and this image is said to be “moving” (37 d 5). Time is the fundamental ordering element of the sensible world created by the divine Demiurge, the occurrences within which, according to the radical formulation of the *Timaeus*, cannot be said “to be,” but rather only “to become” (27 d 5/6). According to this, only the character of becoming, of movement, can be conferred upon time as a component of the sensible world. Being remains reserved for eternity, the way of existing for the realm of Ideas.

Becoming means running through a multiplicity of phases. Therefore, Plato, in the same definition of time, says of eternity that it “persists” “in one,” that is, in a singularity that excludes multiplicity (37 d 6). Aristotle decided, against his teacher, on awarding being to time, in that he defines time in the *Physics* (219 b 2) as something that *is*. It *is* “the number, *arithmos*, of movement, *kinesis*, according to the earlier and the later.” The number that can be discovered in the phases of a movement is itself unmoved. The Aristotelian definition of time contains the determination “earlier and later” because the succession of nows countable in the successive phases of a movement is ordered by the fact that every now lies

earlier or later in relation to all other past or approaching nows. In their being one after the other, the nows constitute the “time” of any given verb, here intended in its technical, grammatical sense, which is expressed in German as the *Zeitstufe* or “stage of time.”

Modern grammar distinguishes “aspects” from “stages of time.” Aspects are mental “looks,” which can present time as happening. Thus, they are ways that the “flow of time” shows itself to our experience. The two fundamental looks, fundamental because assumed in all possible aspects of time, are that of “arriving” and “passing.” Plato was the first to write of the aspects of time. The word “aspect,” which stems from Latin, is nothing other than a translation of the word *eidos*, which Plato uses in the sentence that follows the definition discussed earlier when he says that the *eidē*, the looks of time, are the “it was” Greek *ἦν* and the “it will be” Greek *ἔσται* (37 c 3).

Although Plato distinguishes these looks in the same sentence from the “parts (*mere*) of time,” that is the “stages of time,” with which we associate the countable sites of the sequence of nows, the traditional interpretation of Plato's thought has overlooked this distinction. It has been assumed without discussion that the “it was” and the “it will be,” of which Plato here writes, name the stages of time, past and future.²⁾ The “it was” and the “it will be” do indeed stand in a relation to these stages of time. But they name not these stages themselves, rather they express these in their emergence, their coming to be. The “it was” names the happening of time as a sliding

2) This serious imprecision of interpretation was first uncovered by the German philosopher Gernot Böhme in his investigation “Zeit und Zahl. Studien zur Zeittheorie bei Platon, Aristoteles, Leibniz und Kant,” Frankfurt a.M. 1974.

away into the past and the "it will be" names the same happening as an arriving out of the future.

In the sentences that follow the definition of time, Plato explicitly denies that what is named with the phrase "it is" belongs among the aspects of time. In distinction to the looks "it was" and "it will be," the "it is" names the look of the "present." Eternity consists of nothing other than the present of the "persisting in one." Thus, eternity offers us also a look, an *eidōs*. This is the present of the eternal, the Ideas brought to words in the "it is," for which Plato can use the word *eidōs* in addition to *idea*, *eidōs* being closely related to *idea* in the history of the language. The one present-look of the Ideas stands in contrast to the becoming of the time of the sensible world, which shows itself in two complementary looks.

With the exclusion of the *eidōs* of the present from time, Plato becomes a speaker of the philosophical experience of time, that is, of the experience of time arising from the shock of *thaumazein*. He, thereby, contradicts the pre-philosophical, familiar understanding of time as it is expressed a bit later by Aristotle in his definition. According to this everyday understanding, time shows up in that we can say "now." Time is in the closest way bound up with the present, which is precisely what Plato denies to time. However, Plato also remains untrue to the philosophical attunement of *thaumazein*. He excludes the present as a look of time but he admits it as a look of the paradigm of time, eternity. He thereby evades the experience of a radical loss of the present, by way of which philosophical wonder shocks the self-evident and characteristic familiarity of humans' relation to the world.

On the one hand, Plato still stands very near the beginning of philosophy in *thaumazein*. On the other, however, he exposes himself

to the movement of curiosity's striving for knowledge mentioned earlier, through which philosophical thinking retreats from the attunement of wonder. For the phenomenological consideration of the beginning of philosophy, which is aimed at remaining with its "thing," its subject matter, that is, aimed at lingering with the attunement of the beginning, everything depends on understanding the movement that begins from this attunement. This movement shows itself in Plato especially clearly when he elevates the present, which he does not grant to time, to the way of being unique to the Ideas. With this event, a process begins that ruled in growing measure over philosophy and science from that point on, a process that Husserl, in his last work, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, in 1936, referred to as "idealization." Scientific curiosity is first completely satisfied only through idealization. Plato's assumption of the Ideas and their way of being, eternity, is the "original idealization," which inspired all further idealization processes in the history of metaphysics.

III

What is to be understood, in Husserl's sense, by 'idealization' shows itself in contrast to the praxis of everyday life. All occurrences in the life-world to which we are related in our comportment are ordered according to types, which vary by culture or individual. The features typical for any occurrence can come to appearance in life-worldly praxis such that an optimum state appears to have been attained. We can, however, have the opposite impression as well. That we fluctuate in this way in our impressions about the life-worldly occurrences assumes a tendency towards the optimum state that is

effective throughout our whole comportment. A characteristic example of this tendency is the production of an object, which entails a certain striving towards perfection. A carpenter who makes a piece of furniture of the type "round table" is satisfied only if the finished object has arrived at a state in which the features typical for it — for example the round shape of the tabletop — come fully to appearance. In this optimum state, the praxis of production is fulfilled.

To remain with the example of the tabletop, the optimum state is considered to be achieved only if, in life-worldly praxis under living intuition, it should appear to us as that which — according to the type of the table — it should be. Namely, it should appear as round. Such intuition is proper to fulfilling the optimizing tendency of life-worldly praxis. But something else belongs to it as well. The tabletop achieves its optimum state, if it appears to be in a round condition to the extent that is required in the life-worldly use of the table. Human beings, who gather around the table at mealtimes, are not interested in an exact, mathematically defined circular form, but on the degree of roundness that corresponds to the respective practical demands of the situation. Thus, the fulfilling of the optimizing tendency of a life-worldly praxis always holds itself within the limit of the typical ways of appearing that intuitively satisfy the respective interests. The intention of passing beyond such ways of appearing is not proper to normal life-worldly praxis.

However, we have with all optimal states the ability to mentally allow the processes of perfection leading up to these states to run on to infinity and, thus, to extend beyond the normal life-worldly fulfillment. For example, in the case of the tabletop, this means that we can think of a process, at the end of which we arrive at a perfectly round, circular line and, thus, at the mathematical circle. We

can only, however, assume that we are in a position to arrive at such an end in that we act as though we had completely, in Husserl's words, "run through" the optimization process, despite its infinite character. On the basis of this fictional assumption we accomplish the optimal states that we cannot reach in the realm of living intuition. The optimum state is now a *limes* that lays in the endless beyond with respect to that which is intuitable, the limit value of an optimization process that extends itself endlessly. The optimum state, thus understood, is something merely thought and that means something "ideal" in the Husserlian sense.

The act of "idealizing" consists of our making something "ideal," in this sense, our object and that we integrate this object that transcends the realm of intuitive fulfillment into the normal life-worldly praxis dependent on intuition. We operate with the mentally manufactured optimum state as if it existed in a kind of intuitability similar to the real optimum states achievable within life-worldly praxis. The consciousness of the distinction between these is lost. A new, unique possibility of comportment comes about that we practice as if it were not different from the familiar possibilities of comportment prior to idealization.

The normal optimal states achievable within the realm of the intuitable appear weak in comparison with those won through idealization because they are surpassed by these towards an infinite. And if both kinds of optimum state appear as objects of the same kind in praxis, this can only lead to the weak, normal, optimal states being suppressed from life-worldly consciousness by the strong, optimal states of idealization. In this way, the products of idealization become self-evident, covering over and covering up the original life-worldly self-evident optimal states. They function, thus, as a

“cloak of ideas” (“Ideenkleid”), to use Husserl’s metaphor. This is the crisis of our age, which Husserl describes in his late work as the forgetfulness of the life-world. He himself was able to see idealization primarily in the mental operations within the realm of science. However, the modern “cloak of ideas” woven within the process of idealization covers over all regions of life, including those that Husserl did not indicate explicitly as fields of idealization, such as ethos, economy and religion. I am not able to approach these issues, however, in the context of this lecture.

If we understand, then, the enormity of the concept of “idealization,” we can wager the thesis that the whole of modern life depends upon idealization. Idealization prepared itself already at the very beginning of philosophical-scientific thinking with the Greeks, and the path-breaking step in that preparation was Plato’s assumption of the Ideas and of their way of being, *aion*, eternity. When Husserl speaks of idealization, he understands the stem of this term, “idea,” in the modern sense of “representation,” as an object of consciousness. Idealization is an operation of our consciousness, which produces through the construction of limits a “cloak of ideas.” But that very modern concept of “idea” itself points back to the original philosophical usage of this word with Plato.

The idea is, according to Plato’s own understanding, the diametrical opposite of a representation constructed by us. For, as the truly existing determinacy, which, in modern terms, makes possible and directs *a priori* all our representing, it cannot itself be a product of our consciousness. The very fact that the round tabletop can, for example, in our sensory experience appear *as* round assumes, according to Plato, the *a priori*, mental perception of pure roundness and, thus, assumes a geometrical idea. For him, the deviations from

roundness are recognizable *as* deviations only given the assumption of an original paradigm of roundness. But the earlier-mentioned phenomenological concept of the typical makes the Platonic assumption unnecessary. The knowledge of the deviation from roundness assumes, in fact, a directing representation of roundness, but this representation need not be a Platonic Idea. It can, rather, belong to the features of a familiar type of round form originating from what is familiar in the life-world.

The Platonic Ideas are produced by a philosophical thinking in which the life-worldly appearing of the typical features of certain occurrences, which is characterized by a spectrum ranging from lesser to more, is carried through to its end by the processes of idealization. The original operation of this kind is, however, the assumption of the abiding presence of the *aiôn* as the way of being of the Ideas. This assumption depends namely on the fact that we act as if we had “run through” an infinite process of fulfillment. Time, as it is experienced in philosophical wonder, is marked through the complementarity of the aspects of arriving and passing away and, thus, through the happening of the going over from future into past. Because the arriving never ends in a resting present but, rather, has inevitably a passing away as a counterpart, the referring of occurrences to one another as it is experienced in the horizon of the life-world has no end. It constitutes, as Husserl says, an endless “and-so-forth.”

The original idealization with Plato consists of his thinking this arriving as something “having been run through.” It consists of his thinking as “having been run through” the going over of the future into the past, which itself never reaches the fulfillment of taking up a resting present that transcends time. The motivation for this evasion before the shock of philosophical wonder, however, lies within that

very attunement itself. If the world becomes in itself simply unfamiliar and non-self-evident, then it surely shows itself thereby as something that extends out over our subjective referential possibilities. But even in the world's withdrawing itself from these possibilities in the experience of wonder, it confronts our subjective referential consciousness from a distance and, precisely in doing so, becomes thematized as such. The world steps forth into appearance for the first time *as* world. That is, as the other over against our horizontal consciousness. But through this confrontation we enter into, so to speak, the power possessed by this consciousness and, thereby, the possibility emerges to allow it to have the chance to come to its own in its full range.

Because it is the fundamental character of horizontal consciousness to allow itself always to refer and extend further and, thus, to tend towards the infinite, we grant to this power the greatest measure of freedom when we allow it the possibility of directing itself explicitly into the infinite. This occurs, however, in the processes of idealization. The attunement of *thaumazein* is precisely marked by the world's being experienced there in another way than in the form of the infinity of being-further-referenced. However, at the same time, the philosophical experience of time, which opens up this novel access to the world, makes humans conscious of that infinity insofar as the coming-to-rest in the present is denied to the arriving out of the future. Thereby, the philosophical experience leads the philosophical-scientific thinking that begins with wonder unavoidably into the temptation to want to become lord over that infinity through idealization-operations and, thus, to evade the shock of this very experience of time.

Only idealization, that production of a "cloak of ideas" which

covers over the life-world, satisfies the scientific curiosity concerning the infinity of the world as a whole. It has then as a consequence, on the one hand, the crisis in the health of our whole contemporary life, which was diagnosed by Husserl as the forgetfulness of the life-world. On the other hand, it has made possible thereby the historical progress of the sciences that Husserl, by no accident, terms "European" in the title of his last work. In fact, idealization has awarded European culture the scientific form that distinguishes it from all other advanced cultures. With today's globalization, this very form extends itself through the adoption of the means of improving the quality of life, for which we have the technical achievements in the wake of science to thank. But this form also extends itself over the earth as the counterpart of these improvements, the forgetfulness of the life-world. In medicine, every good form of therapy assumes a diagnosis and every diagnosis assumes a thorough-going recollection. For the healing of globalized humanity from life-world forgetfulness, philosophy cannot offer a form of therapy. It can, however, serve the diagnosis through a historical recollection, which traces the first beginnings of the present crisis and analyzes them in their peculiarity. It was in the hopes of contributing to that project that I undertook the previous reflections.